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Abstract 
It is the contention of this thesis that individual privacy is so important that it 
deserves to be protected by law against incursion by the photojournalism 
industry. That is not to say, however, that this thesis advocates the creation of 
any nebulous right to privacy that is enforceable against the press. This thesis 
challenges the view of those who argue that the term privacy itself may be 
defined with sufficient precision to formulate discrete and unambiguous 
legislation. A preferable approach, it is argued is for the legislature to recognise 
the more specific forms of behavioural tort committed by the photojournalism 
industry. In particular, detailed examination of the existing common law and 
legislation and its likely scope for development reveals that parasitic claims 
under pre-existing torts fail to compensate one for the distant photographer who 
utilises a long lens camera to spy only for a transient or irregular period of time. 
A tort prohibiting an individual from observing, monitoring, or recording the 
activities of another without consent where he knows or ought to know the other 
has a justifiable expectation of seclusion would still prove a valuable addition 
therefore to our laws. The publication of such photographs and the personal 
information they reveal about an individual's lifestyle and relationships also give 
cause for concern. Nevertheless, an expanding equitable doctrine of breach of 
confidence and the potential influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 upon the 
interpretation of the Data Protection Act 1998 make this a less pressing concern 
in view of an efficient self-regulatory system. Should the Human Rights Act fail 
to have the effect prophesied, the author recommends that only then should the 
further consideration be given to enshrining the Press Complaints Commission 
code of practice relating to the publication of such photographs in statutory law. 
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The subject of this thesis, as the title suggests, is that of privacy and modem photojournalism. 
During the twentieth century, the methods used by press or freelance photojournalists to obtain 
photographs which illustrate stories in newspapers have been subjected to increasingly vehement 
criticism. ' An omnipresent tension exists between newspapers that compete for readership and 
those individuals who are the subject of their stories. Controversially, neither the press nor the 
wider private sector to which they belong is subject to any directly enforceable duty to respect an 
individual's privacy. Instead, the victim of such intrusion must rely on an incomplete jigsaw of 
disparate laws, which afford cumulative if fragmented protection for privacy. 2 This thesis 
therefore, seeks to evaluate those laws and to assess the practical feasibility of relying upon a 
claim under an existing action in order to obtain compensation for intrusion by either 
photojournalists or newspapers. In so doing, a conclusion is sought as to whether such individuals 
might benefit from the enactment of an all-embracing right to enjoy privacy or alternatively 
additional torts, which protect specific aspects of individual privacy. In order to answer these 
fundamental questions, which form the recurrent underlying themes of this thesis, one must also 
resolve a number of related composite queries. These include the following: 
Consideration of whether legal intervention to protect privacy' from incursions by 
photojournalists or newspapers represents a realistic and achievable goal 
Analysis of the objectives of existing laws and legal doctrines to determine the extent to which 
they are synonymous with that of compensating individuals who have suffered unreasonable 
intrusion at the hands of the press 
An evaluation of the impact of the European Convention right to respect for one's private life 
upon domestic laws and its likely effect in the future 
Having ascertained whether legislation is needed, to determine if it is needed, the best form that 
legislation should take together with the likely obstacles faced by a judiciary entrusted with its 
interpretation 
Why research Photojournalism and the law? 
1 Even over a century ago, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis prophetically warned that 
"Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of 
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction 
what is whispered in the closet will be proclaimed from the house-tops". See article entitled "The 
Right to Privacy" (1890) 4(5) Harv. L. R. 193,196 
i 
Having outlined precisely the subject of this research and the issues worthy of examination, it is 
important to discuss why the subject of photojournalism and the law merits research at all. 
Several governmental committees have convened over the past decade solely to examine rising 
discontent with media respect for privacy but the issue seems far from conclusively resolved as 
calls for new laws continue unabated. In particular, it is the behaviour of freelance 
photojournalists and newspapers that seem to have rekindled the smouldering flames of debate 
most frequently over the past decade. 3 As such this subject deserves research, particularly as 
intrusive photojournalism at its worse may have dramatic or even tragic effects upon the lives of 
its victims. For example, the fatal road accident to which the late Princess of Wales fell victim 
after a high-speed chase involving freelance photojournalists. Furthermore, the rapid growth of 
huge multi-national media corporations of which newspapers form a constituent have served to 
underline the issue of whether individuals are adequately protected against any abuse of that 
power. 
Defining privacy and what the law ought to protect: narrow duties or broad rights? 
A specific tort or right of privacy enforceable against either the press or indeed the private sector 
is conspicuous in its absence from English law. The most frequently cited reason for this state of 
affairs is said to lie in the deep-rooted divisions between academics as to what it is the law ought 
to protect in order to uphold an individual's privacy. The objective of this chapter is to draw a 
normative conclusion as to what it is the law ought to protect individuals against. Once we have 
identified what it is the law ought to protect, we can then test the hypothesis that existing laws 
adequately protect personal privacy from intrusive photojournalism, albeit indirectly. 4 We must 
begin by "asking what privacy is, and [then] proceed to question to what extent the law protects 
if '. 5 It will be demonstrated that while privacy may indeed be an imprecise term for the purposes 
of a workable legal definition, 6 the development of more specific privacy-related torts represents 
an achievable goal. 7 It is argued within this chapter that while the term `privacy' itself cannot be 
2 See Paragraph 1-23, p19, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (1995,17`h Ed, Sweet & Maxwell) 
3 Notable examples of which include "Queens orders cameramen to stay away" [1996] Cover, 
The Times, Aug 17; "Diana's pain over photos" (1997) Cover, Daily Express, Aug 8. References 
to the contemporary phenomenon of the paparazzi are frequent. 
` An argument which this thesis sets out to disprove. See Richard Norton-Taylor, "Gagging 
orders, `abuse of power"' (1997) 5 The Guardian, Nov 3 
See Ruth Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 421,460 
6 See Paragraph 3.4, p9, Privacy and Media Intrusion - The Government's Response (1995) 
Cm. 2918. 
See Paragraph 12.12, p48, Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (1990) 
Cm. 1102; Paragraphs 7.33 & 7.42, p56-57, Review of Press Self-Regulation (1993) Cm. 2135; 
Paragraph 47, National Heritage Committee's Fourth Report on Privacy and Media Intrusion 
HC(1992/93) 294-I 
2 
narrowly defined, it is possible to devise two fundamental torts in relation to photojournalist 
intrusion. 
Can privacy be defined for the purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of existing laws? 
The Younger Committee convened in 1972 to consider whether legislation was warranted to 
provide individual privacy with greater protection from the private sector, including amongst 
others, the press. 8 
The Committee observed that individual expectations of privacy "differ so widely from one 
individual to another and from one category to the next that it has not been found easy to fit the 
concept tidily into a single legal framework". 9 Since then, philosophers, sociologists, and lawyers 
alike have embarked on an ongoing quest to define the legitimate parameters afforded to privacy. 
As W. A. Parent observes, "It is of crucial importance if we are to present a conception of privacy 
that will lend itself to ready application by the courts". 10 This ongoing academic debate has 
spawned several claims that a core element common to all privacy-based claims may be isolated, 
through which the boundaries of a discrete legal principle might be identified. 
Dignity and Personality 
The first of these claims that merits discussion is that of American theorist, Edward Bloustein, 
who holds that a loss of dignity is sustained by an individual whenever his or her privacy is 
infringed. " This loss of dignity manifests itself as the consequences of an individual's inability to 
determine the degree of familiarity others enjoy with him or her. 12 That individual's self-respect 
is wounded by the notion that his or her privacy is somehow less respected than that of others. 13 
Were a photojournalist to take a picture of an individual through a bedroom window, his 
behaviour is found objectionable in that "his [subject's] status as a person is called into 
question' . 
14 Unfortunately, Bloustein's dignity theory is of little use in clarifying where the 
$ See Paragraph 1, p1, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. Hereafter referred 
to as the `Younger Committee' after its principal chairman. 
9 Ibid, Paragraphs 13 and 37, Ch. 2. 
10 See W. A. Parent, "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law" (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 
305,306 
11 See Edward Bloustein, "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser" 
(1964) 39 NYULR 962,1000 See also Etienne Picard who also considers that "Privacy, whatever 
its varying manifestations, directly derives from this notion of human dignity, which makes it a 
fundamental right", at p73, Ch. 3, Basil Markesinis, Protecting Privacy (1999, Oxford University 
Press) 
12 See p40, Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In from the Cold: national security and 
parliamentary sovereignty (1994, Oxford); David Feldman, "Secrecy, Autonomy or Dignity? 
Views of Privacy as a civil liberty" (1994) 47(2) C. L. P. 41,55 
13 Stanley Benn for example, suggests that privacy is ground in respect for persons. See "Privacy, 
Freedom and Respect for Persons" (1971) XIII Nomos 1,8-9 
14 See Robert Post, "The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort" (1989) 77 California Law Review 957,970 
boundary lies between privacy and other torts, particularly those such as assault" or even libel 
where false statements by newspapers may equally injure one's self-respect. 16 The difficulty in 
identifying privacy's nucleic elements lies in the fact that the concept shares many of its defining 
characteristics such as a loss of dignity with other torts. Were we to accept without qualification 
that loss of dignity represents an unerring indicator that privacy has been infringed, we would 
face the alarming prospect of privacy `colonising' other torts such as libel to produce confusing 
hybrids such as the American `false light' tort. 17 In their consultation paper, the Lord 
Chancellor's department describes privacy as "an interest of the human personality. It 
protects ... the 
individual's dignity and integrity". 18 References to privacy as a right to personality 
are equally treacherous, much for the same reason. Personality is a similarly broad term which 
embraces the peculiar traits and behavioural patterns that distinguish us from others, including 
name, likeness, physical appearance and even manner of speech. Raz comments that the 
antithesis of privacy, freedom of expression is also an important constituent of personality which 
"lies at the heart of.. . 
humanity, it is a requirement of personhood or rationality". 19 Indeed, 
personality is perceived by others partly in the way we are seen to express ourselves. The 
appropriation or commercial exploitation of personality does not necessarily involve the violation 
of individual privacy. Indeed, particular individuals are usually targeted because their distinctive 
image or personality already enjoys a place in the public consciousness capable of benefiting a 
given product or service through association. The wrong is not so much a loss of privacy but a 
combination of unjust enrichment, reduction in potential future licensing revenue and the loss of 
control over a valuable marketing tool in one's personality. 20 Accordingly, descriptions of 
privacy as an inviolate right to personality should be treated with equal caution to claims that 
dignity is central to privacy. In other jurisdictions such as Germany, circumscribing the growth of 
a privacy right against the press and private sector has proved difficult. Here, the German right to 
personality" has grown to encompass appropriation of one's name and likeness for commercial 
is Assault being the direct application or threatened application of physical force to the person. 
16 See Robert Post, "The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and the Self in the Common 
Law Tort" (1989) 77 California Law Review 957,962-964; Jack Hirshleifer, "Privacy: Its 
Origins and Future" (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 649,657 
" See William Prosser, "Privacy" (1960) 48(3) California Law Review 383,398-401 who argues 
that the false light tort usurps the role of libel and protects reputation more than privacy, 
bolstering cases too weak to meet the standards imposed by libel. 
' See Paragraphs 3.4 & 3.11, p8-11, Lord Chancellor's Department (Scottish Office) 
consultation paper on "Infringement of privacy" July, 1993. At Paragraph 3.13, p11, the 
consultation paper goes on to make the error of then describing reputation as an interest of 
personality. 
9 See Joseph Raz's informative article, "Free Expression and Personal Identification" (1991) 11 
O. J. L. S. 303,304 
20 To include appropriation would be to let "Privacy and identity collapse into one another with 
the result that we have no concept left with which to distinguish, descriptively or prescriptively, 
our private from our public identities". See Tom Gerety, "Redefining Privacy" (1977) 12 Harvard 
Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review 233,254-255 21 Known as allegemeines Personlichkeitsrecht or the general right of personality derived from 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law (Constitution of Bonn 1949). See p79, Professor Lorenz, 
Butterworth lectures 1989-90: Privacy and the Press -A German Experience (1990) 
This 
includes a right not to be photographed with a view to publication in one's private sphere. See 
Spatheimkehrer BGHZ 24,200,208 where a reporter surreptitiously photographed the landlady 
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purposes, 22 embarrassing lyrical references to a tennis player in a popular love song, 23 and even 
supplanted libel to some degree by recognising a wrong of casting others in a false light. 24 The 
`rights' to publicity and reputation have thereby become fused with privacy under the umbrella 
concept of personality, yet the reasons why they should enjoy protection are clearly different. As 
Sir Brian Neill comments, "although we can learn from the way other states such as Germany 
have approached the problem, the protection of an individual's `personality' is too imprecise and 
intangible an idea to appeal to English lawyers". 25 While a loss of one's dignity may in some 
circumstances be indicative of infringement of privacy at the hands of the press or others, it does 
not always enable us to distinguish between privacy and other torts. 26 In the words of Gerety, 
such "An unrestricted concept is perhaps no concept at all". 27 
Autonomy and Intimacy 
An alternative argument therefore, suggests that privacy is infringed where a photojournalist or 
newspaper compromises one's ability to exercise autonomy or freedom of choice. 28 Feldman, for 
example, considers that laws need "not be random or unprincipled, so long as the judges base 
development securely in the fundamental values of autonomy. This avoids reducing privacy to a 
redundant or empty concept. It has life and purpose without becoming unmanageably vague"29. 
However, as Barendt acknowledges, the individual's claim to autonomy, like dignity, is much 
of a POW who had tried to move into his wife's apartment after returning from captivity in 
Russia. See also Bundesgerichtshof (VIZR 223/94, December 12 1995) [1996] NJW 985 
(repeated publication of photographs of young son of personality) and Bundesgerichtshof (VIZR 
272/94 Apr 25,1995) 1995 DB 1607 (use of video camera to record all movements on public 
footpath infringed privacy of neighbour as path was only means of access to his property) 
u See p34, Ch. 2, Hans Stoll, in Protecting Privacy Edited by Basil Markesinis. (1999, Oxford 
University Press) Perhaps a prime example of this can be found in Reichsgericht, 28 Oct 1910, 
RGZ 74,308 where a cigar manufacturer placed a portrait of a Count on its products without his 
permission. 
In this particular instance, the lyrics of a pop song entitled "I wanna make love to Steffi Graf' 
were found actionable, and worth some DM 60,000 in damages to the outraged tennis player. 
OLG Jarlsruhe 27.4.1994, NJW 1994,1963 
24 The right has grown to encompass the award of damages for fictitious exclusive interviews. 
Cases in point can be found at BGH 8.12.1964, NJW 1965,685; BGH 15.11.1994, BGHZ 128 
1=NJW 1995,861=JZ 1995,360 Most notably, a television announcer who was referred to in a 
series of articles as a lesbian and a `barren old goat' was able to sue under the German right to 
personality, which accordingly appears much wider than privacy issues. See Bundesgerichtshof, 
5 March 1963, BGHZ 39,124 
25 Op. cit, n. 11, p22, Ch. 1 in Markesinis, "Protecting Privacy". 
26 Besides which the reaction of a given individual to what is perceived to be an infringement of 
his or her privacy may vary greatly. The dignity of some may be affronted, others may shrug it 
off as a hazard of life. See Ruth Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89(3) Yale 
L. J. 421,438 
27 See n. 20, Gerety, p261 
28 An argument put forward, for example, by Jack Hirsleifer is that privacy might be described as 
autonomy within society. See "Privacy, Its Origin, Function and Future" (1980) 9 The Journal of 
Legal Studies 649 
29 See p399, Ch. 8, David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 
(1993, Oxford) 
broader than the concept of privacy. 30 Similarly, DeCew argues that "privacy can be shown to be 
distinct from liberty. For example, one's privacy may constantly be invaded by surreptitious 
surveillance without affecting one's liberty, and one's liberties may be invaded by assault, by 
conferring undesired benefits, or by limiting one's choices... without violating privacy interests". 31 
Accordingly, others such as Julie Inness32 have adopted a narrower version of this theory, namely 
that privacy encompasses an autonomous right to make intimate decisions. 33 If a photojournalist, 
therefore, were to attempt to photograph an unwilling individual upon private property, he or she 
would interfere with that decision making process, denying that individual the freedom to 
determine the familiarity enjoyed by others. 34 The photojournalist's presence thereby interferes 
with this freedom to choose the recipient of emotional intimacy to the exclusion of others. 35 No 
longer is the individual free to specify those to whom he or she communicates ideas, information 
and emotions, 36 altering the relativity of our relationships with others, i. e. A. is much closer to me 
than B. For A to constitute a friend or lover, there must be intimacy, or as Fried puts it, "the 
sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with 
all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy creates 
the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love", 37 but "whenever intimacy is made 
indirect - that is, impersonal, second-hand, and involuntary - and public, its value is lost or 
diminished". 38 There is some truth in this argument, which explains much of our desire to prevent 
photojournalists from enjoying the benefits of intimacy39 and familiarity normally reserved for 
selected others. Perhaps this is another good explanation why we find the photojournalist who 
tries to take our picture through a bedroom window objectionable. However, to recognise a legal 
right to exercise autonomy over intimate decisions would have consequences far beyond those of 
photojournalist and press regulation. The danger is that in doing so, we would simply replace 
privacy with an equally vague or ambiguous term of art. Inness defines an intimate act as one that 
derives meaning as a means of expressing emotion, namely our love, liking or care for others. 40 If 
we protect intimacy pertaining to sexuality, why not sexuality itself? Other difficulties arise when 
delving deeper, we find that this does not explain the intimacy afforded to certain bodily 
functions. The latter clearly constitutes an example of behavioural intimacy, where no emotions 
30 See Eric Barendt, "Privacy and the Press" (1995) YMEL 23,30 
31 See Judith Wagner DeCew, "The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics" (1986) 5 Law and 
Philosophy 145,162 
32 See also Gerety, n. 20, p236 who defines privacy as "an autonomy or control over the 
intimacies of personal identity. " 
33 See p46-47, Ch. 4, Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (1992, Oxford) 
34 See DeCew, n. 31, p165; Raymond Wacks, "The Poverty of Privacy" (1980) 96 L. Q. R. 75,79 
35 Ibid, p127-128, Ch. 7. 
36 See Oscar Ruebhausen and Orville Brim, "Privacy and Behavioural Research" (1965) 65 
Columbia Law Review 1184,1189 
37 See Charles Fried, "Privacy" (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475,484 
38 Op. cit, Gerety, n. 20, p268 
39 The core of intimacy would appear to concern sexual relationships although controversially, 
there is some debate for American laws have not encompassed homosexual relationships within 
privacy protection. See Annamay Sheppard, "Private Passion, Public Outrage: Thoughts on 
Bowers v Harwick" (1988) 40 Rutgers Law Review 521; Bowers v Harwick, 106 S. Ct 2841 (1986) ' 
are shared or conveyed at all. As Benn observes, "why should the bodily functions that in our 
culture are appropriately performed in solitude include defecation but not eating? "41 In his 
discussion of intimacy, Tom Gerety points out that "the stripper in her work restricts her own 
bodily intimacy to the vanishing point... [but] when she leaves the stage, she, as much as anyone, 
can re-assert the usual bounds of physical intimacy and privacy simply by clothing herself in the 
conventional manner". 42 Even if we decide that intimacy is based around those innate core and 
compulsive drives which motivate us on a very basic level, again inevitably, such a broad right 
would grow to include other marginal rights on the peripheral boundaries of privacy. Examples of 
which would include bodily integrity, liberty of action and other intimate issues such as 
euthanasia and abortion, which would greatly enlarge our paradigm of privacy. 43 These peripheral 
rights denote not freedom from intrusion but rather a freedom to act. 44 Their inclusion would be 
an unpalatable development for those who crave legal doctrines with discrete and clearly 
delineated boundaries. The aversion of the legislature to the creation of any generalised right to 
privacy45 is understandable where those elements said to constitute its nucleus such as dignity, 
autonomy, and intimacy cannot seem to resolve the uncertainty as to what is legitimately worthy 
of protection. 
Seclusion and Anonymity 
Perhaps the most widely accepted view is that privacy consists of a state of seclusion from 
others. 46 Indeed, Webster's dictionary describes privacy as consisting of seclusion, retirement or 
solitude and an avoidance of display or publicity. 47 Although selective seclusion is perhaps one of 
the strongest constituent of what we term privacy, a state of seclusion too, is not always 
synonymous with the enjoyment of privacy. 48 This is particularly evident where one's seclusion 
is enforced or involuntary. Similarly, while one may no longer enjoy strict isolation when a close 
friend arrives for dinner, there may be no corresponding loss of privacy arising from the visit 
49 
Parent adds "Think about some of the ways in which A can fail to leave B alone: by hitting him, 
interrupting his conversation, shouting at him, repeatedly calling him, joining him for lunch. 
40 Op cit, Inness, n. 33, p79, Ch. 6. 
41 See Stanley Benn, "Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons" (1971) XIII Nomos 1,15 
42 See Gerety, n. 20, p288 
43 See Jed Rubenfeld, "The Right to Privacy" (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 737 
4' A distinction observed in Blanca Ruiz, "The Right to Privacy: A Discourse-Theoretical 
Approach" (1998) 11(2) Ratio Juris 155,158 
45 I. e. A right to privacy enforceable against both the state, the private sector, and other 
individuals, also referred to in this thesis by the term direct horizontality. See Younger 
Committee, n. 8, Paragraph 44, p12, Ch. 2. 
46 A view held for example by Ruiz, op. cit, 157 
47 See p1003, The New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of the English 
Language (1998, Trident Press International) 
48 One must be careful to draw the distinction between selective seclusion, and seclusion per se. 
Otherwise, those who are subjected to alienation, loneliness or ostracism could be said to enjoy 
privacy. See Michael Weinstein, "The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life" (1971) XIII Nomos 88 
49 Inness discusses this distinction between privacy and separation-based definitions in more 
depth. Op. cit, n. 33, p4l-55, Ch. 4. Supra. 
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There is no compelling reason of logic or law to describe any of these actions as an invasion of 
privacy". "' Finally, the notion of anonymity does little to resolve the legitimate parameters 
afforded to a right to respect for one's private life were it to enjoy direct horizontality. If as 
Gavison suggests, "an individual always loses privacy when he becomes the subject of 
attention... whether the attention is conscious and purposeful, or inadvertent", 51 then there is little 
DIGNITY 
SELF RLSP[ C1 AlJ I ONONIY 
PR I V, -\C'\' 
SECLUSION INTIMACY 
hope of privacy for the local hero, the pop star, or the ordinary citizen thrust suddenly into the 
limelight. The desire of most human beings is to seek recognition of their achievements and to 
articulate their opinions seems contradictory to any need for anonymity. As the Lord 
Chancellor's Department point out, "if it is accepted that another aspect of privacy is anonymity, 
which is lost when attention is paid to an individual, excessive publicity about a person, even 
where the statement is true, may therefore amount to an infringement of privacy. It may 
nevertheless be doubted whether false light cases are a sufficiently distinct category of 
infringements to justify an express reference in legislation". " We may conclude therefore, that 
'privacy' is best thought of as an intermediate good53 whose composite nucleus encompasses a 
need for dignity, autonomy. intimacy, and seclusion. (See Fig. ] above) Commentators place 
varying degrees of emphasis upon the relative importance of each of these values within the 
privacy atom, although seclusion usually features prominently in the majority of paradigms. 
As such, the term 'privacy' does not lend itself readily to the formulation of a precise and 
unambiguous right prohibiting photojournalists and others frone intrusion yet simultaneously 
excluding other more distantly related torts from its remit. " There are those in fact, who suggest 
50 See W. A. Parent, "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law" (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 
305,321 
Op. cit, Gavison. n. 5. p412. 
See Paragraph 5.29. p27. Lord Chancellor's Consultation paper, n. 18, supra. 5' See pXVII, Raymond blacks, Prrvact Vol 19.2. International Library of Essays in Law and 
Legal Theory: Richard Posner. "The Right of Privacy" (I 978) 12 Georgia Law Reý'iew 393,394 
See Thomas Emerson. "The Right of Privacy" (1979) 14 I larvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law Review 329,340 
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the essence of privacy "cannot exist in isolation but must always be balanced against other 
interests and claims". 55 It may be that the values, which coalesce around the amorphous concept 
of privacy naturally, overlap with other freedoms, such as freedom from assault, harassment or 
freedom of liberty. 56 The loss of any one or more of these values may provide evidence that one's 
privacy has been infringed by a photojournalist, but then they may be equally symptomatic of 
liability under some other unrelated torts" Thompson asserts, "It begins to suggest itself, then, as 
a simplifying hypothesis, that the right to privacy is itself a cluster of rights but itself intersects 
with the cluster of rights which the right over the person consists in. -The question arises 
whether or not there are any rights in the right to privacy cluster which are not also in some other 
rights cluster. I suspect there aren't any, and that the right to privacy is everywhere overlapped by 
other rights". 58 Ruiz alternatively suggests that the reason for this is that dignity, autonomy, and 
intimacy merely constitute benefits brought by privacy rather than privacy itself which she 
conceives of as a state of seclusion and secrecy. 59 (See Fig. 2) 
Fig. 2 The Ruiz conception ofprivacy 
PRIVACY 
(seclusion + secrecy) 
DIGNITY AUTONOMY INTIMACY 
This paradigm of privacy is equally feasible, but then for the reasons given above one should 
hesitate in advocating the enactment of a `right to be let alonei60 or any other nebulous right 
based on these values or subjective concepts such as secrecy. 61 After our review of the 
fundamental values upon which a right to privacy is said to be based, "the difficulty is not with 
the terms themselves [e. g. Dignity, personality, autonomy, etc] - they must underpin any 
55 See p36, Ch. 3, Ian J. Lloyd, Information Technology Law (1997,2°d Ed, Butterworths) 
56 See p91, Ch. 4, Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Loyalty Edited by Peter Birks. (1997, 
SPTLJClarendon Press) 
57 Such as assault for example, which consists of the application or threatened application, of 
direct physical force to the person of another. Here, autonomy, dignity, and seclusion may all be 
compromised yet assault is thought of as unconnected to privacy. 
58 See Judith Jarvis Thompson, "The Right to Privacy" (1975) 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
295,306&310 
59 Op. cit, n. 44, supra. See also Paragraph 3.12, p11, Lord Chancellor's Department Consultation 
tipaper 
n. I8which takes a similar view. 
0 Op. cit, n. 1,205 where Warren and Brandeis refer to the use of Cooley J. 's infamous 
description of privacy. 
61 As Judith Wagner DeCew observes, "whatever is secret is concealed or withheld from others, 
and it may not always be private. Thus a secret treaty or military plans kept form the public are 
not always private transactions or information... privacy does not always imply secrecy. For 
private information about one's debts or odd behaviour may be publicised". See "The Scope of 
Privacy in Law and Ethics" (1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 145,155 
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understanding of privacy rights - but with the failure to restrict them' . 
62 The `very 
expansiveness' of privacy "gives us reason to pause over the question of its continued usefulness 
and its ultimate viability in the various settings in which law is made and applied". 3 Indeed, 
"what is there to prevent its operator from slipping in, like a magician, his purely personal 
scarves and rabbits of conviction, and then pulling them out again as applications of principle? "" 
Accordingly, a cause of action for conduct "which constitutes an infringement of {an 
individual's] privacy, causing him substantial distress"65 suggested by the Lord Chancellor's 
Department would be too open-ended to impose on the press. That is not to say, however, that 
there is no way of defining workable legal protection of more specific aspects of privacy. There 
would appear to be, after all, some consensus that privacy encompasses "concern over our 
accessibility to others; the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others 
have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others' attention". 66 The 
Younger Committee conceived of privacy "as having two main aspects. The first of these is 
freedom from intrusion upon oneself, one's home, family and relationships. The second is private 
information, that is the right to determine for oneself how and to what extent information about 
oneself is communicated to others". 67 This tort-based reductionist" approach to the protection of 
privacy from the press and wider private sector has also been approved by a number of 
subsequent committees. 69 Partly, one suspects because this approach has already been adopted in 
the United States. After an extensive review of American case law, William Prosser concluded 
that two bona fide privacy based torts existed: 70 namely, those of "intrusion upon the plaintiffs 
seclusion or solitude7' and the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff'. 
These bear a certain resemblance to those proposed by the Younger Committee. 72 There are those 
such as Feldman that regard torts such as these as "far from being core elements in the definition 
of privacy [which] are usually parasitic on these foundational privacy rights; respect for 
individual dignity, self-determination, family relationships". 73 Arguably, however, they remain 
the preferred approach since the composite nature of privacy does not lend itself readily to the 
62 Gerety, n. 20,261 
63 Ibid, 234 
64 Ibid, 242. 
6s See Paragraph 5.22, p25, Lord Chancellor's Department consultation paper n. 18. 
66 See Gavison, n. 5, p423 The 1970 JUSTICE Report on "Privacy and the Law" also considered 
that there will always be certain areas of our lives that everyone agrees ought to be protected. See 
Paragraph 18, p5, Ch. 2, supra. 
67 Op. cit, n. 18, Paragraphs 38, and 116 on pp10, and 35 respectfully. 
68 As opposed to `collectionism', which attempts to unify all commonly perceived infringements 
of privacy by reference to a common factor, which as the reader will recall, was examined above. 
69 See Paragraph 12.1, p46, Report of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters (1990) 
Cm. 1102; Paragraph 7.34, p56, Review of Press Self-Regulation (1993) Cm. 2135; Paragraph 47, 
pXII, National Heritage Committee's Fourth Report on Privacy and Media Intrusion 
HC(1992/93) 294-1 
70 See William Prosser, "Privacy" (1960) 48(3) California Law Review 383 Prosser having also 
identified two other torts of placing another's name or likeness which he felt did not legitimately 
belong beneath the privacy tort umbrella. 
71 An example of which can be seen in DeMay v Roberts, 9 N. W. 146 (1881) where a young man 
intruded upon a woman giving birth. 
72 Ibid, 389 and 394 respectfully. 
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recognition of a generalised legally enforceable right to the enjoyment of privacy without 
unambiguous parameters, particularly one enforceable against the press. Gavison argues that the 
danger of this approach "is that we might conclude from this... that privacy is not an important 
value and that losses of it should not feature as considerations for legal protection". 74 I don't 
agree that this approach necessarily denigrates the value of privacy. We are simply choosing to 
adopt a practical format to our laws which gives clarity as to what it is precisely we are trying to 
protect from the press. 
Photojournalist wrongs the law ought to prohibit: Intrusion into seclusion 
The first tort considered by the Younger Committee operates where "the victim has put himself in 
or otherwise established a situation in which, were it not for the use of [a surveillance] device, he 
would have been justified in believing that he could not be overheard or observed, as the case 
might be". 75 The Younger Committee's version of the classic intrusion into seclusion tort does, 
however, suffer from the difficulty of determining what constitutes a 'device'76 and whether it 
has been actively used. Nevertheless, a workable tort might prohibit an individual such as a 
photojournalist from observing, monitoring or recording the activities of another without consent 
where he or she knows or ought to know that the other has a reasonable expectation of 
seclusion. 77 The courts have already proved capable of assessing whether our expectations of 
others are 'reasonable 78 although predominantly in the less contentious context of negligence or 
in evaluating the fairness of a statement on a subject of public interest. 79 Even so, the question of 
whether a claimant's expectation of seclusion is reasonable and consistent with that of a 
hypothetical average member of our community would not seem too intractable for a court to 
resolve. 80 The reasonable person device "focuses not on actual injury to the personality of 
specific individuals, but rather on the protection of that personality which would be constituted 
73 Op. cit, Feldman, n. 29, p399. 
74 See Gavison, n. 5, p424 
75 Op. cit, n. 18, Paragraph 560, p172, Ch. 9. 
76 For a description of the wide array of surveillance devices currently available, see Simon 
Davies and Sheridan Hough, "Police tap into the secrets of technology" (1997) Jan 28, Daily 
Telegraph `Connected' Supplement 7. The camera however, remains the most popular given its 
economy and accessibility. 
77 See Alex Samuels, "Privacy: Statutorily Definable? " (1996) 17(2) Stat. L. R. 115,118 Similarly, 
Paragraph 19, p5, of the 1970 JUSTICE Report entitled Privacy and the Law advocated a similar 
test assessing whether a reasonable man with an understanding of the legitimate needs of the 
community would think it wrong to invade". 
78 See J. Baxter, "Privacy and the maintenance of state advantage" (1986) 17 Cambrian L. R. 10, 
16 
79 Op. cit, n. 18, Paragraph 41, Ch. 2, pl 1. 
8° In the U. S., this tort is already well-established. In Hamberger v Eastman, 106 N. H. 107,206 
A. 2d 239 (1964) a husband and wife obtained damages for the distress, humiliation and anguish 
caused by the installation of an eavesdropping device in their bedroom. The reason being their 
landlord's actions in placing the bug would have been similarly offensive to any person of 
ordinary sensibilities. 
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by full observance of the relevant rules of deference and demeanour". 81 As such, the concept is 
inherently normative, rather than neutral, and can be understood only by reference to norms of 
behaviour. 82 For this reason, it makes sense for courts to make such an assessment for they are 
better able to recognise "a state of flux and rapidly changing social and moral values" than the 
legislature. 83 Perhaps the main obstacle the courts might face lies in the nature of the reasonable 
man test itself which purports to represent the universal norms of society as a whole. 4 In today's 
multi-cultural society, this can be difficult, particularly when what is offensive to a minority 
differs from the majority. Were a photojournalist to take a picture, for example, of a Muslim 
woman at home without her veils, she and her family might find this offensive where another 
person of a different faith might not. The courts may need, therefore, to be sensitive to these 
factors and make some effort to accommodate cultural relativity. 85 Other relevant factors for 
consideration would include the ease with which he or she was accessible to the unaided senses 
of others, the time of day the incident occurred, and the character of the neighbourhood. 86 
Accordingly, this test would recognise that "life, especially urban life, necessarily involves many 
annoying infringements of privacy which we nevertheless, albeit reluctantly, have to accept, the 
press of people in a crowded train being an obvious example". 87 Upon property consisting of 
shared resources, which are equally accessible to all, for example, one cannot legitimately expect 
seclusion from photographers. In such places as parks, streets, and shopping malls, one must 
expect to feature regularly in photographs taken by tourists, amateur photographers, the media 
and increasingly CCTV. 88 A photograph taken by a journalist here, merely provides a permanent 
record of those aspects of one's physical appearance and behaviour already accessible to the eyes 
of all casual onlookers. 89 In such places as these, an expectation of seclusion would be 
unrealistic. 90 
In the United States, this tort already enjoys recognition, 91 and operates where: 
81 See Robert Post, "The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort" (1989) 77 California Law Review 957,963 
82 Ibid, 969 
93 See David Eady, "Opinion: A Statutory Right to Privacy" (1996) 3 EHRLR 243,248 
84 Ibid, 977-978 
85 See H. J. McCluskey, "The Political Ideal of Privacy" (1971) 21 Philosophical Quarterly 203, 
311 
86 The character of the neighbourhood also plays a pivotal role in the degree of seclusion one may 
legitimately expect. The gardens of a row of terraced houses may have a much greater sense of 
community than those of detached properties spaced hundreds of metres apart. 
" See Paragraph 3.10, p I0, Lord Chancellor's Consultation paper, supra n. 18. 
88 I. e. closed circuit television operated in shops, petrol garages and town centres for the 
prevention of crime. 
9 See William Prosser, "Privacy" (1960) 48 California Law Review 383,394-395 
90 For this reason, in Gill v Curtis Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224,252, P. 2d 441, a United States 
court denied recovery for the publication of a photograph showing the claimant embracing his 
wife in a market place as an example of the `wrong kind of love'. "On the public street, or in any 
other public place, the plaintiff has no right to be alone... neither is it such an invasion to take his 
photograph in such a place". 
I This common law tort is, of course, backed up by a number of criminal statutes in the U. S. For 
example, surreptitious interception of conversations in a house or hotel room is prohibited 
by 
N. Y. Penal sections 250.00 and 250.05. The contents of envelopes sent via first class U. S. mail 
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a) There is an actual prying, beyond mere disturbing noises or bad manners 
b) And the intrusion would offend a reasonable man 
c) Constituting an intrusion into something private92 
We can learn from the United States tort of intrusion, in that it provides our own courts with 
some guidance as to where an individual ought reasonably to be able to expect seclusion from a 
photojournalist. In this jurisdiction, a valid claim to seclusion has been found in places such as a 
hotel room, 93 a stateroom on a steamboat, 94 a curtained off dressing area, 95 telephone booth, 96 and 
residential property. 97 Similarly, in the crowded ward of a public hospital, one may claim 
seclusion from photojournalists who have no business being there but not from the hospital staff 
or in many cases, the fellow patients around one. 98 These resources are all shared only with a 
select group of others, determined at the discretion of the individuals who dwell there. That is not 
to say that in each of these instances, the claimant's expectation of seclusion needs to be absolute. 
In Huskey v National Broadcasting Co., Inc. 99 for example, a United States federal court was 
called upon to examine whether a prison inmate could legitimately expect seclusion from the 
defendant's camera crew as he worked out in an `exercise cage'. The court remarked that, "Of 
course Huskey could be seen by guards, prison personnel and inmates, and obviously he was in 
fact seen by NBC's camera operator. But the mere fact a person can be seen by others does not 
mean that a person cannot legally be 'secluded'... Further, Huskey's visibility to some people 
does not strip him of the right to remain secluded from others. Persons are exposed to family 
members and invited guests in their own homes, but that does not mean they have opened the 
are similarly private eg. 18 USC s. 1702; 39 USC s. 3623. Telephone conversations, radio and 
telegraph messages are equally so. 18 USC s. 2510 et seq; 47 USC s. 605. 
92 s. 625A-6251 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that unreasonable intrusion 
encompasses physical invasion of a person's home from unwanted entry to looking into windows 
with binoculars or a camera. Examples of which include the illegal search of a shopping bag in a 
store. See Sutherland v Kroger Co., 144 W. Va 673,110 S. E. 2d 716 (1959) Prying into a private 
bank account also qualifies. See Brex v Smith, 104 N. J. Eq. 386,146 A. 34 and Zimmermann v 
Wilson, 3 Cir. 1936,81 F. 2d 847 
93 Newcomb Hotel Co. v Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365,108 S. E. 309 (1921) 
94 Byfield v Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275,125 S. E. 905 (1924) 
95 Doe by Doe v B. P. S. Guard Services, Inc. (8`s Cir. 1991) 945 F. 2d 1422 Security guards who 
used security cameras to ogle models changing clothes in a curtained dressing area did so 
contrary to the models' expectations of seclusion. 
96 Katz V U. S., 389 U. S. 347 (1967) where the Supreme Court found the Fourth Amendment to 
the Constitution's protection against search and seizure governed not only the seizure of tangible 
items but extended as well to the recording of oral statements in a phone booth. Harlan J. 
proposed a two stage test for an expectation of privacy of (1) an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy which (2) society is prepared to recognise as reasonable. 
7 Young v Western & A. R. Co., 39 Ga. App. 761,148 S. E. 414 (1929) 
98 Thus, in Barber v Time Inc., 348 Mo 1199,159 SW 2d 291 (1942) the Missouri Supreme Court 
permitted a woman troubled by a serious eating disorder for the invasion of being surreptitiously 
photographed by a reporter. See also Estate of Berthiaume v Pratt, M. D. (Maine 1976) 365 A. 2d 
792, where a surgeon who photographed a dying cancer patient against his will also committed 
intrusion. Other cases in point include Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1973) 33 Cal. App 3d 654,660; 
DeMay v Roberts (Mich. 1881) 9 N. W. 146,148-149; Shulman v Group WProductions, Inc., 18 
Cal. 4t' 200,237 
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door to television cameras". 100 Similarly, it is arguable that one ought to be able to expect 
seclusion from a photojournalist in the shared space of the workplace. Indeed, the American 
Supreme Court was to take this view in Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies Inc. 101 The 
defendant reporter obtained employment as a `telepsychic' at the claimant's workplace, the 
Psychic Marketing Group. By using a small video camera hidden in her hat in conjunction with a 
microphone attached to her brassiere, she was able to covertly videotape conversations with her 
co-workers. The Supreme Court considered that "Privacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not 
a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances of societal recognition of 
our expectation of privacy: the fact the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or 
absolute as a matter of law". 102 
The Supreme Court adds "in the workplace, as elsewhere, the reasonableness of a person's 
expectation of visual and aural privacy depends not only on who might have been able to observe 
the subject interaction, but on the identity of the claimed intruder and the means of intrusion. 
... The possibility of 
being overheard by co-workers does not, as a matter of law, render 
unreasonable an employee's expectation that his or her interactions within a non public 
workplace will not be videotaped in secret by a journalist". 103 While my supervisor keeps his 
door partially and invitingly ajar to facilitate the entrance of a student seeking enlightenment, this 
would not deny him a reasonable expectation from a press photographer. 104 He might well expect 
conversations uttered therein, in a normal tone of voice to be overheard by other members of staff 
or students lurking outside. However, equally he would not expect those same conversations to 
be electronically intercepted, monitored, or recorded. 105 
In short, it is difficult to see why our own courts should not be able to resolve where an 
individual may reasonably expect seclusion from photojournalists as the US courts have done. A 
workable tort might involve a two-stage test. The first part of which could focus on whether the 
claimant's expectation of seclusion is reasonable and consistent with that of a hypothetical 
member of the community, as discussed above. 
99 Huskey v National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (N. D. I11.1986) 632 F. Supp. 1282 
10° Ibid, 1287-1288 
101 Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et. al, (1999) Super Ct. No. BC077553 
The defendants' acts were found to violate both s. 632 of the California Penal Code and the 
common law tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion. 
102 Ibid. One may expect seclusion from the photojournalist even in the private dining room of a 
restaurant, albeit not from other patrons! See Stressman v Am. Black Hawk Broadcasting (Iowa 
1987) 416 N. W. 2d 685,687 
103 Op. cit. 
104 The American courts have expressly recognised that "A business office need not be sealed to 
offer its occupant a reasonable degree of privacy". See United States v McIntyre (9' Cir. 1978) 
582 F. 2d 1221,1224, where the defendant police officers were convicted of criminally violating 
the anti-wiretapping law (18 USC s. 2510(2), 2511) by bugging the assistant chiefs office. 105 A similar observation was drawn in Walker v Darby (11th Cir. 1990) 911 F. 2d 1573,1579 
Three postal supervisors with a dislike of a fellow worker intercepted the conversations at his 
workstation and transmitted them to their office. Even here amid a shared space rather than a 
private office, the claimant was found to have a legitimate expectation of seclusion. 
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A second such test might then consider whether the defendant's behaviour was proportional 
relative to its purpose and the availability of alternative and less intrusive means of accessing that 
individual. Circuit Judge Hufstedler made an important observation in this regard, in Dietemann v 
Time, Inc. 106 While acknowledging that newsgathering is an integral part of news dissemination, 
he strongly disagreed that "hidden mechanical contrivances are 'indispensable tools' of 
newsgathering. Investigative reporting is an ancient art; its successful practice long antecedes the 
invention of miniature cameras and electronic devices". 107 Accordingly, the use of deception to 
gain access to the claimant's home to surreptitiously take pictures of him was a disproportionate 
means of exposing his practice of medicine without a license. The learned judge added, that "One 
who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor may not be what he seems, 
and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves. But he does and should 
not be required to take the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or 
recording, or in our modem world, in full living colour and hi-fi to the public at large or to any 
segment of it that the visitor may select". 108 We can see therefore, that the United States courts 
already make some assessment of the suitability of the allegedly intrusive means employed by a 
photojournalist to obtain a picture. Thus, in Wilson v Layne, 109 the possibility of good public 
relations for the police was simply not good enough to justify photojournalists accompanying the 
police during a raid into a private home. 110 In the majority of cases, notoriety or mere public 
curiosity in the lifestyle adopted by a particular individual will be insufficient justification for 
unreasonable intrusion by photojournalists. At the same time, nothing should prevent "a media 
defendant from attempting to show ... that the claimed intrusion, even 
if it infringed on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, was justified by the legitimate motive of gathering the 
news". "' Where investigative journalism is concerned, for example, there may be no alternative 
if one is to expose serious wrongdoing or misconduct. Accordingly, journalists engaged in such 
work should not incur liability under this wrong. 
Furthermore, those environments are generally inaccessible to the casual glances of other 
members of the community and thus require a deliberate act to penetrate the seclusion they 
provide contrary to the established conventions of society. Seclusion may only be a partially 
obtainable goal in a back garden overlooked by the windows of neighbouring properties, rights of 
ways, or public highways. If on the other hand, one must make use of binoculars or long lens 
cameras in order to observe that individual, a deliberate conscious decision on the part of the 
defendant to disregard that individual's claim to seclusion is more likely. Intention on the part of 
1°6 Dietemann v Time, Inc., 449 F. 2d 245 (1971) Appeal following decision in 284 F. Supp 925 
(1968) 
107 Ibid, 249 
108 mid, 249 
109 Wilson v Layne, 119 S. Ct 1697 
10 The occupants of which were photographed as they were rousted out of bed in their night- 
clothes. 
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a photojournalist should not be an essential element of this wrong. Perhaps "to limit liability to 
cases of intention would unduly restrict plaintiffs' right to a remedy, but [then] the balance would 
be tilted too much in their favour if the tort were made one of strict liability. The defendant 
should be liable where the infringement was caused intentionally, recklessly or negligently". ' 12 
As Benn emphasises, "there is nothing intrinsically objectionable about being accidentally 
observed, but "there is a difference between happening to be seen and having some one closely 
observe, and perhaps record, what one is doing". 113 Individuals who are the subject of this wrong, 
particularly when perpetrated by photojournalists, should be compensated by damages for any 
distress so caused. "4 Where that behaviour of a photojournalist or indeed some other individual 
also gives rise to liability under some other tort such as trespass or assault, the award of damages 
should be reduced correspondingly to take account of this. ' 15 There are also likely to be times 
when a photojournalist's earnings from an intrusively obtained photograph are likely to exceed 
the figure awarded for compensation so that he or she may still profit from his or her act. In these 
circumstances, aggravated damages and delivery up of all photographs and their negatives might 
be appropriate. The burden of proof of both tests would lie upon the claimant, ' 16 and with these 
safeguards in place, it is difficult to see how such a tort could chill investigative journalism or 
threaten to open the floodgates to frivolous or vexatious claims. 
Publishing intrusively obtained photographs, which reveal intimate information about one 
Whether the law should prohibit the public disclosure of private facts which the Younger 
Committee also considered, "7 is of course, slightly more controversial given its capacity to 
suppress freedom of speech. This is hardly surprising given the difficulty in resolving what is 
legitimately private, "8 particularly in terms of publicly available facts rendered private by the 
passage of time'" or private facts rendered public by one's choice of career. As W. L. Weinstein 
111 See Sanders vAmerican Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et. al, (1999) Super Ct. No. 
BC077553 
112 A view I share with the Lord Chancellor's Department Consultation Paper. See Paragraph 
5.35, p29, supra n. 18. 
113 See Stanley Benn, "Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons" (1971) XIII Nomos 1,4-5 
14 Covert observation which deceives an individual as to the unmonitored nature of his or her 
environment ought also to be actionable if unperceived until after the event. 
tts The author is far from convinced that a jury, as in the Untied States, would be best suited to 
making such an assessment. In ABC v Food Lion (1997) an American jury's award of $5.5 
million dollars in punitive damages for the surreptitious use of hidden cameras and microphones 
by the ones to check food handling procedure was scaled back to $315,000. 
http: //www. emunix. emich. edu/-jcooper/errlaw/units-int. html 
116 As with the US tort of intrusion, there should be no need to prove actual injury as mental 
distress in order to claim 
117 See Paragraph 56, p16 Ch. 3, ref n. 18 supra. 
"a See discussion in Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, "Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of 
Privacy by the Publication of `Private Facts"' (1998) 61 M. L. R. 318,332 
119 See Melvin v Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,297 P. 91 (1931) for example, where the story of a 
prostitute turned wealthy socialite who had once been implicated in a murder trial was told on the 
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comments, "there is in our own culture alone an extensive range of diverse views, which may not 
even share a common moral footing, about what matters are properly private". 120 Professor 
Raymond Wacks spurns any attempt to draw a distinction between the spurious realms of public 
and private and instead suggests it is `personal information' that deserves legal protection. '2' 
Personal information includes "those facts, communications, or opinions that relate to the 
individual and which are of such a nature that it would be reasonable to expect him to regard as 
intimate or sensitive, and therefore want to withhold or at least to restrict their collection, use or 
circulation". 122 In the United States, this wrong has been categorised similarly. "One who gives 
publicity123 to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicised is of a kind that 
a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person124 and 
b) is not of legitimate concern to the public". '25 
So far as the first criterion of offensiveness to a reasonable person is concerned, this does seem a 
better approach than attempting to reduce a photograph into a collection of personal and non- 
personal facts. Were we to do so, we might "enter a legal and philosophical morass, involving 
ourselves in possibly endless inquiries and disputes over the classification of this or that 'item' of 
personal informations126. Such a tort, therefore, would need to discuss "not merely 
communicative content, but also such varied aspects of these acts as their timing, justification, 
addressees, form, and general context". '27 "Any definition of 'personal information' must... refer 
both to the quality of the [photographic] information and to the reasonable expectation of the 
individual concerning its use". 128 Accordingly, this wrong is based around an objective test, 
which considers whether the published photograph is likely to cause distress, annoyance, or 
embarrassment to a reasonable person in the same position as the claimant. '29 Examples of which 
silver screen. Given the successful reform of the claimant and her reintegration into mainstream 
society, the accurate portrayal of her on film was bound to invade her privacy. 
120 See W. L. Weinstein, "The Private and the Free: A Conceptual Inquiry" (1971) XIII Nomos 
27,29 In the U. S., a claimant's heavy drinking, unstable employment, adultery and conduct 
towards his wife and children were held to fall short of the kind of revelations that the doctrine 
was intended to protect. See Haynes v Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F. 3d 1222 (7t' Cir. 1993) 
121 See p23, Ch. 2, Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995, Blackstone Press) 
122 Ibid. 
123 The Restatement defines `publicity' as "communicating information to the public at large, or 
to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of 
public knowledge". See Restatement (second) of Torts s. 652D comment a. 
4 See Siddis v F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) where a newspaper charts a 
child progedy's descent into obscurity after lecturing as an eleven year old at Harvard. His 
complaint was dismissed as it was not a public revelation of "so intimate and so unwarranted in 
the view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notion of decency". 125 See Restatement (Second) of Torts s. 652D 
126 See Gerety, n. 20, p284 
127 Op. cit, Post, n. 81,979 
128 See pXVI, Raymond Wacks, Privacy Vol-1, Areas 19.1, The International Library of Essays 
in Law and Legal Theory (1993, Dartmouth) 
129 See Paragraph 5.6, p21, Lord Chancellor's Consultation paper, supra n. 18. Cherie Blair, 
allegedly "cherishes privacy to the extent of challenging newspapers over stories about the soft 
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include the publication of a photograph depicting a hospitalised woman's exotic disease, 130 and of 
a woman whose skirt was blown upwards by an air vent. 131 Photographs, which depict the 
occupants and interior of residential private property who could not normally be observed 
without the deliberate use of a long lens might also be included, particularly where they depict 
areas such as the matrimonial bedroom, or the bathroom where ablutions and bodily functions are 
performed. In the United States, for example, a young woman succeeded in her claim against 
Wal-Mart developers when an employee circulated copies of a photograph which depicted her 
and a friend naked in a shower, together. The publication proved to be particularly sensitive, as 
people in the small town in which she lived began to question the woman's sexual orientation as 
a result of the photograph's dissemination. 132 The dissemination 133 of photographs such as these 
are objectionable because they reveal aspects of an individual's habits, lifestyle, and in some 
cases, details of his or her interpersonal relationships with others to all and sundry. 
If our own law is to protect individuals from the publication of such photographs as these in the 
tabloids, we need to be able to distinguish between those photographs which are genuinely 
newsworthy and those which are not. In the United States, a photograph of a semi-naked hostage 
clothed partially by a strategically placed dishtowel as she was freed by her captor was found to 
be a newsworthy publication. 134 Freedom of speech is so highly prized under the First 
Amendment to the constitution that American courts have been reluctant to define what is 
legitimately `newsworthy' and consequently have a tendency to protect all speech, regardless of 
its quality or value. 135 Thus, the story of the eccentric behaviour of a surfer who ate spiders and 
stubbed out cigarettes in his mouth was found in Virgil v Time Inc., to be newsworthy. 136 
It is important therefore, to discuss how our own courts may resolve the problem of which 
photographs the public have a strong and legitimate interest in receiving, even where they divulge 
furnishings of Downing Street". This is surely an inappropriate use of the law, to which a public 
disclosure tort should not be put. Idle speculation and gossip on one's lifestyle and mode of living 
by others is a natural, not to say, national pastime. See Jasper Gerrard, "When nannies tell all, 
there are bound to be tears before bedtime" (2000) p16, The Times, Mar 6 
130 Barber v Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199,159 S. W. 2d 291 (1942) 
131 Daily Times Democrat v Graham, 276 Ala 380,162, So. 2d 474 (1964) 
132 See Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) January 31,1999. 
http: //www. wahnartsucks. com/privacyenters. html 
133 By this, I refer to the public disclosure of the photograph to a number of persons over whom 
the claimant pictured has no control. As the Michigan Supreme Court observe, the "publicity 
requirement should not degenerate into a numbers game". See Beaumont v Brown, 401 Mich. 
AAp. 105,257 N. W. 2d 531 
13 See Cape Publications v Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (1982), 431 So. 2d 988 (1983), cert. denied 
on appeal. 
135 See p16-34, Theodore L. Glasser, "Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the 
Newswothiness Defense" in Privacy and Publicity - Readings from Communications and the Law, 2 Edited by Theordore R. Kupferman. (1990, Meckler) 
136 Virgil v Time Inc., 527 F. 2d 1122 (91h Cir. 1975) 
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intimate information about an individual. 137 Perhaps the most well known justification for leaving 
freedom of speech unfettered is that of John Mill who considered that "if the teachers of mankind 
are to be cognisant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and 
published without restraint". 139 Mill sees the protection of truth as "an overriding value, and that 
free speech is a necessary condition to allow truth to emerge". 139 This argument from truth is said 
to emerge "from the cut and thrust of debate in a `free market place of ideas. "' 140 It is worth 
emphasising the word ideas, for the public disclosure wrong is intended to restrict only the 
publication of information and not opinion. '4' Furthermore, Mill was concerned with the 
substitution of error with truth, rather than the provision of personal information where before 
there was none. 142 The publication of photographs providing information on an individual's 
lifestyle, and what goes on behind the closed doors of private property contrary to a legitimate 
expectation of seclusion would not always seem inimical to the welfare of society. 143 Posner, 
however, views the desire to suppress truthful information about oneself, whether in 
photographic form or otherwise, as selfish and merely a deceitful attempt to "manipulate by 
misrepresentation other people's opinion" of one. 144 He adds, "We think it wrong (and 
inefficient) that the law should permit a seller in hawking his wares to make false or incomplete 
representations as to their quality. But people `sell' themselves as well as their goods". 145 
Posner's views are unduly harsh, however, as this wrong is concerned not with deceitful 
misinformation about oneself as precluding the enforced disclosure of personal information about 
oneself and one's family, lifestyle and relationships. It seems dubious to argue that the personal 
information, whether in photographic form or otherwise, of the individual should necessarily be 
sacrificed, against his or her wishes, in the furtherance of public debate and the quest for truth. 
Mill himself acknowledges the value of individuality and states that "it is only the cultivation of 
individuality, which produces or can produce, well-developed human beings". 146 It is arguable 
that a wrong which prevents the enforced public disclosure of personal information against an 
individual's wishes produces a conducive environment in which individuality can flourish. 
Another variant of the argument from truth holds that perhaps surreptitiously obtained 
photographs depicting the "personal lives of wealthy and successful people whose tastes and 
137 See David Eady, "Opinion: A Statutory Right to Privacy" (1996) 3 EHRLR 243 although the 
tort he envisages prohibits the unlawful publication of personal information which would seem to 
have censorious connotations and might present the press with a convenient loophole. 
138 See John Stuart Mill, p166, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism (1975,12th Impression) Edited by 
Mary Warnock. 
139 See Christopher McCrudden, p104, Ch. 8, The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English 
Law (1998, Oxford University Press) Edited by Basil Markesinis. 
'40 Ibid, p106. 
141 Op. cit, n. 138, where Mill makes it clear he is referring to freedom of opinion as opposed to 
freedom of speech more generally. 
142 Ibid, n. 138, p142-143. Mill viewed the suppression of all discussion as an assumption of 
infallibility. 
143 See Eric Barendt, p7-10, Freedom of Speech (1985, Oxford University Press) 
144 See Richard Posner, "The Right of Privacy" (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 393,395 
145 Ibid, 399 
" Op. cit, n. 138, Mill, p193. 
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habits offer models - that is, yield information to the ordinary person in making consumption, 
career, and other decisions". 147 Nevertheless, this argument is flawed in that what is to prevent 
the photojournalist obtaining such information through more legitimate channels? Similarly, it 
seems difficult to justify the enforced publication of personal information through photographs of 
the rich or famous at play in that "public portrayal and expression of [these] forms of life 
validates the styles of life portrayed". 149 Often the press seek neither to validate a lifestyle or to 
condemn it but merely to proffer a photograph depicting it for the amusement and titillation of its 
readers who may draw their own conclusions. Where a celebrity voluntarily discusses intimate 
aspects of his or her private life to the media, however, he or she cannot complain when a 
photograph is published that depicts a similar area of that individual's life. It is only the 
unreasonable and disproportionate methods used by a photojournalist to obtain such a photograph 
that might give him or her grounds for complaint. Similarly, this wrong should not extend to 
cover matters and photographs on public record, 149 that are already accessible but located in 
obscure documents prior to wider publication. '50 
It seems equally difficult to argue that the law should not protect individuals against this wrong in 
that we are stopping the photojournalist himself from enjoying autonomy through freedom of 
expression. 151 This view of freedom of speech "turns on the idea that the free communications of 
feelings, opinions, and ideas is essential to the full development of human personality in society. 
The human desires to persuade, impress, assert or to inspire have always been a powerful 
presence in every social situation, and their suppression has often been thought to stunt some of 
the most admirable aspects of human nature". 152 The photojournalist remains free to 
communicate feelings, opinions, and ideas in other ways. It might well be said that "the very act 
of censorship insults the censored, denies their rationality'. 153 The same may equally be said of 
forcibly disclosing personal information about the environment in which an individual lives when 
choosing to retreat from society. 
If the public disclosure wrong were to receive recognition in the United Kingdom, it is most 
likely to clash with freedom of the press and expression in relation to photographic exposes of 
politicians' private lives. An argument promoted repeatedly throughout freedom of speech 
literature is the necessity of the role of the press in ensuring the electorate are kept fully 
147 Op. cit, n. 144,396. Again, this is another argument drawn by Posner against the recognition of 
this wrong. 
148 See Jospeh Raz's informative article, "Free Expression and Personal Identification" (1991) 11 
O. J. L. S. 303,310-312 
149 See Paragraph 5.52, p33, Lord Chancellor's consultation paper n. 18. 
150 See Judith Wagner DeCew, "The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics" (1986) 5 Law and 
Philosophy 145,151 
151 See T. Scanlon, "Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression" (1979) 40 U. 
Pittsburgh Law Review 519 
152 See Mark Janis, Richard Kay, and Anthony Bradley, p158, Ch. 6, European Human Rights 
Law - Texts and Materials (1995, Clarendon Press) 153 Op. cit, n. 148, Raz, p313. 
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informed, often referred to as the argument from democracy. '54 Raz elaborates that 
"Governmental responsiveness to the wishes of the governed is to be desired only if the wishes 
themselves are not entirely the product of manipulation by the government. .. The better informed 
the governed are and the better able they are to evaluate the information at their disposal the 
stronger the case for heeding their wishes". 155 Clearly, the electorate has a need for information 
necessary "to make informed choices and to participate fully in the democratic process". 156 The 
question arises therefore, as to the extent to which the electorate need to be supplied with acts and 
photographs depicting politicians' private lives? A related issue is whether such 'public persons' 
engaged in political activities ought to be able to expect seclusion from cameramen to the same 
degree as others. In practice therefore, it is here where the parameters of a public disclosure 
wrong are most likely to come into conflict with editorial interest in those who hold or seek 
public or political office. Inevitably, one's vocation may influence the particular lifestyle or mode 
of living adopted and vice versa. Separating the two from one another does not present the easiest 
of tasks. A controversial example arises when a newspaper publishes a surreptitiously obtained 
photograph of a politician during an extra martial liaison with another upon private property. 
There is often an almost naive willingness to accept that a publication like this, of obscure and 
previously unknown information as to an individual's sexual habits lends itself to the furtherance 
of social debate. The electorate have a right to view the above photograph only in so far as such 
information directly relates to his or her ability to effectively perform that role or where the 
electorate might otherwise be misled. Consider for example, if the photographic evidence of the 
affair were to appear after the politician's announcement of a new family values policy. 
Publication could then be justifiable given the apparent conflict between the politician's publicly 
professed beliefs and his private activities. Consequently, public disclosure of the photograph 
might have a direct bearing on that government servant's fitness for office of which an informed 
electorate ought to be aware. The politician's actions appear to cast doubt on the credulity of his 
new policies. With these exceptions, however, there remains a strong argument for protection to 
ensure those who might prove suitable for public or political office are not discouraged by the 
thought of paid employees of the press combing meticulously through their private lives in search 
of evidence on their sexual inclinations or past relationships. There is consensus at least, that 
everyone should be entitled to a core `zone of privacy' regardless of occupation. '" Sir David 
Calcutt considered that "there remain parts of every person's life which should be wholly 
inviolate, no matter the extent to which a person may be in the public eye". 158 The National 
Heritage Committee on Press and Media Intrusion similarly observed that "even the Queen and 
the Prime Minister must have the right to keep some aspects of their lives away from the public 
gaze". 159 As for those who failed in their bid for office or who used to hold office, they too 
154 See A. Meiklejohn, "Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government" in Political Freedom 
(New York 1965) 
X56 Op cit, n. 148, Raz, 308 
156 Op cit, n. 143, Barendt, p25, Ch. 1. 
158 See Paragraph 5.44, p3 1, Lord Chancellor's Department consultation paper n. 18. 158 See Paragraph 4.30, p28, "Review of Press Self-Regulation" Cm. 2135. 
159 See Paragraph 6, p5, HC(1992/93) 294-I 
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should not be required to suffer distress solely to provide the public with a steady flow of pictures 
of prominent persons at rest and play upon private property. The same may equally be said of 
entertainers. In the words of one commentator, "to treat an entertainer's life simply as material 
for entertainment is to pay no more regard to him as a person than to an animal in a menagerie. 
Of course, anyone who indiscriminately courts publicity, as some entertainers do, can hardly 
complain if they are understood to be offering a general licence. But merely to be a celebrity - 
even a willing celebrity - does not disable someone from claiming the consideration due to a 
person". 160 It does seem possible therefore, for a public disclosure tort to operate successfully 
without interfering unduly with the right of the press to freedom of speech and expression. Ex 
parte injunctions which are much hated by the press, 161 need not be available under such a tort. 
Indeed, "if the public disclosure tort is understood simply as a mechanism for protecting the 
secrecy of private facts, it would seem to be entirely self-defeating. But if the tort is instead 
understood as a means of obtaining vindication for the infringement of information preserves, the 
disclosure of information in the course of a judicial action may be of only secondary importance 
so long as the plaintiff is ultimately reintegrated into that chain of ceremony which defines and 
embraces members of the community". 162 The most important remedy that must be available to 
the claimant may very well prove to be damages therefore. The award of which enables society 
both to recognise the distress caused to the individual and to compensate that individual for the 
publication of the photograph which conveys intimate information about him or her to all and 
sundry. 
Why the law ought to recognise these wrongs - the derivative value of privacy 
The value of these torts would seem to derive from the value we attach to the possibility of the 
conditions and activities they protect. 163 As Raz comments, "The natural explanation is that the 
reason for the right is (at least in part) that it serves the interest of the right-holder. Pointing to the 
interests of right-holders is the standard argument for rights. This would suggest that the 
importance of the right-holders' interest is a factor in assessing the importance of the right". 164 As 
Barendt commented, with regard to freedom of expression "it is almost impossible to draw a 
clear line between legal and philosophical (or political) argument for the disposition of such 
litigation", and so it is with privacy also. 165 Both the wrongs identified above deserve to be 
recognised either overtly or implicitly by our legal system in so far as they facilitate an 
individual's enjoyment of other goods. Were an individual aware, for instance, that he or she 
might be accessed by another such as a photojournalist at any time and a permanent record made 
160 See Stanley Benn, "Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons" (1971) XIII Nomos 1,14 
161 See "Frantic phone calls followed Nanny's story" (2000) 3 The Times, Mar 6 where the 
suppression of the Blair's nanny memoirs caused significant costs to a newspaper as the 
euivalent of 1.5 million copies had been printed prior to the injunction being granted at 2: 00 am. 16' See Robert Post, "The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort" (1989) 77(5) California Law Review 957,986 
163 Op. cit, Gerety, n. 20,245 
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of one's activities at any given moment would surely stifle creativity and experimentation. There 
are those who view these wrongs as considerably less serious when committed by the press or 
private sector as opposed to the state, but such complacency is dangerous. The knowledge that at 
any time or place, a private individual or organisation is permitted to monitor or record one's 
activities and later disclose the information obtained at will, may be an equally chilling thought 
as that of state intrusion. The mere threat of surveillance by errant photojournalists or others may 
serve as a means of social control'66 on a par with state surveillance, which equally instils 
individuals with the fear of engendering society's disapproval. 167 Were individuals unable to 
expect their seclusion to be respected, the ever present threat of the publication of such 
photographs would instil that individual with the fear of engendering society's disapproval and 
would strive to ensure their behavioural patterns conformed to societal norms at all times given 
uncertainty as to whether they are being monitored or not. 168 "When a person knows his conduct 
is visible, he must either bring his actions within the accepted social norms.. . or decide to violate 
those norms and accept the risk of reprisal". 169 Although such an individual knows he or she 
cannot be monitored all the time by a photojournalist, his or her behaviour will alter nonetheless 
just in case of intrusion. 170 This is likely to impair the development of distinctive personalities 
and individualism. 17' It would seem that these privacy torts are valuable because they prevent 
"interference, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavourable decisions, and other 
forms of hostile reaction". Photographs taken through intrusion may reveal a great deal about an 
individual's lifestyle, and "the more one knows about a person, the greater one's power to 
damage him". '72 Even if the individual is unaware he or she is being observed, monitored, or 
photographed, an intrusion occurs nonetheless in that he or she is deceived as to the nature of that 
environment. Fried adds that the actions of a photojournalist or another undermines "the subject's 
capacity to enter into relations of trust". Trust requires the possibility of error on the part of the 
person trusted yet monitoring minimises the possibility of undetected fault. 173 
The Lord Chancellor's consultation paper proclaims that "Privacy.. . is also a 
basic human need. 
Everyone needs some privacy, for their physical, mental, emotional and spiritual well- 
being". 174McCluskey, however, counter-argues that "this seems to be empirically untrue. Human 
beings seem to have an unlimited capacity to adapt to publicity, provided that the publicity is not 
connected with interference". 175 Others too point out that "History does not teach that privacy is 
164 See Raz, n. 148, pp306-307 
165 See Eric Barendt, p2, Ch. 1, Freedom of Speech (1985, Oxford University Press) 
166 See pVIII, preface, Julie Inness, Privacy,. Intimacy, and Isolation (1992, Oxford) 
167 See Richard Posner, "The Right of Privacy" (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 393,401 
168 See VIII, preface, Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (1992, Oxford) 
169 See p58, Professor Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967, Athenaum) 
170 Op. cit, p59. 
171 Op. cit, n. 165, p10, Ch. 1, Eric Barendt. 
172 See Benn, n. 91, supra, 6. 
173 See Charles Fried, "Privacy" (1968) 77 Yale Law Journal 475,490 
174 See Paragraph 3.9, p 10, Lord Chancellor's Department consultation paper above n. 18. 175 See H. J. McCluskey, "The Political Ideal of Privacy" (1971) 21 Philosophical Quarterly 303, 
312 
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a precondition to creativity or individuality. These qualities have flourished in societies, 
including Ancient Greece, renaissance Italy and Elizabethan England that had much less privacy 
than we". 176 Perhaps it is truer to state people adopt their expectation of privacy according to their 
environment and circumstances. Similarly, Gavison questions whether the alternative of chronic 
obedience of social norms will "always lead to mental breakdown? This is plausible if individuals 
obey social norms only because of social pressures and fear of sanctions, but this is not the 
case ... It could be argued that too much permissiveness is at least as dangerous to mental health 
as too much conformity too". "' 
There is some truth in this, in that human beings have a renowned ability to adapt, and can 
conceivably exist in environments where only minimal levels of seclusion are available. Were the 
law to ignore such claims of individuals to seclusion, only, those wealthy few able to finance 
appropriate security measures and anti-surveillance mechanisms could afford to enjoy it. For the 
majority, the threat of one's behaviour being related to other members of society through the 
medium of a photograph would cause conversations to lose their brevity and informality, 178 and 
individuals to become cautious as to with whom they were seen to form alliances and 
relationships. 179 Some degree of seclusion has "facilitated private conversation and thereby 
enabled us to economise on communication - to speak with a brevity and informality apparently 
rare among primitive peoples". 180 Permitting the editor of a newspaper to knowingly or recklessly 
publish a photograph of an individual upon private property which has been acquired in this 
fashion is perhaps the equivalent of "permitting the readership to suddenly peer in through a 
window" and might jeopardise this economy of communication. 181 If "one of the defining 
characteristics of a free person is the ability to control information about oneself', 182 then surely 
the law ought to intervene to ensure that freedom of choice is respected by others. Covert 
surveillance by the press deceives an individual into thinking his or her movements are 
unmonitored, 183 and empowers others with knowledge at his or her expense. '84 
Why the state should interfere 
176 See Richard Posner, "The Right of Privacy" (1978) 12 Georgia Law Review 393,407 
177 See Ruth Gavison, "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" 89 Yale Law Journal 421,448-449 
178 Op. cit, Posner, p401 
179 See Harry Kalvin, "Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? " (1966) 31 
Law and Contemporary Problems 326,354 
180 See Posner, p402, n. 176 
181 See Edward Bloustein, "Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser" 
(1964) 39 NYULR 962,979 
182 See p39, Ch. 2, Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In from the cold (1994, Clarendon Press) '$' See Frederick Shauer, "Reflections on the Value of Truth" (1991) 41 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review 699,714 
184 See W. A. Parent, "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law" (1983) 2 Law and Philosophy 
305,310-311 
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Having argued why seclusion and personal information merit legal protection, it is also worth 
discussing why the state itself should take a paternal approach in intervening to protect us from 
the attentions of the press? If what Hirsleifer terms the privacy ethic worked fully, an individual 
would insist "on his own claims to inviolability of persons and property while being prepared to 
concede corresponding rights to otherss185. It would seem that either this social contract never 
worked or that it used to work but does so no longer given both the technology and inducements 
now available to encourage intrusion. The state needs to intervene or this form of social contract 
is unlikely to survive if the free rider problem of intrusive photojournalists persists. To do 
nothing is to "accept stoically all the changes for better or worse which follow from advances in 
technology or changes in the structure of society". 186 If every possible technological means of 
observing one's neighbour and recording his activities is deemed permissible, the notion of 
seclusion will soon be confined to the history books. An increasingly expensive array of anti- 
surveillance devices would become needed simply to maintain the level of seclusion enjoyed by 
individuals today. A purely economic and utilitarian argument may be made therefore, for the use 
of the law in this context. This surely represents a more efficient means of ensuring seclusion 
relative to the costs of erecting physical or technological barriers against the intrusive use of 
long-lens and other surveillance technologies. 187 The state itself benefits by protecting individuals 
from these wrongs for they are then better able to function efficiently and contribute creatively to 
the wider society it exists to serve. Society as a whole reaps the benefits of this arrangement and 
it is the duly appointed representative of that society which must ensure this arrangement 
continues to persist. Another argument that the law should intervene "rests largely on the insight 
that the State is constitutive of all legal relations, because the law is itself a construct of the 
State... The private sphere itself is constituted by the State in the sense that it is dependent on the 
state for the provision and enforcement of the norms which regulate relations within that 
sphere". 188 The individual himself is often powerless to compel other organisations or groups 
larger than himself to respect it. This is the first argument for a paternalistic state to intervene to 
ensure the reciprocal arrangement, where one respects the seclusion of others, so that they in turn 
will respect one's own desire for seclusion comes to fruition. It should be remembered that when 
one photojournalist is permitted to unreasonably infringe an individual's privacy, the chances of 
our own being respected is also correspondingly reduced. Privacy "is also essential to democratic 
government because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central 
requirement of a democracy". 
199 
Conclusions 
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To summarise then, we are now in a position to answer at least one of the questions set at the 
outset of this thesis. Namely, consideration of whether legal intervention to protect `privacy' 
from incursions by photojournalists or newspapers represents a realistic and achievable goal. We 
may conclude that those elements said to constitute the nucleus of privacy through which a 
discrete legal principle might be based, cannot seem to resolve the boundaries between this and 
other more distantly related concepts. A loss of dignity, autonomy, intimacy, or seclusion may be 
equally symptomatic of infringement of privacy through unreasonably intrusive photojournalism 
or simply of some other wrong. Accordingly, it is not a vague composite notion of `privacy' that 
ought by law, to be protected from unreasonable intrusion by the press, but much more specific 
forms of behavioural tort. 10 In the first of these, liability would only arise where both parts of a 
two-part test were satisfied. Firstly, the claimant would need to satisfy the court that he had a 
reasonable expectation of freedom from observation, and seclusion from the defendant. Secondly, 
he or she must establish that the conduct of the defendant photojournalist was disproportionate, 
relative to its underlying purpose or aim. On a practical level, this would seem a feasible 
objective which we might entrust to the judiciary. A tort protecting us from the public disclosure 
of personal information is admittedly more controversial, given the ambiguities of what is 
personal, for "however artful or ingenious, definition will never go the whole way towards the 
ideal of unambiguous application of legal rules to situations of fact". 191 Nevertheless, it does 
seem possible to reconcile the boundaries of this wrong with those of freedom of expression. It 
remains the contention of this chapter that the law ought, either directly or indirectly to 
compensate individuals who suffer these wrongs at the hands of photojournalists. The question of 
whether the law does indeed do so is the subject of the following chapters. 
10 It is interesting to note that in Hong Kong, the Law Reform Commission's Sub-committee on 
Privacy chaired by Mortimer J. has also recommended the creation of similar torts. http: //www. hkgcc. org. hk/member/infoserver/bb/others/99082001. asp? 191 See Tom Gerety, op. cit, n. 20,296 
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Curiousity's Tort: The Legality of Paparazzi Methods to Obtain uhotoeraphs 
The preceding chapter examined each of the rival claims in turn of philosophers, sociologists, and 
lawyers who claim to have isolated a core element core to all privacy-based claims. The 
significance of which might be to facilitate delineation of the boundaries of a discrete legal 
principle capable of protecting individuals from press intrusion. However, after due consideration, 
we determined that while a loss of dignity, autonomy, intimacy or seclusion may prove indicative 
of press infringement of privacy, they are by no means conclusive. Further, they are unable to 
resolve where the boundary lies between privacy and other torts. Accordingly, it was felt that 
were a generalised right or tort of privacy enforceable against the press, there would be 
considerable risk of eventual illegitimate `colonisation' of other torts. If the law is to protect our 
privacy from incursion by press photojournalists, a more viable alternative is to address the 
problem by means of more specific forms of behavioural tort. Specifically, wrongs of intrusion 
and unauthorised public disclosure of personal information were identified which this thesis 
argues deserve legal recognition. 
If we are to rely on the current legal system as an effective alternative to these wrongs, it must be 
capable of at least indirectly compensating an individual who is subjected to unwarranted 
intrusion by errant photojournalists. Clearly, "there would be no great practical problem if all 
genuine privacy grievances were capable of remedy through the media of other established heads 
of liability"! The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which existing laws are capable 
of compensating an individual, wither directly or indirectly, for unreasonable intrusion by 
photojournalists. A related objective is to ascertain whether these laws provide comprehensive if 
fragmented protection against maverick members of the press or whether there are sufficient 
lacunae to warrant the enactment of a new tort of intrusion. To answer these questions, this 
chapter will assess the scope of each potentially applicable tort or offence in turn before 
discussing the capacity of each to evolve over time to recognise the wrong of unreasonable 
intrusion by the press. It is with these objectives in mind, that this chapter begins by assessing the 
tort of trespass in this respect. 
Trespass 
The tort of trespass may be defined as "any unjustifiable intrusion by one person upon land in 
possession of another". 
2 A photojournalist, like any other person, has an implied license to set 
foot upon an individual's property for the purpose of ascertaining whether he or she is willing to 
1 An observation made in Paragraph 32, p8, of a report entitled Privacy and the Law (1970, 
JUSTICE) 
Z See Paragraph 17-01, p837, Clerk & Lindell on Tort Edited by Margaret Brazier. (1995,17`h 
Ed, Sweet & Maxwell) 
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be photographed or interviewed, 3 without incurring any liability in trespass. 4 Should that 
individual decline to be photographed, he or she may revoke that journalist's license to enter the 
property with the effect that he or she enjoys a reasonable period of time in which to leave before 
that presence becomes a trespass. Should he or she choose to return with a camera to attempt to 
surreptitiously obtain a photograph anyway or alternatively take photographs without having 
initially sought permission, that journalist exceeds his or her license to enter the property. 
Accordingly that journalist may be held liable in trespass, s which is actionable without proof of 
6 damage. 
An action for damages under this tort might then provide such an individual with a source of 
indirect compensation for the photojournalist's unwarranted intrusion by physically encroaching 
upon the property. However, the primary purpose of damages under the doctrine lies in 
compensating the individual for the temporary loss of use of his property, based on the rental 
value of that land, 7 rather than to compensate that individual directly for the disturbance and 
distress caused by the intrusiveness of the photojournalist's behaviour. 8 
This is an important distinction to note, for general damages calculated to compensate one for the 
loss of enjoyment of one's property may not always adequately reflect the grossness of the 
photographer's intrusion, particularly for example if the journalist has pressed his camera against 
a bedroom window for a better shot. Perhaps an award of discretionary exemplary damages might 
mitigate any such shortcomings. Prima facie, Merest v Harvey (1814)9 would seem to provide 
some support for their sue in this context. Here, Gibbs C. J. expressed no doubt that "were a man 
to walk up and down before the window of [the plaintiff's] house and look in while the owner was 
at dinner, is the trespasser to be permitted to say, `here is halfpenny to you, which is the full 
extent of all the mischief I have done? ' Would that be compensation? I cannot say that it would 
be", and accordingly felt that such a plaintiff would be worthy of an award of exemplary 
damages. '° 
The persuasive dicta of Gibbs C. J. seems to support the notion that a trespassing photojournalist 
ought to be subject to an award of exemplary damages both to compensate the property owner for 
the intrusion suffered and to deter others from doing the same, " but the categories where such 
3 Ibid, Paragraph 17-46, p863. 
Ibid, Paragraph 17-47, p863. 
s See Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, p210, Ch. 4, Media Law (1992,3`d Ed, Penguin) 
6 Op. cit, n. 2, Paragraph 17-08, p841. 
7 See Paragraph 1383, Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed) for general discussion. 8 See Raymond Wacks, p145-147, Ch. 6, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995, Blackstone Press) 
9 Merest v Harvey (1814) 5 Taunt. 442; 128 E. R. 761 
10 Ibid, 443 per Gibbs C. J. 
" An example of exemplary damages being applied in the context of trespass may be seen 
in 
Lavender v Betts [1942] 2 All ER 72,73H-74A per Atkinson J.; Burdett v Abbott (1811) 14 East 
1,104 E. R. 501 
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awards may be made are now restricted by the decision of Rookes v Barnard (1964). 12 The facts 
of this case are not directly relevant to this thesis. Suffice to say that the issue of exemplary 
damages arose when the claimant draughtsman resigned from a `closed shop' trade union and 
refused to rejoin much to the consternation of his fellow workers. His employers, the defendants 
capitulated to the threat of industrial action by the outraged union and dismissed the claimant 
contrary to the tort of intimidation. Lord Devlin allowed the defendant's appeal against an award 
of exemplary damages made to the claimant. His Lordship viewed the very notion of such 
exemplary damages as an anomalous function of the civil law giving rise to confusion between the 
respective roles of the civil and criminal law13 which should accordingly be circumscribed. 
For an award of exemplary damages to be made against a photojournalist liable in trespass, or 
indeed liable in another tort, "a jury should be directed that if, but only if, the sum which they 
have in mind to award as compensation.. . is inadequate to punish him for his outrageous conduct, 
to mark their disapproval of such conduct and to deter him from repeating it, then it can award 
some larger sum". 14 Lord Devlin outlined only three specific categories where such an award 
might be appropriate. Those categories include (i) oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional acts by 
government servants; (ii) or where the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a 
profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; (iii) or 
where expressly authorised to award such damages by statute. Clearly, the second category 15 is 
the most conducive of the three to a court seeking to award exemplary damages against a 
photojournalist likely to profit from an intrusive trespass. It seems arguable that where a freelance 
photojournalist exhibits a "cynical disregard for a plaintiff's rights" 16 through a trespass 
calculated to exceed the damages at risk, that individual should be liable for exemplary damages 
to ensure he or she does not profit from the sale of any photographic material obtained during the 
commission of the tort. However, "the mere fact that a tort ... is committed in the course of a 
business carried on for profit is not sufficient to bring a case within the second category ... what 
is 
necessary in addition is (i) knowledge that what is proposed to be done is against the law or a 
reckless disregard whether what is proposed to be done is illegal or legal, and (ii) a decision to 
carry on doing it because the prospects of material advantage outweigh the prospects of material 
loss". 17 
Objectively, a freelance photojournalist ought to know that to enter an individual's property 
without permission to enter for the purpose of taking photographs, or where that permission has 
been denied amounts to a trespass committed with reckless disregard for another's wishes. Where 
the photograph of the individual sought has a valuable and highly marketable image for which 
'2 Rookes v Barnard [1964] A. C. 1229 
13 Ibid, 1221 & 1226 
"Ibid, 1228 per Lord Devlin. 
'S Ibid, 1226 
16Ibid, 1227 
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newspapers would be willing to pay a considerable sum, it is arguable that such a photojournalist 
should be subject to an award of exemplary damages where he might otherwise profit unduly from 
his trespass. An additional limitation on the award of exemplary damages known as the cause of 
action test was later imposed in A-B & Others v South West Water Services Ltd (1993). 18 This 
requires that exemplary damages may only be awarded where there is a precedent for their use 
under a given action prior to Rookes v Barnard. 19 Fortunately, there are a number of precedents 
for their use in the context of trespass. 20 Liability in trespass may not deter all photojournalists, 
particularly as some have even admitted being willing to break Colorado's severe trespass laws to 
photograph an individual on private property. 21 Nevertheless, exemplary damages should provide 
an added deterrent, although the difficulty of identifying the trespassing journalist remains. "On 
one already legendary occasion, [Princess Diana allegedly] demanded a photographer's name. He 
frivolously told her it was Quentin Crisp and she took out a notebook and jotted it down' . 22 It is 
also worth noting that the use of a photograph taken by a trespassing photographer is unlikely to 
be restrained by an action for trespass 23 For example, in Service Corp. International and Assoc. 
Funeral Directors v Channel 4 Television Corp. & Hardcash Productions (1998)24 Lightman J. 
refused to grant the claimant funeral chain owners an ex parte injunction restraining the 
defendants from broadcasting a film obtained surreptitiously by an undercover journalist in the 
course of his employment on the basis of trespass. While here there is an obvious public interest 
in this particular film alleging corruption to be shown, Lightman J. held that regardless of whether 
or not the journalist might be a trespasser, "his trespass did not confer upon the plaintiffs the right 
to prevent the defendants from showing the film". 25 The reason perhaps for this reluctance is that 
the film itself remains the property of the photographer. 26 
The requirement of possession and the feasibility of trespass by proxy 
The owner or occupier with exclusive possession of a property and the subject of the journalist's 
unwanted intrusion may not be one and the same person. For that individual to take action in 
trespass against a photojournalist, he or she must have possession, 27 which entails regular 
"See Broome v Cassell & Co. [1972] A. C. 1027,1079B-D per Lord Hailsham. 
18A-B& Others v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] Q. B. 507 (C. A) 
19 lbid, 523B per Stuart-Smith L. J. 
20 Most notably in Wilkes v Wood (1763) Lof8.1,98 E. R. 489 
21 See p21, Mark Saunders and Glenn Harvey, Dicing with Di - The amazing adventures of 
Britain's royal chasers (1996, Blake) 
u Ibid, p 18. 
23 See Paul Brogan, "Surveillance and the law - what price privacy? " (1995) 25 Legal Times 18 
24 See Service Corp. International and Assoc. Funeral Directors v Channel 4 Television Corp. & 
Hardcash Productions (1998) May 19, Lawyer 17 (Ch. D) 
23 See Savoy Hotel v B. B. C. (1983) 133 N. L. J 105 (Q. B. D); 1100 (C. A) 
26 See p92, Ch. 9, Don Cassell, The Photographer and the Law (1989,2"d Ed, BFP Books) 
27 See Paragraph 17-10, p842, n. 2 supra. A licensee who is not in possession of land can, 
however, claim possession against a trespasser it would seem, if such a remedy is necessary to 
vindicate and give effect to the licensee's contractual rights of occupation. See Dutton and 
Others v Manchester Airport plc [1999] 2 All ER 675 (C. A) However, in the above case it was 
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occupation and physical control of the property on which the alleged trespass takes place. 28 
Problems may arise therefore if the subject of unwanted photographer attention upon private 
property is merely a guest or licensee on the property of another. The courts have declared "the 
house of everyone is to him as his castle fortress, as well as for his defence against injury and 
violence as for his repose29... [but] the house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself, 
and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to his house.. . for the privilege of 
his house 
extends only to him and his family" 30 The reason for this rule is said to be "because the landlord 
[or occupier]... has retained to himself the occupation, though he has agreed to give the exclusive 
enjoyment of the occupation to the lodger, '31 or licensee. 
The extent of this limitation in terms of who may sue in trespass in relation to intrusion by 
physical encroachment upon private property can be seen in Kaye v Robertson (1991). 2 This case 
arose where an actor lay convalescing in a private hospital room having been seriously injured in 
a road accident. Ignoring a note pinned to his door that indicated his desire for seclusion, several 
photojournalists burst in and proceeded to photograph and `interview' the semi-conscious patient 
before being eventually ejected by hospital staff. The claimant subsequently sought an injunction 
to restrain publication of a newspaper article accompanied by photographs based on the 
encounter. Glidewell L. J. did not favour an injunction "to prevent the defendant from profiting 
from his own trespass. Attractive though this argument may appear to be, I cannot find as a matter 
of law that an injunction should be granted in these circumstances" 33 While trespass to land itself 
was not pleaded, it would seem that for those licensees who reside upon property as Kaye did, in 
which they have no interest, turning to this tort for assistance when the seclusion they enjoy there 
is shattered is not an option. Furthermore, Glidewell L. J. 's dicta appears to make no distinction 
between an action pleaded in either form of trespass. 
Nevertheless, there are those who would suggest that the problematic possession requirement may 
be circumvented through an action in trespass by the occupier on behalf of the licensee whose 
privacy is infringed by a photojournalist. Advocates of this notion of trespass by proxy suggest 
that "there is no hospital in London who would not gladly consent to be joined as co-plaintiff in a 
situation of the Kaye v Robertson type". 34 Hospitals are unlikely, however, to be willing to 
necessary for a licensee company to take possession against squatters on National Trust land in 
order to perform a contract for the construction of a second airport runway. 
28 The owner of an equitable interest with possession may sue in trespass, see Mason v Clarke 
[1955] A. C. 778 (H. L) 
29 Semayne's Case (1604) 5 Co. Rep 91a, 91b; 77 E. R. 194,195 
30 Ibid, 93a; 77 E. R. 194,198 
31 See Allan v Liverpool (Overseers) Ltd (1874) 9 Q. B. L. R. 180 per Blackburn J. 32 Kaye v Robertson [1991] F. S. R. 62 This case appears frequently throughout this thesis, and is 
discussed in some detail elsewhere with regard to the other actions utilised by the plaintiff in 
respect of the same wrong of photojournalist intrusion. Hereafter, the facts of the case will only be 
repeated briefly to avoid unnecessary repetition. Please refer back to this section if necessary. ;' Ibid, 69 per Glidewell L. J. 
34 See Peter Prescott, "Kaye v Robertson- a reply" (1991) 54 M. L. R. 451,454 
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undertake legal actions on behalf of disturbed patients when their primary function lies in the 
provision of healthcare. Even were one to assume that such a landowner were outraged by the 
treatment of his guest, he would doubtless be discouraged by the thought of contributing to legal 
costs, the inherent risks of losing the case, and the onerous prospect of litigation. These factors 
provide an explanation for the reluctance of the hospital in Kaye to join the claimant in an action 
for trespass. The notion of trespass by proxy therefore is an unrealistic one, particularly when one 
considers the further problem of privity of loss. The owner of the property has the right to sue but 
has suffered little in the way of loss. The licensee on the other hand, has seen his or her seclusion 
violated but lacks the right to sue. The land owner's victory would be at best a technical one. 
There are some limitations, therefore to the use of the tort of trespass as a means of redress for 
photojournalist intrusion through physical encroachment upon private property. 35 The claimant is 
compensated for the rental value lost through the unauthorised use of his or her land by the 
photojournalist rather than the distress caused by the nature of the intrusion itself. 36 Trespass is 
concerned only with corporeal forms of physical encroachment upon private property and its 
immediate airspace. Unfortunately, close proximity with a subject or physical contact with that 
person's property are no longer necessitated to take pictures of him or her. Spotting Princess 
Diana in a two-piece bathing costume at a private villa, one photojournalist commented "Even 
through a distance of a mile she looked sensational... As the film shot through the cameras, I knew 
we had some good shots' . 37 This technological revolution enables photojournalists to fly 
overhead and takes pictures without interfering with any airspace above their subject's property38 
that is essential for his or her enjoyment of that land, 39 or simply to take pictures from the street 
outside that property from which it rarely becomes necessary for them to stray and trespass. 
0 The 
mere taking of a photograph cannot turn an act which is not a trespass into one that is, 
41 for `the 
eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass'. 2 The professional photographer is 
fully aware of the limitations of trespass and makes full use of any public right of way over 
private property43 or hovers just beyond the very perimeter of his subject's private property, a 
process known as doorstepping. 
35 The damages awarded in respect of a trespass for the purpose of facilitating audio, as opposed 
to visual surveillance or a married couple's bedroom amounted to a mere £52. See Sheen v Clegg 
(1967) Daily Telegraph June 22. Discussed p99, Ch. 3, G. Robertson, Freedom, the Individual and 
the Law (1989,6ý' Ed, Penguin) 
36Opcit, n. 26, p161 
37 See Colin Munro, "Photographs and Legality" (1997) 8(6) Ent. L. R. 197,199 
38 See Bernstein v Skyviews Ltd [1978] Q. B. 479,488A-B per Griffiths J. As Raymond Wacks 
points out, even if an individual could preclude others from flying over his land and taking 
photographs at such altitude, they would simply fly over adjoining land instead and take them 
from there. See p33, Ch. 2, The Protection of Privacy (1980, Sweet & Maxwell) 
39 See also Civil Aviation Act 1982 
40 See p466, Ch. 12, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort by W. V. H. Rogers. (1998,15`s Ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 
41 Griffiths J. expressed this view in Bernstein v Skyviews [1978] Q. B. 479,488. 
`z See Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1030,1066 
43 Such public rights of way enable photographers to take pictures of Royalty on the Balmoral 
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The inevitable conclusion therefore, is that trespass alone constitutes an inadequate means of 
protection against modem forms of photojournalist intrusion where physical contact with property 
proves unnecessary. Indeed, Vice Chancellor Kindersley remarked in Turner v Spooner (1861)44 
that "with regard to the question of privacy, no doubt the owner of a house would prefer that a 
neighbour should not have the right of looking into his windows or yard, but neither this court nor 
a court of law will interfere on the mere ground of invasion of privacy of a neighbour's premises 
and so interfering, perhaps, with his comfort". 45 The prevailing view therefore, at least in the 
context of trespass, has tended to be that "the law does not protect privacy ... 
light and air are 
things of necessity, while prospect and privacy are but things of delight" 46 A fu ther explanation 
as to why the law has not sought to protect our seclusion until now may be that the walls and 
boundaries of private property were once sufficient to protect individuals from the prying eyes of 
others rendering legal intervention unnecessary. 47 Many individuals still rely on the use of 
curtains, shutters, frosted glass, open-spaces and some security measures to guarantee seclusion 
but technology has evolved to overcome these defences 48 
There are those who suggest that the presence of a group of photojournalists outside a particular 
private property may amount to a contravention of the Public Order Act 1986. McCowan L. J. was 
to briefly express support for this proposition in D. P. P. v Jones and Lloyd (1997) 49 The case 
itself did not concern journalists at all but rather some twenty-one protestors who gathered on the 
grass verge of a highway adjacent to the ancient monument of Stonehenge. Their presence there 
was found to contravene an order made under s. 14A(2) of the Public Order Act 1986 prohibiting 
the holding of trespassory assemblies within a four mile radius of the monument. 50 During his 
summation, McCowan L. J. was to consider the question of what is incidental to passage or 
repassage upon a highway. He concluded that "Passing the time of day with an acquaintance who 
one happens to meet on the highway might well qualify, but I would reject the suggestion that the 
holding of an assembly of 21 persons possibly could, any more than I would accept Counsel's 
suggestion, by way of analogy, that a photographer outside Buckingham Palace taking 
photographs from the highway of members of the royal family on that land would only be doing 
something which was incidental to his right of passage on that highway". st McCowan L. J. makes 
this remark casually without further elaboration. On further examination, the implication that the 
estate for example. See "Prince Charles and Family threatens legal action against British press 
photographers" (1996) Aug 26 http: //www. nyu. edu/classes/Schiffnian/gelc/news/uk-news 
14 Turner v Spooner (1861) 30 L. J. (n. s) Ch. 801 
`s Ibid, 803 per Kindersley, V-C 
46 See Jones v Taplin (1862) 31 L. J. (n. s) Ch. 342,353 per Blackburn J. 
47 See Paragraphs 37, p8, and 81, p25, Report of the Committee on privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 48 See p89, Ch. 4, Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967, Athenaeum) 
49 D. P. P. vJones and Lloyd [1997] 2 All ER 119 (Q. B. D) 
50 See commentary in Ben Fitzpatrick and Nick Taylor, "A case of highway robbery? " (1997) 
147(6782) N. L. J. 338; See also (1997) 94(6) L. S. G. 27; (1997) 147 N. L. J. Rep 162 
51 Op. cit, 124E-F per McCowan L. J. 
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photojournalist is somehow exceeding his legitimate right to make use of the highway seems 
erroneous. 
Firstly, the presence of a lone photojournalist on the highway does not constitute a public 
assembly within the meaning of the Act. A public assembly under s. 14(1) is said to consist of 
"twenty or more people in a public place (any highway or any place to which the public, or any 
section of the public, has access as of right or by virtue of any express or implied conditions on 
payment or otherwise). 9952 Secondly, for s. 14A(1) to prove applicable, a Chief Officer must 
reasonably believe that an assembly is intended to be held on land to which the public has no right 
of access or only a limited right of access. He must believe that the assembly is likely to be held 
without the permission of the occupier of that land in such a way as to exceed the public right of 
access. Furthermore, he must also believe the land or some building or monument upon it of 
architectural, archaeological or scientific importance is likely to sustain significant damage as a 
result. Only then he may apply to the council of the district for an order prohibiting for a specified 
period the holding of all trespassory assemblies. Even if a chief of police was to reasonably 
apprehend a gathering of doorstepping photojournalists were imminent, their presence would 
hardly seem likely to cause a serious disruption to community life. It seems an unconvincing 
argument that a Chief of police would be willing to request such an order simply to protect the 
seclusion of a few selected individuals. In D. P. P. v Jones and Lloyd itself, the property protected 
was both a site of architectural and historical heritage. 
Similarly, it is difficult to concur with McCowan L. J. 's view that the actions of the photojournalist 
outside Buckingham Palace in taking pictures of its occupants is necessarily so unreasonable as to 
constitute a trespass to the highway. It is a question of degree, and furthermore it is unlikely that 
the occupants of Buckingham Palace possess an interest in the subsoil of the highway upon which 
the hypothetical photojournalist stands or substantial portions of land on either side of it. 
53 The 
subsoil beneath the vast majority of roads upon which photojournalist doorstepping takes place 
will belong to a local authority, 
54 thus precluding an action in trespass to the highway by the 
owner of the beleaguered property. 
" Although s. 130(3) of the Highways Act 1980 requires "a 
highway authority to prevent as far as possible, the stopping up or obstruction of highways" which 
might conceivably include large gatherings of journalists in residential areas, it is unlikely that 
many local authorities would take action against doorstepping photojournalists. Burdened by tight 
52 See p827, Ch. 17, David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 
(1993, oxford) 
s' For example, see Harrison v Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 Q. B. 142,146-147 per Lord Esher M. R. 
(C. A); Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 Q. B. 752,756-757 (C. A); Cinnamond v British Airports 
Authority [1980] 1 W. L. R. 582,588E-F per Lord Denning, M. R. ýCompare Hubbard v Pitt [1976] 
Q. B. 142,175D per Lord Denning, M. R. regarding potential for departure from the subsoil 
requirement of trespass to the highway. 
sa See Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn U. D. C. [1954] Ch. 383 which provides authority 
for the proposition that ownership of a highway is vested in the appropriate local authority. 55 See A. Goodhart, "Public meetings and processions" (1937) 6 C. L. J. 161,165 
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budgets, there are few likely to undertake costly legal action56 on behalf of those pestered by the 
press. On the rare occasion that photojournalist, Klaus Wagner was arrested for obstructing the 
highway outside the gym frequented by Princess Diana, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped 
the charges given insufficient evidence. 7 
It seems unlikely therefore that a photojournalist who is engaged in surveillance or photographing 
an individual upon private property with a long lens would incur liability either for trespass to the 
highway or s. 14A(2) of the Public Order Act 1986. It is more probable perhaps that such a 
photojournalist might incur liability under sections 4A or 5 of this Act. 58 Section 4(A) as inserted 
by s. 154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides an offence where an 
individual intends to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress by virtue of threatening, 
abusive, or insulting words or disorderly behaviour. The difficulty in applying this offence to a 
photojournalist in this context lies in establishing the necessary intent to cause alarm or distress. 
Similarly, s. 5 provides that "a person is guilty of an offence if he (a) uses threatening, abusive, or 
insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour... within the hearing or sight of a person 
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby". The presence of a photojournalist and 
his camera is likely to be neither threatening nor disorderly. Indeed while Bernard Quinn was 
arrested for behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace for trailing after the Princess Royal, 
magistrates later dismissed the charge in all probability for precisely this reason. 59 Those 
members of the police force who do encounter photojournalists loitering outside private property, 
60 are generally content to move them on. 
Nuisance 
The tort of trespass has proved unequal to this task largely because photojournalist intrusion 
through surveillance constitutes an interference with the enjoyment of a property as distinct from 
its use. A private nuisance, however, includes any "condition or activity which unduly interferes 
with the use or enjoyment of land". 
61 Actionable nuisances can be separated into three distinct 
categories which are (1) nuisance by the encroachment of objects other than persons, such as 
roots, branches, or synthetic constructs upon a neighbour's land; (2) nuisance by direct physical 
injury to a neighbour's land; or (3) nuisance by interference with a neighbour's quiet enjoyment 
of land, of which the latter is the most relevant in this context. The nature of the interference 
caused by doorstepping journalists with the enjoyment of private property is intangible, but then 
56 See Paul Wallington, "Injunctions and the Right to demonstrate" (1976) 35 C. L. J. 82,86 
17 See p2, Michael Allen, "Look Who's Stalking: Seeking a Solution to the Problem of Stalking" 
(1996) 4 Web JCLI http: //webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/1996/issue4/allen4, html 
58 Discussed p44, Ch. 2, David Feldman, Privacy and Loyalty (1997, SPTIJClarendon Press) 
59 See p2, Michael Allen, "Look Who's Stalking: Seeking a Solution to the Problem of Stalking" 
(1996) 4 Web JCLI httpJ/webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/1996/issue4/allen4. html 
60 See p76, Mark Saunders and Glenn Harvey, Dicing with Di - The amazing adventures of Britain's royal chasers (1996, Blake) 
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the tort of nuisance has long been applied to similarly intangible annoyances capable of causing 
`sensible personal discomfort' such as noise, noxious vapours and the like 62 It is well recognised 
that while "Nuisance is a wrong to property ... that even where there is no physical 
damage to 
property it may cause annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort to the occupier of the property in 
his enjoyment of it" 63 
Although there is nothing unlawful about a journalist's use of the pavement as a place from which 
he or she takes photographs, this is not to say such lawful behaviour may not amount to a 
nuisance if that individual chooses to linger for such a sustained period as to interfere with the 
quiet enjoyment of neighbouring private property. Take for instance, the case of Thompson- 
Schwab v Costaki (1956)M in which a group of house owners banded together in an action in 
nuisance to restrain passage of the defendant prostitutes to and from their place of work who 
passed by their properties. Lord Evershed acknowledged that the defendants, do "not in any 
material, that is to say physical way interfere with the land of the plaintiffs or their use of 
it... [and] there is nothing about the activities of the defendants that has been shown to be illegal 
or criminal... [but] it does not to my mind follow at all that their activities should, therefore, be 
regarded as free from risk or probability that they cause a nuisance... merely because they do not 
impinge on the senses65... the test is whether what is being done interferes with the plaintiffs in the 
comfortable and convenient enjoyment of their land, regard being had... to the character of the 
neighbourhood". 66 Admittedly, this case does seem to lie somewhat controversially at the very 
borders of nuisance in that the effects of the prostitutes on the enjoyment of these properties 
appears minimal. Nevertheless, it remains a valid precedent, and it would seem considerably less 
radical to suggest that sustained doorstepping by photojournalists might also be considered an 
interference with the comfortable enjoyment of one's home. 7 Surely this is "not a mere hurt of his 
sensibilities as a fastidious man, but a sensible interference with the comfortable and convenient 
enjoyment of his residence? " 
68 The conduct of the journalists may be less morally reprehensible 
than that of the prostitutes, but it may still be equally obnoxious in nature to the victims of such 
close unyielding scrutiny. 
69 
61 Op. cit, n. 2, Paragraph 18-05,891 
62 See St. Helen's Smelting Company v Tipping (1865) 11 H. L. C. 642; 11 E. R. 1483; 
63 Bone v Seale [1975] 1 W. L. R. 797,804E-F per Scarman L. J. (C. A) 
64 Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 W. L. R. 335 (C. A) 
65 Ibid, 337 per Lord Evershed, M. R. 
66 Ibid, 338 
67 While in the Australian case of Victoria Park Recreational Grounds v Taylor (1937) 58 C. L. R. 
479,493 per Latham C. J. (1938) Argus L. R. 597 the defendant's deliberate efforts to overlook 
and photograph the horse racing activities that took place on neighbouring land did not constitute 
a nuisance, this was because the interference was not so much with the enjoyment of land as the 
business conducted upon it. See G. W. Paton, Notes (1938) 54 L. Q. R. 319 
68 Ibid, 339 
69 The possibility of mere onlookers who gather in the street simply to watch the day to day 
activities of a given individual is discussed briefly in a note to Rex v Carlisle (1834) 6 Car. & P. 
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It is possible to find a number of authorities that suggest a nuisance can be created from the 
presence of a crowd, like that of a group of journalists gathered outside private property for the 
purposes of surveillance 70 In Walker v Brewster (1867)71 for example, the claimant house owner 
sought to restrain the defendant's firework display and loud music which caused "great numbers 
of boys to climb on to the walls of the plaintiff's grounds.. . and 
destroy their privacy". 72 The 
Vice-Chancellor, Sir Page Wood stated that "the plaintiff complains that when these fetes are 
given, crowds of idle people are drawn together who, being idle, do not pass on but occupy the 
road and plaintiff's wall so as to obtain a view of the fireworks and other entertainments 73 ... 
it 
appears to me, therefore, that a clear case of nuisance is established in the collecting of a crowd 
alone", 74 deriving support for such a proposition from the earlier case of Rex v Moore (183 2)75 It 
should of course be remembered that not all crowds are nuisances. The key to whether a large 
gathering of the press or indeed, a lone photojournalist amounts to a nuisance lies in proving that, 
as Lindley L. J. remarked in Todd-Heatly v Benham (1888), 76 the conduct of such persons can be 
objectively judged a nuisance "in the minds of reasonable men" as distinguished from a mere 
77 fanciful feeling of distaste. 
The Continuity Factor: The relevance of the duration of doorstepping to liability in 
nuisance 
Sustained periods of observation by a photojournalist outside private property may represent an 
actionable nuisance, but an opportunistic photographer who spends a comparatively short period 
of time engaged in surveillance or intrusion may pose more of a problem. As the Lord 
Chancellor's Department observed in their consultation paper on privacy, "nuisance is usually a 
continuous wrong, arising out of a state of affairs, rather than a single act". 78 Though the courts 
may consider the "harassment of constant surveillance" as both "a monstrous invasion of 
privacy... [and] an actionable nuisance for which they would give relief', 79 a transient intrusion is 
636; 172 E. R. 1397 
70 Stemming from Betterton's Case (1689) Holt. 538; 90 E. R. 1196; See also Barber v Penley 
; 1893] 2 Ch. 447,461 per North J. 
1 Walker v Brewster (1867) L. R. 5 E. Q. 25 
72 Ibid, 26 
" Ibid, 31 per Sir W. Page Wood, V-C. 
74 Ibid, 34 per Sir W. Page Wood, V-C. 
75 Rex v Moore (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 184,188; 110 E. R. 68,70 in which Lord Tenterden C. J. found 
the defendant's pigeon shooting on land adjacent to a highway which caused "divers persons to 
meet there for that purpose-and caused a great number of idle and disorderly persons" to gather 
there amounted to a nuisance. 
76 Todd-Neatly v Benham (1888) 40 Ch. D 80; 5 T. L. R. 9 (C. A) 
77 Ibid, 96 per Lindley L. J. 
78 See Lord Chancellor's Department (Scottish Office) consultation paper entitled "Infringement 
of Privacy" July, 1993, p56, Part 1, Annex A. 
" See Bernstein v Skyviews [1978] Q. B. 479,489F-G per Griffiths J. The defendant's intention in 
the above case, however, was to sell the aerial photograph they had taken to the claimant property 
owner and not to disseminate it to the wider public. This distinction is discussed further in Samuel 
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unlikely to qualify. It may be therefore, that the owner of private property will only be 
compensated for the intrusion caused by a sustained period of press surveillance under this tort. In 
Fritz v Hobson (18 80)80 Fry J. expressed the opinion that this requirement of continuity does have 
some flexibility but only where such conduct `results in substantial damages, and the question, 
therefore is not answered by time, but by the effects upon the plaintiff'. gl While a nuisance can 
last as little as fifteen minutes, as in Crown River Cruises v Kimbolten Fireworks Ltd (1996)82 the 
shorter the duration of an alleged nuisance, the greater the damage it must cause to prove 
actionable. In this instance, a defendant's brief but energetic fireworks display in this case had 
caused burning debris to shower down, damaging the claimant's barges. 83 The mental distress 
caused by intrusive surveillance techniques is far less tangible and rarely gives rise to economic 
loss. The courts have made it clear that they "will be more strict as to the proof of a case of 
nuisance only lasting eight weeks than in the case of a permanent one". 84 One of the principal 
means by which the judiciary will assess whether the actions of a photojournalist in setting up 
long lens photographic equipment outside private property amounts to a nuisance is by 
considering the length of time that individual spends in the vicinity of his subject's property. It 
would appear that "private nuisances, at least in the vast majority of cases, are interferences for a 
substantial length of time ... with the use or enjoyment of neighbouring property" 
85 The duration 
of a photojournalist's presence poses a vital question in determining whether the conduct 
complained of amounts to a nuisance, for the injury must be of a "substantial character, not 
fleeting or evanescent' . 86 
Other difficulties likely to arise from any attempt to utilise nuisance against unreasonably 
intrusive photojournalists, as with trespass stems from the inability of licensees87 to sue in 
nuisance. 88 In KhorasandjIan v Bush (1993)89 the Court of Appeal was to briefly and 
controversially depart from this rule by permitting a licensee to obtain an injunction for the 
nuisance of harassing telephone calls in her parents and grand parents' houses. 90 Turning to the 
Canadian authority of Motherwell v Motherwell (1976)9' for inspiration, in which the wife of a 
Stoljar, "A re-examination of privacy" (1984) 4 Legal Studies 67,75; Stephen Todd, p183, Ch. 6, 
Torts in the Nineties Edited by Nicholas J. Mullany. (1997, LBC Information Services) 
80 Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 Ch. D 542 
81 Ibid, 556 per Fry J. 
82 Crown River Cruises Ltd v Kimbolten Fireworks Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep 533 
83 Ibid, 545 
84 See Inchbald vRobinson and Barrington (1869) 4 L. R. Ch. App. 388,395 per Sir C. J. Selwyn 
85 Cunard and Wife v Antifyre Ltd [1933] 1 K. B. 551,557 per Talbot J. 
86 Benjamin v Storr (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 400,407 per Brett J. 
87 The propriety of permitting a licensee to sue in nuisance is generally perceived as undesirable, 
and is discussed in the following articles, See John Ford, "Squaring analogy with principle or vice 
versa" (1994) 53 C. L. J. 14,16 
88 See Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 K. B. 141; Metropolitan Properties v Jones [1939] 2 All ER 
202; Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd V Greater London Council [1983] 2 A. C. 509. 
89 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 All ER 669; [1993] Q. B. 727; [1993] 3 W. L. R. 476 (C. A) 
90 The propriety of which is discussed in "Stalking the tortfeasor" (1997) 31(2) Law Teacher 252 
91 Motherwell v Motherwell (1976) 73 D. L. R. (3d) 62 
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property owner was held entitled to sue in respect of harassing telephone calls, Dillon L. J. 
concluded "I do not see why that should not also apply to a child living at home with her 
parents". 2 Dillon L. J. took the view that "it is ridiculous if in this present age the law is that the 
making of deliberately harassing and pestering telephone calls to a person is only actionable in the 
civil courts if the recipient of the calls happens to have the freehold or a leasehold proprietary 
interests in the premises in which he or she has received the calls". 93 Dillon L. J. added that "the 
court has at times to reconsider earlier decisions in the light of changed social conditions", 94 
referring to the absence of either a tort of harassment of invasion of privacy at that time. For these 
reasons, Dillon L. J. found "the inconvenience and annoyance to the occupier caused by such calls, 
and the interference thereby with the ordinary and reasonable use of the property are sufficient 
damage" 95 His fellow judge, Peter Gibson J. dissenting, felt unable to concur, for in his words, 
"private nuisance is usually defined as an act or omission which is an interference with, or a 
disturbance or annoyance to, a person in the exercise or enjoyment of his ownership or occupation 
of land96... I know of no authority which would allow a person with no interest in land or right to 
occupy land to sue in private nuisance,,. 97 Indeed, the subsequent House of Lords decision in 
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997)98 agreed with these views and overruled Khorasandjian v 
Bush on this basis. While, the facts of this case are not relevant to the theme of this thesis, 99 the 
comments of their lordships have much to tell us about the flexibility of the tort of nuisance. Lord 
Hoffman emphasised that "Once it is understood that nuisances `productive of sensible personal 
discomfort' do not constitute a separate tort of causing discomfort to people but are merely part of 
a single tort of causing injury to land, the rule that the plaintiff must have an interest in the land 
falls into place as logical and, indeed, inevitable". 100 He went on to observe that "there is a good 
deal said in this case and other writings about the need for the law to adapt to modem social 
conditions. But the development of the common law should be rational and coherent. It should not 
distort its principles and create anomalies merely as an expedient to fill a gap". '°' This would 
seem to suggest that the judiciary would be unwilling to attempt any radical application of 
nuisance to combat the problem of press intrusion. Lord Hope expressly remarked that the 
language of Khorasandjian v Bush "demonstrates that the case was concerned with the invasion 
of the privacy of the plaintiff's person, not the invasion of any interest which she might have had 
in any land ... But the solution to 
her case ought not to have been found in the tort of nuisance, as 
her complaint of the effect on her privacy of the defendant's conduct was of a kind which fell 
92 [1993] 3 All ER 669,676A; [1993] Q. B. 727,735C; [1993] 3 W. L. R. 476,482A per Dillon 
L. J. 
93 Ibid, 675B; 734C-D; 481B per Dillon L. J. 
94 Ibid, 675J; 735B; 481H per Dillon L. J. 
95 Ibid, 676A-B; 735D; 482A-B 
96 Ibid, 684D; 744F-G; 490H per Peter Gibson J. 
97 Ibid, 684J; 745D; 491E 
98 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] 2 All ER 426 (H. L) 
" The case concerned, in fact, whether licensees can bring an action in nuisance in respect of 
interference with television reception caused by the construction of a neighbouring tower block. 100 Op. cit, 452E per Lord Hoffman 
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outside the scope of the tort". 102 Damages in nuisance are measured either by diminution in the 
value of the land or, in the case of interference with quiet enjoyment, by loss of amenity value and 
not the offensiveness of intrusion! '. 103 
Nevertheless, nuisance does go further than trespass in that liability may arise where 
photojournalists gather outside the confines of an individual's property for sustained periods of 
time. Those members of the press who do so for the purpose of conducting surveillance which 
thereby disturbs both an individual's seclusion together with his enjoyment of that property may 
be subject to an injunction or an award of damages. The tort of nuisance may be invaluable to a 
subject of long-term interest to the press such as for example pop stars or politicians, but unable 
to compensate individuals for the transient of irregular attentions of photojournalists even where 
they are justified in their expectation of seclusion. Both the continuity requirement of nuisance 
and the inability of licensees to make use of it therefore severely constrain its use as a means of 
compensation for press intrusion. Accordingly, some commentators have turned once more to the 
criminal law for an answer, in the hope that such behaviour might at least attract liability under 
s. 241 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.104 This section 
provides it is an offence for a "person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain 
from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from 
doing". Specifically, the offence refers to the act of wrongfully and without legal authority 
persistently following another person about from place to place with this objective in mind. 
Watching and besetting the house or place where that person resides, works, carries on business 
or happens to be or the approach to such house or place similar attracts liability under this 
offence. Promising as the terms of the offence may sound in that they apparently encompass the 
behavioural elements of photojournalist intrusion, the offence is unlikely to be applied in this 
context. In all those instances where the identical predecessor of this statute has been applied, 105 
such as J. Lyons and Sons v Wilkins (1899)106 injunctions granted to restrain defendants from 
activities such as picketing a workplace have been limited to "all watching and besetting... except 
such as merely for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information". Watching and 
besetting for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information is the principal motivation of 
a photojournalist for indulging in such behaviour. While the offence itself makes no reference to 
the wrong of compelling others to participate in industrial action, the title of the Act establishes it 
was intended primarily for use in this context. 107 The photojournalist, in contrast, seeks neither to 
compel his subject to take any action or refrain from doing so but merely wishes to impartially 
101 Ibid, 452G 
102 Ibid, 469B per Lord Hope of Craighead 
103 Ibid, 442A-B per Lord Lloyd of Berwick 
104 See Paragraph 12-68, p305, The Law of Journalism by Catherine Courtney, David Newell and 
Santha Rasaiah. (1995, Butterworths) 
los See s. 7 of the repealed Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875. 
1°6 J. Lyons & Sons v Wilkins [1899] 1 Ch. 255 (C. A) 
107 See C. H. Rolph, "Snooping the Snoopers" (1994) 144(6680) N. L. J. 1308 
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observe and record his or her natural movements. Something more on the part of the journalist in 
question would be called for in order for his or her actions in seeking to obtain a photograph of an 
individual upon private property to incur liability under this offence. Perhaps the use of 
intimidation to compel his or her subject to acquiesce to posing for a photograph or to grant an 
interview against their will. log The penalties then at the disposal of the course would include a fine 
not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, six months imprisonment or both. 109 The purpose of 
s. 7 of the repealed Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 which the identical s. 241 of 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 replaced was to give "certain 
specified classes of acts, for which there was previously a civil remedy, a criminal remedy by 
summary proceedings before justices". 1° It would seem that the wrong of photojournalist 
intrusion which is an "annoyance short of a legal nuisance is not a wrong... [for] mere annoyance 
without infringement of some legal rights is not an offence". "' 
Harassment 
Thus far we have a strong case for the introduction of a new tort to combat the wrong of intrusion 
into seclusion identified in the inaugural chapter. A comparatively recent addition to the law of 
torts does however, offer the potential to compensate individuals for multiple or repeated forms of 
intrusion by photojournalists, Section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 that "a 
person must not pursue a course of conduct which (a) amounts to harassment of another, and (b) 
which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other". Section 3(1) states that 
"an actual or apprehended breach of section 1 may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings 
by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question". Damages may be 
awarded under s. 3(2) for any anxiety or financial loss resulting from the harassment, 112 and so this 
tort should prove particularly valuable to licensees where photojournalists repeatedly congregate 
outside property in which an individual resides but has no interest. ' 13 Even those persons, such as 
Camilla Parker-Bowles who find it "increasingly difficult to carry out simple trips to the shops" 
given the pursuit of freelance reporters may stand to benefit under the Act therefore. 114 The 
government have expressly stated that unlike either trespass or nuisance which we examined 
earlier, those wishing to utilise the tort of harassment need have no proprietary rights in the 
property upon which the acts complained of take place. ' 15 
108 See p814, Ch. 17, David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 
(1993, Oxford) 
109 See s. 241(2) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 
110 See Ward, Lock & Co. Ltd v The Operative Printers' Assistants Society and Another (1906) 22 
T. L. R. 327 
111 Op. cit, n. 106,265 per Lindley M. R. 
112 Harassment even includes speech under s. 7(4) of the 1998 Act. 
113 See Peter Jones, "Stalking the tortfeasor" (1997) 31(2) Law Teacher 252,253,257-58 
ýý 114 See Robert Hardman, "Prince acts to protect Camilla from harassment with a staff or her own 
(1997) 6 Daily Telegraph, Jan 28 
"s See Paragraph 5.5, Home Office Consultation paper entitled "Stalking - The Solution" 
July, 
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Objectively Unreasonable Behaviour 
It would seem that photojournalists who persist in pursuing an individual from place to place or in 
soliciting photographs after being asked to desist ought reasonably to be aware that their 
continued presence may have a distressing effect upon that individual, ' 16 particularly where the 
use of close-up shots impedes that individual's progress along a street and hampers their freedom 
of movement. 117 Behaviour which causes anxiety in the subject of one photojournalist may be 
untroubling to another, "8 so the question therefore is one of the probable effects of that 
journalist's conduct upon the reasonable or hypothetical average man. Indeed, s. 1(2) expressly 
states that "for the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question 
ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the 
same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other". In 
determining whether a journalist should have been aware of the probable consequences of his 
actions in relation to this young and consequently undeveloped tort, the court will undoubtedly 
undertake a factual assessment of that individual's conduct in relation to the claimant, such as 
perhaps, the unsociable hours at which an incident took place or the availability of alternative and 
less intrusive means by which that individual might have legitimately sought the claimant's 
image. ' 19 Even otherwise lawful conduct, such as attempting to take a photograph might incur 
liability if such a photographer ought reasonably to be aware that his actions might be perceived 
as harassment of another person. 120 
A Course of Conduct 
While Princess Diana once allegedly objected to the presence of two photographers some thirty 
metres away taking pictures of her and her children amongst a crowd of public cinema goers, this 
single act in itself is unlikely to be viewed as harassment. Harassment by virtue of its very name 
implies a repeated or prolonged course of distressing behaviour and it is unsurprising therefore, 
that s. 7(3) of the Act also requires that the harassing behaviour complained of must occur on at 
least two occasions. The Act itself makes no reference to the necessary degree of proximity 
between the first and second instance of allegedly harassing behaviour in order for an individual 
1995 
116 See John Marston and Katherine Thompson, "Protection from Harassment Act 1997" (1997) 
161(31) J. P. 739; Leonard Jason-Lloyd, "The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 -A 
Commentary" (1997) 161(33) J. P. 787 
117 Op. cit, n. 21, p2, at which the authors recount an encounter with the late Princess of Wales 
which today might be construed as harassment if indulged in upon more than one occasion. 118 See Nicholas Mullany and Peter Handford, p15-45, Ch. 2, Tort Liability for Psychiatric 
Damage (1993, Sweet & Maxwell) 
119 See Martin Davies, "Do We Need Our Privacy? " (1997) 8(8) Ent. L. R. 286,287-88 
120 See discussion in "Right of peaceful protest preserved" (1998) (Apr) Legal Action 10 of 
instances where injunctions have been obtained against otherwise lawful behaviour 
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such as a photojournalist to incur liability under the tort. Presumably the two would need to be 
relatively close for a link to be established between the two acts as to constitute a course of 
conduct. 121 Fortunately, some measure of clarification on this point is provided by Rv Williams 
(Michael) (1998)l22 in which a stalker incurred liability under the Act in respect of two acts 
separated by an intervening period of two days. The defendant first distressed one claimant by 
putting his hand through her bathroom window as she showered and later another individual in 
that same flat by peering in through a window from the rooftop. This was found sufficient by 
Rose L. J. for the defendant to incur liability, because he was satisfied that the subject of the 
second intrusion had been emotionally distressed by both events although she had not been 
present during the first encounter. This decision would seem to suggest that were a 
photojournalist to intrude upon the seclusion of two separate individuals on two separate 
occasions, he might still prove liable for harassment if they both lived as a "close knit definable 
group" such as flat mates or indeed a family at the same address. 
Anxiety 
It seems entirely possible therefore that an individual might be compensated under this tort for 
either the use of long lens technology to take pictures of an individual upon private property 
without consent or surveillance providing (1) that individual ought reasonably to be aware of the 
harassment he might thereby cause, and (2) that behaviour occurs on at least two occasions so as 
to constitute a course of conduct within the terms of the Act. Such a proposition seems 
particularly realistic when one considers that s. 3(2) of the Act enables an individual to be 
compensated through an award of up to £5,000 in damages for any anxiety or financial loss 
caused by the harassment. This amount bears an uncanny resemblance to the remedy proposed by 
both Sir David Calcutt 123 and Nigel Fricker J. '24 as a means of compensating those individuals 
whose privacy was unjustifiably infringed by the press. 125 
`Anxiety' appears to bear its ordinary meaning and in this regard, the tort may be considered 
ground breaking in that traditionally, the judiciary have sought to avoid providing redress for 
purely mental distress in the absence of more serious manifestations of the harm caused by 
another. 126 Given the previous reluctance of the judiciary to provide redress for merely transient 
forms of anxiety127 in the absence of a recognised Wrong 128 the importance of the behavioural 
121 See Liz Davies and Mary Lawrenson, "Protection from Harassment Act 1997" (1997) (Aug) 
Legal Action 23 
122 Rv Williams (Michael) (1998) (Unreported) 12(35) Lawyer 16 
123 See Paragraph 7.24, p55, "Review of Press Self-Regulation" Cm. 2135 
124 See Nigel Fricker J. 's proposals in "Harassment as a tort" (1992) 142(6546) N. L. J. 247 
'25 See also Memorandum submitted jointly by Fricker J. and Margaret Brazier in p287, Appendix 
8, National Heritage Committee's Fourth Report on "Privacy and Media Intrusion" HC(1992/93) 
294-II 
126 Se Alec Samuels, "Protection from Harassment Act 1997" (1997) 141(18) S. J. 426 
127 See F. Trinidade, "The intentional infliction of purely mental distress" (1986) 6(2) O. J. L. S. 
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elements necessary for liability under the tort are likely to be stressed, particularly in the context 
of photojournalists. 
Should a photojournalist violate an injunction granted by the High Court under this tort which 
restrains him or her from attempting to photograph a specific individual, he or she may face 
criminal proceedings. 129 The offence of harassment under s. 2 or of violating an injunction 
contrary to s. 3(6) may lead to imprisonment for up to five years. 130 The Act itself also contains no 
express provisions to enable the subject of unauthorised photographs taken through harassment to 
confiscate that journalist's film, despite one instance of a good Samaritan who grabbed a 
photographer in an arm-lock and snatched such a film on behalf of the late Princess Diana. 
131 In 
doing so, that passer-by risked a civil action for assault, battery or trespass to goods, 132 and it is 
equally unclear that a claimant would be successful in seeking an account of any profits acquired 
through the publication of a photograph obtained through harassment. 133 
Defences to Harassment 
Behaviour on the part of a journalist which might otherwise amount to harassment may be 
justified under s. 1(3)(a) of the Act on grounds of the prevention or detection of crime, which 
provides a defence for those journalists engaged in valuable investigative journalism. The 
effectiveness of the tort's application in this context of unreasonably intrusive photojournalism 
may depend upon judicial interpretation of s. l(3)(c) which provides a defence which applies to 
conduct which can be justified as reasonable. 134 Under this section, it may be possible for the 
judiciary to develop a public interest defence although it seems unlikely that the celebrity status of 
a particular individual alone provides a sufficient ground for harassment during the acquisition of 
photographic material by journalists. The Home Office which drafted the Act, echoes this view, 
by suggesting that while members of the press are "legitimate professionals who should be free to 
carry out their activities... they do not have total immunity under the provisions of this Act". 
135 
219,221; See also P. Handford, "Intentional infliction of mental distress: Analysis of the growth 
of a tort" (1979) 8 Anglo. Am. L. R. 
128 See, for example, McLouglin v O'Brien [1983] 1 A. C. 410,431 per Lord Bridge. 
129 See s. 3(3) and s. 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. See discussion in Gary 
Slapper, "The nature of injury in the criminal law" (1997) N. L. J. 1308 
"30 See s. 3(8) of the above Act. See also Martin Davies, "Good News All Round? The Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997" (1997) 8(6) Ent. L. R. 191,192; See also "Maxwell would have loved 
it" (1997) 7 M. L. N. 1 
131 See Stephen Farrell, "Princess accuses photographer of harassment" (1997) 3 The Times, Apr 
2; "Mirror: No more Princess Paparazzi Pics" (1997) p112, Ceefax BBC Home News, Apr 1 
132 See Don Cassell, p82, Ch. 6, The Photographer and the Law (1989,2°d Ed, B. F. P. Books) 
133 A point I should like to pursue further in the third chapter of this thesis. 
134 Indeed, there is already some evidence of the judiciary developing new defences drawn from 
this section. See David Thomas, "Harassment and the right to protest" (1998) 142(13) S. J. 304 135 See Lee Hughes, "Protection from Harassment Act 1997" Home Office Circular 34/1997 J. P. 
661 
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The primary goal of a photojournalist is, of course, to remain unobtrusive to avoid disrupting or 
influencing the very natural behaviour they wish to capture on film, and therefore try to keep 
hidden from their subject. 136 Harassment in its traditional sense tends to imply persistent conduct 
which simultaneously has the effect of distressing another and unduly impinges on his or her 
senses, but it is nevertheless conceivable that a subject who is unaware he or she is under 
surveillance until a later date may still bring an action under the tort. 137 The fact that the wording 
of the Act imposes liability for harassment where the defendant ought to have known that his acts 
amounted to harassment, means that damages may be recoverable for post traumatic stress138 or 
retrospective feelings of exposure or anxiety resulting from such acts subject to the limitation 
period for such an action. 139 It is probable that a perfect surveillance system may evade detection 
for many years140 or indeed never become known to the subject under surveillance, but so far as 
photojournalists are concerned, the whole purpose of indulging in such conduct is the acquisition 
of publishable quality photographic information. For this reason, since the photographic 
information gathered through such methods is intended for public consumption in newspapers, the 
vast majority of these intrusions become known to the subject. 
To summarise, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is capable of compensating individuals 
indirectly for unreasonable photojournalist surveillance or intrusion that occurs on two or more 
occasions. The Act does not eradicate the need for the wrong of intrusion to be recognised by the 
legislature, although it does do much to alleviate it. The tort of harassment has, as yet 
unrecognised potential for the courts to combat unnecessary intrusion by employees or freelance 
members of the press. The Lord Chancellor's Department recognised the role that such a tort 
might play in their consultation paper, but added, "Harassment connotes persistence, whereas 
molestation may take the form of a single act". 141 In their view, individuals ought to be protected 
against both. While it may even be possible for an individual to seek an injunction on the basis of 
a single intrusion by a photojournalist, presuming it can be shown he or she is likely to re-offend, 
damages would not be available for a single isolated act. It is possible therefore that an 
opportunistic photographer who uses a long lens camera to take a picture of an individual upon 
136 See TV programme entitled "Hypotheticals: Prying and Lying" (1998) First screened Aug 1, 
19: 00 on BBC2 
137 See Alec Samuels, "Harassment: Some Practical Problems for Prosecutors and Defenders" 
(1998) 162(30) J. P. 581 
138 For a discussion of post traumatic stress syndrome in the context of stalking, see Harvey 
Wallace and Joy Silverman, "Stalking and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome" (1996) 69(3) Pol. J. 
203 
139 An American court, for example, awarded damages for the latent distress caused by the 
realisation that a landlord's bug had been placed in the matrimonial bedroom and the feeling of 
intrusion and humiliation thus evoked. See Hamberger v Eastman, 106 N. H. 107,206 A. 2d 239 
(1964) 
140 Photographers may even shoot from the hip or make it unclear at the time as to who is the 
subject of their attentions. See Lisa Henderson, p101-10, Ch. 4, "Access and Consent in Public 
photography" in Image Ethics by L. Gross, J. Katz and J. Ruby. (1988, Oxford) 
141 See Lord Chancellor's Department (Scottish Office) consultation paper entitled Infringement 
of privacy July, 1993 Paragraph 5.23, p26. 
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private property, perhaps through a distant bedroom window over a comparatively short period of 
time may escape liability as might a pack of journalists who operate by pooling their resources 
and taking turns at keeping their subject under surveillance. 142 One may be compensated, 
therefore, for repeated forms of intrusion by photojournalists sufficient to give rise to a claim of 
harassment but intrusions taking the form of a single act are more problematic. In the absence of 
physical contact with person or property, or threatening conduct giving rise to alarm, the 
photojournalist is free to point his long lens camera at the interior of private property and gain 
access within. Accordingly, we must turn to a wrong where an individual might be compensated 
for a single act. Namely, the tort of intentionally inflicting emotional harm. 
Isolated intrusion by photographers and the intentional infliction of emotional harm 
The origins of this tort may be traced back to the well-known case of Wilkinson v Downton 
(1897) 143 in which the defendant told the claimant her husband had been seriously injured in a 
road accident as a practical joke. So severely traumatised was she by this statement that she 
suffered an acute form of psychiatric illness with palpable outward symptoms. This situation was 
covered by no existing actions at the time but Wright J. found that the defendant should be liable 
in tort, since he had "wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff' and 
so this tort of intentionally inflicting emotional harm was born. '44 The defendant had intended 
merely to deceive the claimant for his own amusement. Nevertheless, Wright J. felt that "it is 
difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, could fail 
to produce grave effects under the circumstances upon any but an exceptionally indifferent 
person, and therefore such an intention must be imputed, and it is no answer in law to say that 
more harm was done than was anticipated, for that is commonly the case with all wrongs". 
'45 
The tort is particularly relevant to the present discussion in that American academic, William 
Prosser considered that "the gist of the [intrusion into seclusion] wrong is clearly the intentional 
infliction of mental distress", 146 but clearly intrusive photojournalism is fundamentally different. It 
can hardly be regarded as "a violent shock to the nervous system, producing vomiting and other 
serious and permanent physical consequences at one time threatening her [the plaintiffs] reason, 
and entailing weeks of suffering and incapacity to her". 147 Few intrusions by the press are likely to 
have an effect upon their victims of this magnitude. They tend to find themselves inconvenienced 
or distressed rather than physically traumatised by the encounter, and so for many years the 
142 A further difficulty arises in establishing a photojournalist was also involved in intrusive 
behaviour on a previous occasion. See discussion in David Burles, "A problem of privacy" (1997) 
141(35) S. J. 860 
143 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q. B. 57 
144 Ibid, 58-59 per Wright J. 
145 Ibid, 59 per Wright J. 
146 See William Prosser, "Privacy" (1960) 48 California Law Review 383,422 
147 [1897] 2 Q. B. 57,58 per Wright J. 
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doctrine was thought to be inapplicable in this context. The necessity for a claimant to produce 
evidence of tangible symptoms of the psychological harm suffered precluded the use of this 
doctrine to compensate individuals for lesser forms of mental distress. 148 The claimant in Kaye v 
Robertson (1991) for example, would not have been able to utilise this doctrine at that time unless 
he suffered some medical setback as a result of the intentional media intrusion he suffered. For 
this reason, the decision was largely unexploited, and remained something of a tortious white 
elephant. 
In 1961, Gerald Dworkin was among the first to suggest that were the courts to take a more 
flexible view of the necessity for physical manifestation of psychiatric harm, the doctrine might 
prove applicable to the problem of press intrusion. 149 Thirty years passed and it seemed that the 
Wilkinson v Downton tort was analogous to a seed that had fallen to earth and failed to germinate. 
The doctrine proved not to be dead, but merely dormant, awaiting an adventurous judiciary to 
nurture it and was to resurface in Burnett v George (1992). '5° The tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional harm established in Wilkinson v Downton was to begin something of a metamorphosis 
as liability under the tort for harassing phone calls was established in this case on the basis of a 
risk of serious psychiatric damage rather than actual evidence of such. Sir John Arnold freely 
admitted that the "impairment of [the claimant's] health is not supported by any evidence", 151 yet 
he went on to hold that the doctrine was applicable, and for this reason, this modified application 
of the doctrine appears to provide a more amenable standard of harm for actions in respect of 
press intrusion. 152 If we return to the example of Kaye v Robertson given earlier, it would now no 
longer be necessary to establish that the claimant had suffered some serious psychological injury 
but would suffice to show some risk of illness. Arguably, the medical condition of one who is 
recovering from a serious head wound sustained in a road accident may be aggravated or put at 
risk by the disturbance of several photojournalists. Although Wright J. suggests in the original 
case of Wilkinson v Downton, that "all actionable cases have involved consequences [which] were 
not in any way the result of previous ill-health or weakness of constitution", 153 the subsequent 
development of the `egg shell thin skull rule' 154 clearly establishes that the tortfeasor takes his 
victim as he finds himiss or `talem qualem' were a similar scenario to reoccur now. 
156 It seems 
therefore that despite the isolated nature of the intrusion by the photojournalists in Kaye v 
Robertson, which was clearly of insufficient duration to cause either a nuisance or harassment, a 
148 See J. Bridgeman and M. Jones, "Harassing conduct and outrageous acts: a cause of action for 
intentionally inflicted mental distress? " (1994) 14(2) Legal Studies 180,192 
149 See Gerald Dworkin, "Privacy and the Press" (1962) 24 M. L. R. 185,188 
'50 Burnett v George (1992) 1 F. L. R. 525 (Decided 6/3/86) (C. A) 
151 Ibid, 527H-528A per Sir John Arnold P. 
152 See Margaret Brazier, "Personal injury by molestation - an emergent or established tort? " 
(1992) (Aug) Fam. Law 346 
153 [1897] 2 Q. B. 57,58 per Wright J. 
154 See Smith v Leech Brain Co. Ltd [1962] 2 Q. B. 405 
155 See p520, Ch. 23, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (1996,21s` Ed) 
156 See p399, Ch. 7, Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (1995,17th Ed) See also discussion in article 
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similar claimant might at least obtain an injunction restraining photojournalists from further 
intrusion through an application of the modified standard of a risk of psychiatric harm developed 
in Burnett v George. 
The decision in the subsequent case of Khorasandjian v Bush (1993)157 seems to reinforce the 
authority of Burnett v George. Here too, the claimant sought an injunction under the Wilkinson v 
Downton tort to restrain her ex-boyfriend from assaulting, molesting, or otherwise interfering with 
her by doing acts calculated to cause harm. Dillon L. J. concluded that "there is no medical 
evidence and it could not be said that the plaintiff is suffering from any physical or psychiatric 
illness". Nevertheless, the learned judge found the claimant's testimony to the effect that "the 
defendant's conduct was putting her under a lot of stress" sufficient to illustrate "an obvious 
risk ... that continued 
harassment... would cause such an illness". 158 Accordingly, Dillon L. J. chose 
to grant an injunction despite the absence of palpable evidence of illness. Although part of Dillon 
L. J. 's decision to grant an injunction to the claimant rested on the now discredited ground'59 of 
permitting a licensee to sue in nuisance for harassing phone calls at her parent's and grandparent's 
homes16° which has since been overruled in this respect, the remaining Wilkinson v Downton limb 
of this decision remains a valid authority. 
Dillon L. J. was to justify this development of the Wilkinson v Downton doctrine to include 
conduct causing a risk of psychiatric illness on the basis that the judiciary should be free to adapt 
the law to fight modem social ills. 161 Press intrusion would also seem to qualify as a `social ill' 
and for this reason, the tort has been touted as ripe for extension to psychological battery. 
162 It is 
possible to find a precedent for the application of the tort to press intrusion, albeit ill-reported. 
The late Princess Diana succeeded in obtaining an injunction restraining freelance photographer, 
Martin Stenning from coming within 300 yards of her in 1996 on the basis that the cumulative 
effect of his continued doorstepping, stalking, and use of a camera to take close up photographs of 
the Princess without her consent posed a grave risk of permanent damage to her health. 
16' Here 
too, the court chose to accept the late Princess Diana's affidavit to the effect that "I have felt a 
prisoner in my own home. I always leave home with an acute sense of anxiety. Sometimes I 
do 
entitled "The Law of Damages - taking your victim as you find him" (1991) 91(33) E. G. 101 
"' Khorasandjian v Bush [ 1993] 3 W. L. R. 476; 3 All ER 669; Q. B. 727 (C. A) 
158 Ibid, 483B-C; 677B-C; 736E-F per Dillon L. J. 
159 It is possible that Dillon L. J. 's decision may also have been motivated by a desire to remedy 
deficiencies in the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 which does not enable a cohabitee to sue in 
nuisance without some form of possessory or proprietary interest, although there is no express 
dicta to support this. A discussion of this avenue of thought, however, remains outside the scope 
of this particular thesis. 
160 The dual nature of the decision to grant an injunction in this case is discussed by Keith 
Stanton, "Harassment: An Emerging Tort? " (1993-94) 1-2 Tort. L. R. 179 
161 Op. cit, n. 156,481H; 675J; 735B per Dillon L. J. 
162 See p143, Ch. 6, Roderick Bagshaw, Privacy and loyalty Edited by Peter Birks. (1997, 
SPTUClarendon) 
163 A summary of the main points in this sadly unreported case may be found in "Queen orders 
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not leave at all" which outlined her anguish at being the regular subject of this particular 
photographer's attentions which had reduced her to tears on numerous occasions as sufficient to 
pose the necessary risk of psychiatric damage. 'TM There was also evidence of threatening 
behaviour on the part of the defendant that might have given rise to assault although the Princess 
declined to pursue such an action. 165 
It should be remembered, however, that while these authorities may support the granting of a quia 
timet injunction against intrusive behaviour by photojournalists on an alternative head to that of 
harassment which requires a course of conduct where the modified principle of Wilkinson v 
Downton does not, these cases do not provide clear support for the award of damages in such 
circumstances. 166 If an injunction under this tort is the sole remedy available, the individual who 
suffers a singular press intrusion would be better advised to seek redress elsewhere through the 
statutory tort where he need only establish mere anxiety rather than an obvious risk of psychiatric 
injury. Camilla Parker-Bowles, for example, was understood to have been advised that were she 
to apply for an injunction under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a 
husband and wife photojournalist team, she might fail as they were "sporadic in their attempts to 
photograph her. Sometimes they would pursue her night and day for weeks then they would 
disappear for long periods". 167 
Lest we forget, it is worth underlining that those cases examined above in which the courts have 
applied a lower standard of the mere risk of psychiatric harm than that of Wilkinson v Downton 
itself, involved multiple or repeated forms of intrusion and what might be said to amount to a 
course of conduct under today's statutory tort of harassment. It may be that the court would have 
been stricter if they had been dealing with a single encounter such as that of Wilkinson v Downton 
itself from which this tort stems. In the New Zealand case of Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd 
(1993)168 for example, Gallen J. remarked that "it is necessary for the plaintiff to establish 
something more than a transient reaction, however initially severe. This must translate itself into 
something physical and having a duration which is more than merely transient". 169 The claimant's 
grievance lay with fourteen seconds of film depicting a burial plot over which he held exclusive 
rights in perpetuity which threatened to be televised as a backdrop to the defendant's horror 
spoof. i70 The subject of the photographic material which the claimant sought to restrain was not 
cameramen to stay away" (1996) Cover, The Times, Aug 17 
164 The text of the late Princess Diana's affidavit to this effect may be found in the article 
entitled "Princess's affidavit tells of confrontations with persistent photographer" (1996) The 
Times, Aug 17 
165 op. cit. 
166 See Raymond Wacks, p86, Ch. 2, Privacy and the Press (1995, Blackstone) 
167 See Andrew Alderson and Simon Wright. "Frightened Camilla seeks help to fight off 
`stalkers"' (1997) 1 Sunday Times, Feb 9 
168 Bradley v Wingnut Films [1993] 1 N. Z. L. R 415 
169 Ibid, Paragraph 40,421 per Gallen J. 
170 Ibid, Paragraphs 5-20,421 
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himself but his property therefore, and not easily identifiable property at that. Furthermore, the 
defendants could not reasonably have foreseen the claimant's property as background scenery. 171 
While persuasive, there is, of course, no necessity for English courts to follow this decision, 
particularly as it may be distinguished on a number of grounds. Nevertheless, this would seem to 
indicate that subsequent development is still required before this tort is able to compensate 
individuals for singular or irregular forms of press intrusion. 172 
It seems unlikely that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm is likely to succeed in 
compensating an individual for a single isolated intrusion by a photojournalist where both 
nuisance and harassment fail. It is possible to envisage singular intrusions where the victim may 
find it difficult to reasonably establish a risk of psychiatric damage. One example might be that of 
actress, Patsy Kensit who "chased one photographer who had pointed his lens through the window 
of her north London home, and clung to his car door handle as he sped away and hurt her arm". 173 
It seems a tenuous argument that any significant risk of psychiatric damage accrued to the 
unfortunate actress from the encounter. 
In its current state, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress merely amounts to an 
alternative basis to that of s. 3(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 upon which to 
obtain an injunction. In this regard, therefore, there is a certain amount of overlap between the 
new statutory tort of harassment and the modified principle of Wilkinson v Downton. Harassment 
remains the preferred option for those seeking redress for photojournalist intrusion simply 
because claimants need only establish they have been caused anxiety by their actions, rather than 
an obvious risk of psychiatric harm. Pioneering litigants who attempt to utilise the Wilkinson v 
Downton tort as a means of obtaining compensation from photojournalists or their employers for 
unwarranted intrusion may be in short supply therefore. Litigation involving the Wilkinson v 
Downton tort may well become an increasingly rare occurrence, resulting in a decelerated rate of 
development of this tort as a remedy for press intrusion. Given the current overlap between these 
torts, it might seem logical for the judiciary to apply the modified Wilkinson v Downton tort to 
mop up those more serious isolated or singular press intrusions for which one cannot obtain 
compensation under the new Act. Indeed, there are those who have suggested that this principle 
ought now to operate in the absence of any proof of damage like a fourth tort of the person, 174 but 
one must take care not to remove what is presently perhaps the only remedy for intentional yet 
indirectly inflicted harm. 175 There are some obstacles to the use of this obscure tort by the 
'" Ibid, Paragraph 25-30,422 
172 Lord Hoffman expressed his support for such a development albeit in Hunter v Canary Wharf 
Ltd [1997] 2 All ER 426,452J which was concerned primarily with private nuisance. He 
remarked, "I see no reason why a tort of intention excludes compensation for mere distress, 
inconvenience or discomfort in actions based on negligence". 
173 See John Harlow and Olga Craig, "Rock Steady" (1997) 12 Sunday Times, Feb 9 
"' See Margaret Noble, "Harassment -a recognised tort? " (1993) 143(6626) N. L. J. 1685,1686 
175 See Keith Stanton, p179, Ch. 9, Modern Law of Tort (1994, Sweet & Maxwell) For further 
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judiciary as a means of compensating individuals for singular instances of press intrusion. The 
original case upon which this principle is built holds that "a wilful act (or statement) which causes 
physical harm is an actionable wrong". 176 A distinction between this and the tort of intrusion 
advocated in the earlier chapter, lies in the focus of Wilkinson v Downton upon "evil intentions 
while [an intrusion tort] guards against the penetration of private space". "' In the cases described 
above, the defendants instituted a general policy of molestation or interference with an 
individual's comfort suggestive of malice and certainly intent to inflict emotional harm. 178 The 
photojournalist guilty of unreasonable intrusion, in contrast, is simply reckless as to how he goes 
about his job in seeking to obtain a photograph. It is possible, however, to argue that it may be 
unnecessary for the photojournalist to commit an act with an intention to intrude so long as 
emotional harm through intrusion is a consequence of the act he or she intended. On this basis, a 
court might be able to impute an intention to inflict emotional harm on the part of a reckless 
photojournalist. A more troublesome obstacle to judicial development of this tort as a common 
law remedy for photojournalist intrusion remains however. The precedents of Khorasandjian v 
Bush (1993) 19 and Burnett v George (1992)180 have already given rise to a more flexible 
interpretation of this doctrine where a mere risk of psychiatric harm may be sufficient to impose 
liability for the intentional infliction of emotional harm. Nevertheless, it seems far less convincing 
to argue that a single act might give rise to psychiatric harm, as opposed to mere anxiety or mental 
distress. The doctrine as it exists today still requires a risk of future psychiatric harm as a control 
mechanism or threshold test. '8' If the Wilkinson v Downton tort is to be developed even further by 
the judiciary as a means of compensating the victims of press intrusion, that mechanism must be 
removed. Bloustein contends that the acts of a photojournalist or another who unreasonably 
intrudes "are wrongful because they are demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or 
not they cause emotional trauma". 182 As such, the tort of intentionally inflicting emotional harm 
misses the point somewhat in focusing upon the effects of the photojournalist's deliberate acts 
rather than the acts themselves as a tort of intrusion would. The former tort "does not allow truly 
independent recovery for mental distress, because it is based on the likelihood and the actual 
occurrence of physical harm" or a quantifiable effect on the claimant's mental health . 
183 It seems 
difficult to accept that emotional harm or the risk of emotional harm should be central to common 
analysis of this category of harm, see Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 Q. B. 232,238D-G per Lord 
Denning; Reynolds v Clarke (1765) 1 Str. 634,35 per Fortescue J. 
176 See Paragraph 52, p13, of the 1970 JUSTICE Report cited above at n. 1. 
177 See Robert Post, "The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort" (1989) 77 California Law Review 957,971 
178 See J. Bridgeman and M. Jones, "Harassing conduct and outrageous acts: a cause of action for 
intentionally inflicted mental distress? " (1994)14(2) Legal Studies 180,193 
17 Op cit, See Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 W. L. R. 476,482A-B per Dillon L. J. 180 Burnett v George (1992) 1 F. L. R. 525,527H-528A per Sir John Arnold 
181 Ibid, 197 
182 See Edward Bloustein, "Privacy as an aspect of human dignity: an answer to Dean Prosser" 
(1964)39 NYULR 962,974 
183 See P. Hanford, "Intentional infliction of mental distress: Analysis of the growth of a tort" 
(1979) 8 Anglo Arn. L. R. 1,14 
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law protection against press intrusion. 184 We find therefore that both these torts are recognised on 
as separate entities in the common law of the United States. 185 The tort has been applied to 
photojournalists in this jurisdiction, as in Galella v Onassis, 186 where a photojournalist jumped 
out from behind bushes, and even paid another individual to embrace his subject as part of a 
campaign of obnoxious behaviour. 187 The U. S. have been alert, however, in weeding out claims 
which present no evidence of severe emotional distress. 188 Further, the defendant's behaviour 
must be so outrageous and "extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, 
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilised community". 189 A standard of 
conduct of which a photojournalist's unreasonable intrusion often falls short. This is not to say 
that our own judiciary would find it absolutely impossible to adapt our own tort of intentionally 
inflicting emotional harm for the purpose of combating press intrusion. This thesis simply argues 
that legislation has indisputable advantages over the common law development of this tort. 190 If 
our judiciary are to `develop' this tort into a tort of unreasonable intrusion, they will be required 
to distort it from a wrong originally consisting of intentionally inflicting psychiatric harm upon 
another to a considerably more radical one of recklessly inflicting emotional distress. 19' Why 
should we saddle our judiciary with the burden of effectively re-writing existing law to this extent 
and devising new and appropriate safeguards limiting the sphere of the revised tort? Bagshaw 
observes that the legislature's resolution of conflicts may have been better considered because the 
resolutions of any conflicts may have been resolved after greater examination of arguments than 
those brought solely by litigants. 192 
194 Keith Stanton makes a similar argument in relation to the wrong of harassment prior to the 
enactment of a statutory tort which, like intrusion, was then unrecognised as a wrong in itself. See 
"Harassment: An Emerging Tort? " (1993-94) 1-2 Tort Law Review 179,181 
185 The American version of the tort of intentionally inflicting emotional harm imposes liability 
where four elements are present. The conduct complained of must be extreme and outrageous, 
committed either intentionally or recklessly so as to cause severe emotional distress. Reckless 
infliction of emotional harm necessitates evidence of actual psychiatric harm, however. 
186 See Galella v Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196,231 (D. N. Y. 1972), modified, 487 F. 2d 986 (2d Cir. 
1973) enforced, 533 F. Supp 1076 (D. N. Y. 1982) 
187 The tort has also been applied to newspaper publications. See for example, Rev. Faldwell v 
Hustler Magazine (1984) 34 Editor & Publisher, Dec 15. See also Parnell v Booth Newspapers, 
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909,917-18 (D. Mich. 1983) 
'$$ See Marsch v QRZ Media, Inc., Super Ct. No. BC176082 where broadcasting the responses of 
parents to a child's death through a drug overdose constituted intrusion but not the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
189 See s. 46 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. See Christensen v Superior Court 
(1991) 54 Ca1.3d 868,903 
190 While some might view the Wilkinson v Downton principle as an anomalous relic preserved by 
judicial conservatism, for which no further use can be put in its current form, one can equally 
argue that it is defunct and should be abolished rather than expanded. 
19 As Sir Robert Megarry V-C observed elsewhere in Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344,372. "At times judges must, and do legislate; but... they do so 
interstitially, and with molecular rather than molar motions... Anything beyond that must be left 
for legislation". The adaptation of the Wilkinson v Downton principle to this extent would seem to 
fit the molar category Sir Robert referred to. 
192 See p137, Ch. 6, Roderick Bagshaw, Privacy and Loyalty (1997, SPTL / Clarendon) 
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A common law tort of harassment - the tort that never was 
There are those who suggest that the anomalous case of Burris v Azadani (1995)193 "is certainly 
capable of being developed to provide protection against journalists or photographers who follow 
one about, or beset one's home or office with long range cameras". 194 Burris v Azadani appears 
relevant to the present discussion of the law relating to press intrusion in that the court appears to 
grant an injunction prohibiting similar behaviour on an entirely novel basis. The claimant in this 
case was the victim of harassing telephone calls and other behaviour akin to that of the earlier 
decision of Khorasandjian v Bush. 195 The statutory tort of harassment remained at this time, a 
gleam in the eyes of the legislature and had yet to be enacted. Sir Thomas Bingham M. R. chose to 
grant a protective exclusive zone around the claimant which even encompassed the public 
highway prohibiting the defendant from "loitering about the house, watching and besetting it, in a 
manner likely to be highly stressful and disturbing to the plaintiff . 
196 Sir Thomas attributed his 
decision to grant this injunction to a common law tort of harassment, 197 but this proposition seems 
dubious for several reasons. Firstly, as we have seen, the previous decisions of Khorasandjian v 
Bush and Burnett v George did not establish any new tort. Instead, the judiciary adapted the old 
remedies of private nuisance and Wilkinson v Downton to meet new problems. Sir Thomas went 
on to assert that the court's power to grant an injunction is not limited to situations where the 
conduct restrained is either tortious or unlawful, 198 and if so, how can this decision be based in 
tort? 
Since this decision is not based on a common law tort of harassment as Sir Thomas suggests, the 
real basis of this decision seems elusive. s. 37(l) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 to which the 
judgement of Sir Thomas refers, does enable a court to grant an injunction "in all cases where it is 
just and convenient to do so". 199 It does not however, permit the courts to usurp the role of the 
legislature by granting injunctions on an arbitrary basis at will, however well-meaning their 
intentions may be. This decision appears to defy The Siskina (1979)200 in which Lord Diplock 
stated albeit while referring to interlocutory injunctions, that such "a right to obtain an 
interlocutory injunction is not a cause of action. It cannot stand up on its own. [It] is merely 
ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action" . 
201 Where is the pre-existing cause of 
action in Burris v Azadani then if neither Khorasandjian v Bush or Burnett v George were 
followed? As Conaghan observes, there is little discussion of what rights or interests of the 
"' Burris v Azadani [1995] 1 W. L. R. 1372 
194 See p48, Ch. 2, David Feldman, Privacy and Loyalty edited by Peter Birks. (1997, 
SPTL/Clarendon press) 
195 See Commentary in "Exclusion Zone" (1995) 8 FantM 3 
191 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 1372,1380H-1381A per Sir Thomas Bingham M. R. 
197 Ibid, 1378H per Sir Thomas Bingham M. R. 
198 Ibid, 1377F-G per Sir Thomas Bingham M .k 199 See p146, Ch. 5, n. 165. Supra. 
200 The Siskina [1979] A. C. 210 
201 Ibid. 256 per Lord Diplock 
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claimant are infringed by the presence of the defendant in her neighbourhood. 202 Burris v Azadani 
therefore, is in all probability wrongly decided, and in fact does not establish an independent tort 
as some might suggest at all. 203 Perhaps Sir Thomas was dissatisfied with either of the 
Khorasandjian v Bush limbs and chose instead to seek a new basis in equity from which to grant 
injunctions against harassment, but in so doing he added to already growing confusion prior to the 
Protection from Harassment Act rather than resolving it. Accordingly this decision cannot be 
viewed as an additional ground upon which a court might restrain the unreasonable activities of a 
photojournalist. 204 Individuals who sustain singular or transient intrusions by photojournalists 
would seem to be equally bereft of protection under the criminal law also. Our criminal law 
directly prohibits surveillance through the interception of postal or telephonic communication205 
but does not regard surveillance by those armed with simple long lens cameras in the same light. 
Where photojournalists gather for a sustained period, an injunction to restrain further surveillance 
may become available under the Justice of the Peace Act 1361206 This Act provides that "those 
such as listen under windows, or the eaves of a house, to harken unto discourse, and thereupon to 
frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are a common nuisance and are punishable by fording 
sureties for their good behaviour". 207 The mere threat of an injunction being granted under this 
little used and antiquated piece of legislation is unfortunately, unlikely to provide a serious 
deterrent to the professional photojournalist 208 
The vicarious liability of an editor for the acts of a photojournalist 
It is possible that a photojournalist may have conunitted one of the above torts at the behest of 
another, such as his editor. If so, his or her employer, the newspaper editor may prove vicariously 
liable for the acts of his employee. For such a case to be made out, it must be established that the 
photojournalist in question is an employee as opposed to a freelance operative. This can usually 
be determined by the existence of a contract of service. Alternatively, the courts "tend to look for 
who has control over such matters as numbers of hours to be worked and where they are to be 
202 See Joanne Conaghan, "Equity rushes in where tort law fears to tread: The Court of Appeal 
decision in Burris v Azadani" (1996) 4(2) Fem. L. S. 221,227 
203 See Timothy Lawson-Cruttenden, "The Final Emergence of the Tort of Harassment" (1995) 25 
Fam. Law 625,627 
204 Equally an action against photojournalists under the tort of conspiracy is unlikely to be 
successful given the requirement of damages. 
205 See Interception of Communications Act 1985 and discussion in Paul Bogan, "Surveillance 
and the Law: What price privacy? " (1995) 25 Legal Times 18. See also James Michael, p15, 
Ch. 3, Privacy and Human Rights: an international and comparative study with special reference 
to developments in information technology (1994, Dartmouth) 
206 See Geoffrey Robertson, p95-96, Ch. 3, Freedom, the Individual and the Law (1989,6th Ed 
Penguin Books) 
207 See Andrew Martin, Paragraph 4, p98, Ch. 2, Written Communications - Privacy in 
English 
Law Edited by A. Robertson. (1973, Manchester University Press) 
208 A view shared by the Younger Committee. See Paragraph 33, p299, Appendix I, Report of the 
Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012 
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worked, and in the case of freelance photographer doing casual work, the right of the 
newspaper.. . to select photographic assignments for that person". 
209 
Having resolved the issue of whether a photojournalist is indeed a newspaper employee, the 
question then becomes one of whether he was acting in the course of his employment or off on a 
frolic of his own. In Janvier v Sweeney (1919)210 for instance, the defendant private detective 
instructed his assistant to bribe the claimant who was engaged as a French maid into revealing the 
contents of her employer's letters. Instead, the assistant sought to induce her to do this through 
threatening behaviour instead which caused her to fall ill. Nevertheless, his employer was found 
vicariously liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm since "he knew to attain 
his object it would be necessary to offer the plaintiff some inducement to commit a gross breach 
of her duty" . 211 The question therefore is whether the newspaper editor willed the photojournalist 
to do an act whose outcome he ought to have foreseen. 212 A general policy of encouraging 
employees to seek evidence of scandals or pictures of public persons at rest is unlikely to suffice. 
One instance of express duplicity might arise, however, were a newspaper editor to instruct his 
employee to "Get that photograph at all costs and by any means - just get it". Difficulties may 
arise in relation to the extent one can legitimately hold an editor to account for the actions of 
many such employees in a sizeable organisation. 213 Often freelance journalists simply advertise 
the material they have obtained which the newspaper editor then purchases in good faith. 
Conclusions 
The tort of trespass to land was devised in an age when physical proximity to a person or 
encroachment on their property was necessitated to intrude upon his or her seclusion through 
surveillance. The advent of long-lens cameras and other forms of sophisticated electronic devices 
have rendered trespass unnecessary so that the press are rarely compelled to stray upon private 
property. Other torts such as nuisance and harassment compensate individuals who are the subject 
of such surveillance with an award of damages only where this intrusion takes place on a 
sustained or repeated basis. Of course, liability under the tort of intentionally inflicting emotional 
distress could conceivably arise in respect of a single act by a photojournalist. However, although 
a mere risk of psychiatric harm is sufficient for a court to grant an injunction under this tort, 
perhaps to restrain a photojournalist from further intrusion a claimant may still have to 
demonstrate actual psychiatric harm in order to claim damages. Singular or irregular forms of 
intrusion may escape liability under the existing law of torts therefore, which seems able only to 
209 See p103, Ch. 10, Don Cassell, The Photographer and the Law (1989,2nd Ed, BFP Books) 
210 Janvier v Sweeney (1919) 2 K. B. 316 
211 Ibid, 326 per Rankes L. J. 
212 Op. cit, n. 2, Paragraph 1-44, p31, Ch. 1. See also Raymond Wacks, p81, Ch. 2, Privacy and the 
Press (1995, Blackstone) 
213 See Richard Townshend-Smith, "Harassment as a tort in English and American Law: The 
Boundaries of Wilkinson v Downton" (1995) 24(3) Anglo AmL. R. 299,306 
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partially cover the gap left by the absence of a specific tort based on unwarranted intrusion into 
seclusion. 
The suggestion by Warren and Brandeis that existing common law remedies could naturally 
evolve in their `eternal youth' to recognise this wrong in time would seem somewhat overly 
optimistic. 214 On closer examination, we find that torts such as trespass and nuisance for example, 
are concerned with the loss of use or enjoyment of property rather than seclusion. Both are also 
severely constrained by the requirement of possession. Subjecting the Wilkinson v Downton tort 
to further development is perhaps the most feasible option but even this wrong is far from an ideal 
basis for compensating individuals for isolated forms of intrusion. In order for the judiciary to 
develop this doctrine even further, both the requirement of intent and psychiatric harm will 
necessitate considerable dilution so that the tort is a pale shadow of its former self. It would seem 
more sensible therefore to enact the purpose built wrong of unreasonable intrusion discussed in 
the first chapter. If we are to rely on existing torts to ensure our seclusion is respected by the press 
or private sector, this gives rise to a fundamental question. In making use of these remedies at 
their disposal, are the courts really compensating the individual for the intrusion caused by a 
photojournalist's unreasonable behaviour or merely for the violation of some other tort that 
happens to coincide? Damages under these torts, which are calculated on the basis of temporary 
loss of amenity or enjoyment of property, anxiety caused or psychiatric harm intentionally 
inflicted indirectly compensates for photojournalist intrusion. They do so without overtly 
acknowledging the importance of being able to temporarily and partially the presence of others to 
enjoy seclusion in today's society. Aggravated damages might serve a useful function in this 
respect, by recognising that a fundamental human right and need has been compromised. The 
modem civil law, as it exists today, however, fails to overtly recognise the value of ensuring an 
individual has a place of refuge from the continuous scrutiny of others and all those who would 
infringe it. 215 
The existing law also fails to take account of photojournalists who stand to profit from their 
intrusion. A-B & Others v South West Water Services Ltd (1993) 216 severely constrains the causes 
of action in which the judiciary are able to award exemplary damages against such a 
photojournalist to those where a precedent exists prior to 1964. The effect of this restriction is to 
preclude the award of exemplary damages where newer torts enacted after 1964 are committed 
such as the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 where a photojournalist may equally stand to 
214 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard Law 
Review 193 A view more recently echoed by David Seipp, "English Judicial Recognition of A 
Right to Privacy" (1983) O. U. S. 325,370 
215 The Law Commission shared this view in acknowledging that aggravated damages may serve a 
useful purpose in compensating individuals for the heads of mental distress unrecognising by 
existing torts. See Paragraph 2.41 of the Law Commission Report entitled Aggravated! Exemplary 
and Restitutionary Damages (1997) 
216,4_B & Others v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] Q. B. 507 (C. A) 
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profit from his tort. 21 It would seem logical therefore, to also favour the expansion of exemplary 
damages for they have a useful role to play here. 21' As Lord Denning once remarked, both Rookes 
v Barnard smacks of retrospective legislation. 219 The courts also face the equally thorny issue of 
determining when and where restitutionary damages should prove available to recoup the profits 
earned by a photojournalist unjustly enriched through wrongdoing. Legislative intervention both 
to enact a new tort of intrusion and to ensure photojournalists are deterred from intrusive 
photojournalism is long overdue . 
220 
Z" The Law Commission itself observes, "certainly the fact that exemplary damages were not 
awarded for a particular type of wrong before 1964 is not considered a good reason as such for 
refusing to award them for that wrong today". See Paragraph 4.5, op. cit. 
218 The Law Commission considered the three possible approaches to the problem of reforming 
exemplary damages. One might expand the categories of tort in which they are available as the 
author has suggested, abolish them entirely and rely instead upon compensatory and restitutionary 
damages, or endorse a hybrid, model where they may be awarded only against government 
servants. Ibid, Paragraphs 5.13-5.15. If exemplary damages are to remain a feature of our law, the 
Law Commission considered that awards must be predictable, and limited to the minimum 
necessary to achieve the aims of punishment, deterrence and disapproval. Paragraph 5.30, ibid. 
219 See p199, Lord Denning, What next in the law? (1982, Butterworths) where at p264 Lord 
Denning himself argues that exemplary damages have a part to play in recognising the grossness 
of intrusion into a person's private affairs. 
uo Rabinder Singh shares my view that the primary fault of English law lies in its inability to 
compensate individuals who are the victim of press intrusion. See p170, Ch. 7, Basil Markesinis, 






Chapter Three: Unauthorised Publication of intrusively obtained photographs by newspapers and 
the law of tort 
"It would appear that every proprietor and every editor of every publication that has paid for 
intrusive and exploitative photographs of her, encouraging greedy and ruthless individuals to 
risk everything in pursuit of Diana's image, has blood on his hands today ". - Earl Spencer, 
1997. 
In the previous chapter we saw that although the law of torts has evolved to afford partial 
protection against photojournalist intrusion, our law might still benefit from the enactment of a 
specific intrusion into seclusion tort. Individuals do not receive compensation when they fall 
victim to irregular or isolated forms of intrusion. This deficiency is open to exploitation by 
photojournalists who attempt to use long lens cameras for the purpose of photographing or merely 
observing an individual on private property. Where the law does incidentally recognise the claim 
of such an individual to seclusion, it does so through the application of other pre-existing torts 
rather than by overtly recognising the legitimacy and independence of this need. At the very least, 
if one is to rely on a parasitic claim under these heads, aggravated damages should be awarded to 
acknowledge the importance of some degree of seclusion in our everyday lives. 
The reader will recall the premise of the first chapter of this thesis, which to reiterate, holds that 
the law should also prohibit the publication of photographs obtained through such means where 
they threaten to disclose intimate information about one. The purpose of this chapter therefore, is 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the law of torts in this regard. 
The difficulty of restraining the publication of photographs taken by another without 
consent 
s. 4(1)(c) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides that photographs, like any 
other artistic work, are the property of the photographer himself rather than his subject. This 
presents a certain difficulty therefore, for those who wish to restrain the publication of 
photographs without consent by the press. Although such a photograph may have been taken 
contrary to a legitimate expectation of seclusion and threaten to reveal intimate information about 
the individual depicted, the photographer's camera and film are his own. His is free to do with 
them as he pleases for he has invested both his time and money in purchasing them and the 
selection of his shot and in later developing it. These proprietary rights prevailed long before even 
the enactment of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act. In Sports and General Press Agency v 
"Our Dogs" Publishing Company Ltd [1916] the claimants organised a canine competition 
along the lines of Crufts and sought to raise further capital by assigning exclusive rights to 
1 Sports and General Press Agency Ltd v "Our Dogs- Publishing Ltd [1916] 2 K. B. 880 
59 
photograph the show. The claimant's attempts to suppress photographs taken at the show by an 
unauthorised journalist were unsuccessful, as the judiciary refused to acknowledge their claim to 
control and restrict the taking of photographs at the show. There can be no property in a spectacle 
which the subject of a photograph intentionally or unintentionally creates through his or her 
presence. Generally speaking, therefore, the person to whom a photograph belongs and who may 
therefore determine its use, is he or she who creates it, 2 unless of course, that individual is acting 
in the course of his employment for another such as a newspaper. 3 While photographs must be 
`original' to enjoy the protection of copyright, this requirement presents no barriers as few 
photographs are exactly alike4 and they are protected `irrespective of artistic quality'. 5 
A `moral right to privacy' is to be found within s. 85(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 but this operates only where "a person.. . for private and domestic purposes commissions the 
taking of a photograph or the making of a film... a copyright subsists in the resulting work issued 
to the public, exhibited or shown in public, or broadcast or included in a capable programme 
service". 6 This section would be applicable only where an individual engages the services of a 
specific photographer to perform the task of photographing either himself or another for which the 
photographer will be paid, such as wedding photographs for example.? Where, however, a 
photojournalist utilises a long lens camera to violate the seclusion of an individual upon 
residential private property, his activities are not even consented to much less commissioned and 
so this section is currently of limited applicability in this context. This section, accompanied by 
pre-existing common law authorities such as Williams v Settle (1960)8 does however, preclude the 
unauthorised use of photographic material for purposes other than those for which it was 
originally commissioned or copies of such photographs or their negatives being passed on to third 
parties such as the press without approval. 
Consequently, a wedding photographer was found liable for providing journalists with 
photographs of a murder victim amid a wedding group in exchange for certain financial 
inducements in the aftermath of a police investigation. The claimant was the son-in-law of that 
murder victim and both he and his wife were much distressed by the publication. They were 
2 See s. 9(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
3 See Kevin Garnett and Alistair Abbott, "Who is the `Author' of a Photograph" (1998) 20(6) 
EIPR 204,206 
4 See Keith Lupton, "Photographs and the Concept of Originality in Copyright Law" (1988) 10(9) 
EIPR 257 
See Don Cassell, p15, Ch. 1, The Photographer and the Law (1989,2°d Ed, BFP Books) 
6 See Hugh Jones, p54, Ch. 3, Publishing Law (1996, Routledge); Paragraph 13-159, p347-348, 
The Law of Journalism by Catherine Courtney, David Newell, and Santha Rasaiah. (1995, 
Butterworths) 
7A photographer might then be precluded from disseminating a photograph taken in the course of 
his employment. See Pollard v Photographic Co., (1889) 40 Ch. D 345 where such a picture was 
displayed in a shop window without permission and sold to others as a Christmas card. 
8 Williams vSettle [1960] 2 All ER 806; [1960] 1 W. L. R. 1072 (C. A) 
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accordingly awarded the sum of £1,000 damages under s. 17(3) of the Copyright Act 1956.9 
Sellers L. J. considered that such "heavy damages might well hold the defendant up as an example 
to the community ... they may act as a deterrent to others who are willing to supply the press with 
information which they know is going to be used in a manner which will be hurtful and distressing 
to the people involved". 10 Thus, the damages awarded reflect the distress suffered as a result of 
the intrusion to which Sellers L. J. made express reference, " as well as the infringement of 
copyright for which the action was taken. 12 Accordingly, the law of copyright requires a 
newspaper to inquire how it is X is able to sell the copyright in photographs made or 
commissioned by y. 13 The fact remains, however that for the subject of a photojournalist's 
camera to have any proprietary interest in the photographs he or she shoots, some consideration 
must pass from the subject to the photographer such as perhaps showing the photographer around 
private premises and suggesting possible shots. 14 The use of a long lens camera to take pictures 
means that such a photojournalist is not required to have any such contact with, or assistance by 
his subject. 's 
With the exception of this limited moral right to privacy in relation to the use of commissioned 
photographs derived from the Beme Convention, 16 the purpose of copyright is not to protect the 
privacy of an individual but rather creative or innovative new designs which are the product of his 
intellect. Photographs similarly necessitate some degree of skill and selectivity as to the chosen 
subject-matter and copyright therefore, seeks to prevent others from reaping the economic 
benefits arising from the exploitation of that photographer's work rather than ensuring his work 
does not reveal intimate information about individuals he should not have photographed. '7 
Publishing photographic material obtained through the use of a long-lens camera without the 
consent of the individual depicted upon private property therefore, will not amount to a breach of 
copyright unless perhaps such intrusion results in the acquisition of trade secrets. In Shelley Films 
Ltd v Rex Features Ltd (1993)18 for example, the case was actionable not so much because of the 
9 See s17(3) of the Copyright Act 1956 having been subsequently amended by a similar provision 
under s. 97(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 which gives the court a 
discretionary power to award additional damages, having regard to the flagrancy of the 
infringement and the profit accrued to the defendant. 
lo Op cit, 812C; [1960] 1 W. L. R. 1072,1081 per Sellers L. J. 
11 Ibid, 812H-I; [1960] 1 W. L. R. 1072,1082 per Seller L. J. 
12 See Gerald Dworkin, "Privacy and the Press" (1961) 24 M. L. R. 185,187; (1961) 77 L. Q. R. 12 
13 See Lady Anne Tennant v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1979] FSR 298,302 per Vice 
Chancellor. 
14 See Stackemann v Paton [1906] 1 Ch. 774,779-780 per Farwell J. See also Ellis v Marhall & 
Son (1865) 64 L. J. (Q. B) 757 
" See John Adams, "Copyright in Character Merchandising" (1997) 66 C. W. 29,30 
16 See Gavin McFarlane, Paragraph 2.32, p19, Ch. 2, A Practical Introduction to Copyright (1989, 
tad Ed) 
11 See Graeme Johnston, "Copyright and Freedom of the Media: A Modest Proposal" (1996) 
18(1) EIPR 6 
1e Shelley Films Ltd Rex Features Ltd (1993) Dec 10, LEXIS 
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surreptitious and unauthorised means by which the photographer took pictures of cast members of 
a film on private property but rather because of the secrecy afforded to the film's premiere. The 
costumes of those pictured were deemed to be works of artistic craftsmanship under s. 4(l)(c) of 
the Act. 19 
If the doctrine of copyright in its present format grants exclusive proprietary rights to 
photojournalists regardless of the means by which they acquire their photographs, might the law 
be amended to take into account any intrusive methods used to acquire a photograph? One radical 
proposition is that automatic economic copyright should be abolished and available only to those 
who have registered a photograph at an officially designated website. In order to register and 
enjoy the protection of copyright, the photographer would need to sign a sworn declaration that 
(1) he or she was the photographer of the material preferred for registration; (2) which has not yet 
been modified, altered or manipulated; or (3) obtained through intrusive means. The term 
`intrusive' meaning a photograph obtained without consent, of a scene where privacy might 
reasonably be expected yet unjustified by public interest. Under this proposal, a photographer 
who made a false declaration and subsequently sold that photograph for consideration would be 
liable under sections 15 and 16 of the Theft Act 1968 of obtaining pecuniary advantage or 
property by deception. 20 
This proposal suffers from a number of practical difficulties, however, which would need to be 
overcome. Firstly, such a proposal would necessitate a formal change to the Berne Convention or 
at the very least, domestic legislation during which, the powerful press lobby would undoubtedly 
pull out all stops to impede its progress or alter its form assuming parliamentary support could be 
found for such a bill. Secondly, significant resources would be necessitated to maintain such an 
online system which is likely to become overburdened if, as was suggested, amateur 
photographers are also encouraged to use it. The somewhat thorny question arises, therefore, of 
who is going to pay for this system. Those who use it perhaps? But then the amateur or the 
impecunious photographer might not be able to afford the costs of registration. Thirdly, there is a 
further problem to be considered of whether foreign photojournalists working in Britain or British 
photojournalists working abroad should be required to register their photographs. The picture of 
prominent couple, Dodi Al Fayed and Princess Diana intimately embracing on a private beach2l 
was in fact, taken in France by an Italian photojournalist and published by a British newspaper 
19 See Commentary, (1994) 16(3) EIPR D55 
20 See Alistair Kelleman, "Dealing with Stalkerazzi: Using Copyright to Eliminate Intrusive 
Photographs Without Censorship" (1997) 3 J. I. L. T. 1,2 (Sep 16) 
hq: //elj. warwick. ac. uk/jilt/wip/973kelni/kelman. htm 
21 See "World Exclusive: The Kiss" (1997) Aug 10, Sunday Mirror, Cover; "Diana's pain over 
photos" (1997) Aug 8, Daily Express, Cover by Robert Jobson, Royal editor 
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which illustrates the nature of this global problem. 22 The final blow to what one might dub the 
registration proposal is that the onerous prospect of having to register all photographs may 
discourage investigative journalism, or at the very least, provide legitimate targets of press inquiry 
with a useful fount of information as to who registered what photograph facilitating suppression 
and restraint prior to publication. Moreover, the publisher is still free to publish any non- 
registered photograph regardless of how it was obtained. 
One suggestion is that an amendment of the moral right to privacy under s. 85(1) of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 was considered. The suggestion being that an amended moral right 
might grant the subject of an intrusive photograph of film the right not to have copies of the work 
issued, exhibited, broadcast or made available to the public. A new section of 85(3) would then 
define an intrusive photograph as one which depicts its subjects engaged in lawful acts on private 
premises or even private vehicles without their consent 23 Although this second proposal does 
seem more practicable than the first, it would face the difficulties of navigating its way through 
Parliament. The current definition of an intrusive photograph includes pictures of individuals in a 
"private vehicle, vessel, hovercraft or aircraft" without the permission of its driver. Surely any 
expectation of seclusion here is greatly diminished and must give way to the autonomy of one's 
fellow passengers to take whatever pictures they wish in the limited environment of their 
conveyance. In any case, even if this definition were altered accordingly, the underlying purpose 
of copyright is to protect the property of individuals, so such an amendment may not represent the 
ideal means of redressing a wrong which is essentially in the nature of a tort. The fact remains that 
copyright as it stands now does not afford the subject of intrusively obtained photographs with a 
means of restraining their publication. 
Defamation and the publication of intrusively obtained photographs 
Since the modem law of torts does not recognise a tort of public disclosure of personal 
information through intrusively obtained photographs, this chapter considers the extent to which 
one may rely upon pre-existing torts for indirect compensation. Libel is one such tort worth 
evaluating24 for in some ways, it prima facie appears to resemble public disclosure of intimate 
information in that it provides redress for injured feelings25 and similarly requires an objective 
26 
assessment of what one may reasonably publish. 
22 Although this particular thesis focuses the problem in the context of those that take place on 
English soil, it is important that potential solutions are discussed against the backdrop of media 
globalisation. 
2' See Joanna Gretton, "Using Copyright to Prevent Intrusive photography" (1998) (Oct 30) 
J. I. L. T. 1,2 http"/lwww law. warwick. ac. uk/iilt/98-3/eretton html 
24 We are dealing here with libel as opposed to slander as the publication of photographs takes a 
permanent rather than transient form. 
s See Louis Blom-Cooper, "A remedy for lost dignity" (1989) 15(3) C. L. B. 1090 
26 See Paragraph 4, p5, Ch. 1, Gatley on Libel and Slander by Philip Lewis. (1981,8t' Ed, Sweet 
& Maxwell) 
63 
Despite these apparent similarities, the two concepts are quite disparate, and may be distinguished 
on a number of grounds. Libel encompasses statements by newspapers which are "published 
without justification or lawful excuse, [and are] calculated to injure the reputation of another, by 
exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule". 27 Libel, therefore, makes no allowance for the 
effect of a publication upon the feelings of the claimant him or herself, but rather attempts to 
quantify the effect of a publication upon others and their change in perception of a given 
individual. The interest protected by libel is that of reputation28 therefore, rather than any intimate 
information revealed. There is no necessity to actually demonstrate that the esteem in which one is 
held by specific members of the community has been lessened, 29 but the plaintiff must establish a 
statement tends to defame him3° by lowering him in the estimation of right-thinking members of 
the public generally. 3' Publication of a photograph obtained perhaps through the use of a long 
lens of an individual upon otherwise inaccessible portions of private property or through trespass 
need cause no damage to reputation32 and may even evoke sympathy on the part of other members 
of the community. 33 The ability of libel to intervene on behalf of the subject of an intrusively 
obtained photograph either to obtain damages or an injunction will be entirely dependent 
therefore on how others perceive the image and the context in which it is placed. It is said, 
"ordinary men and women have different temperaments and outlooks. Some are unusually 
suspicious and some are unusually naive. One must try to envisage people between these two 
extremes and see what is the most damaging meaning they would put on the words in question' . 34 
Libellous innuendoes have included the exhibition of a waxwork model of an individual acquitted 
of murder amid the waxworks of several convicted murderers35 which would leave him "at the 
mercy of idle gossip for the rest of his life". 
36 The use of a photograph of police constable Plumb 
as he paused in his ceaseless pursuit of criminal activity to mop his brow, for a foot odour 
advertisement, 37 and even a military Colonel's image to endorse a fire guard product have all been 
27 See Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6M&W 105,108; 151 E. R. 340,342 per Parke B. 
28 Such as for example, the reputation of the late Princess Diana impinged by allegations of 
profiting through charity work. See Richard Kay and Geoffrey Levy, "Diana issues writ for libel" 
(1997) 6 Daily Mail, Feb 25 
29 See p398, Ch. 4, Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander by R. Walker and H. Starte. (1994,4" Ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell) 
30 See Mc Carey v Associated Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1965] 2 Q. B. 86 
31 See Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237,1240 per Lord Atkin (H. L) 
32 See Percy Winfield, "Privacy" (1931) 47 L. Q. R. 23,24 
33 See Thomas Gibbons, p589, Regulating the Media (1991, Sweet & Maxwell) 
34 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] A. C. 234,259 per Lord Reid who had been examining the 
nature of an innuendo in the context of whether the defendant's newspaper headline proclaiming 
that the plaintiff's company was being investigated by the fraud squad was defamatory. 
35 See Monson v Tussauds [1894] 1 Q. B. 671,688 per Lord Halsbury (C. A) 
36 Ibid, 687 
37 See Plumb v Jeyes Sanitary Compounds Ltd (1937) Times, April 15 
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found to give rise accordingly to a defamatory innuendo although much depends on the nature of 
the product itself. 38 
While embarrassment, loss of dignity, outrage or distress may be suffered by those such as PC 
Plumb whose image has been appropriated for commercial exploitation, the primary purpose of 
this tort is to compensate such individuals instead for any injury to their reputation incurred from 
such a use rather than the use itself or to recoup the profit accrued from it. 39 For this reason, the 
plaintiff amateur golfer in Tolley v Fry (1931) 40 successfully sought damages in a libel action 
against a chocolate manufacturer's advertisement bearing his caricature with one of their product 
protruding from its pocket on the basis of an innuendo that he had "prostituted his amateur status 
for advertising purposes"`t rather than the unauthorised use itself. 42 More importantly, Greer L. J. 
took this opportunity to underline that "unless a man's photograph, caricature, or name be 
published in such a context that the publication can be said to be defamatory within the law of 
libel, it cannot be made the subject-matter of complaint by action at law". " 
For example, in Li Yau-Wai v Genesis Films Ltd (1987) the plaintiff obtained damages of $25,000 
HK and an injunction restraining the use of his photograph in a film which appeared in the 
background of a scene in which a central character discussed her sexual unfulfilment, on the basis 
that such a use was libellous. 44 It was found that the background use of his image was sufficiently 
prominent to associate him with the explicit subject and content of that particular scene thereby 
exposing the plaintiff to `ridicule of sufficient magnitude' . 45 A photograph such as this is found 
libellous by virtue of the context in which it appears rather than the means by which it was 
obtained or the intimate nature of its content. Libel considers whether the claimant would be 
lessened in the eyes of a hypothetical reasonable man other than the claimant himself, whereas 
privacy considers whether a reasonable man in the same position as the claimant would be 
38 See p270, Ch. 31, McNae's Essential Law for Journalists (1995,13`h Ed) by Tom Welsh and 
Walter Grenword. See also Rutherford v Turf Publishers Ltd (1925) The Times, Oct 30; and 
Stockwell v Kellogg Company of Great Britain Ltd (1973) Times, Jul 31; and Dunlop Rubber 
Co. Ltd v Dunlop [1921] A. C. 367 
39 See discussion in Peter Jones, "Manipulating the Law against Misleading Imagery: Photo- 
Montage and Appropriation of Well-Known Personality" (1999) 1 EIPR 28 
ao Tolley v Fry [1931] A. C. 333 (H. L) 
41 This case is discussed further by Tim Frazer, "Appropriation of Personality -A New Tort" 
(1983) 99 L. Q. R. 282 
42 Normally, a misleading impression of participation in an advertisement is not libellous unless 
by virtue of association which a product or service which injures one's reputation. See William 
Houesley, `Me Unauthorised Commercial Exploitation of the Publicity Right" (1996) YMEL 
263,271 
43 Op cit, n. 40,478 per Greer L. J. 
44 Li Yau-Wai v Genesis Films Ltd [ 1987] H. K. L. R. 711 
`s The action was also successful on the basis of breach of confidence, which is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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offended to the same degree. It is also suggested that the wrong in defamation is "material rather 
than spiritual . 46 
The publication of intrusively obtained photographs and the defence of justification 
Perhaps the most important distinction one can make between the wrong of public disclosure of 
intimate information and that of libel is that truth is an absolute defence to the latter. 47 The burden 
of proving this defence known as justification rests on a newspaper, which need only establish on 
the balance of probability that a photograph is genuine. 48 This defence cannot, of course, apply to 
those photographs which are manipulated or distorted to give a misleading impression such as for 
example, to give the appearance one has consented to a risque undergarment advertisement. 49 
Having said that, not every reproduction of one's image in an altered or potentially misleading 
state constitutes a libel. 
50 In Charleston v News Group Newspapers (1994)51 for example, the 
reproduction of a manipulated photograph of two actors whose faces had been superimposed on 
the bodies of a couple apparently engaged in an intimate sexual act on the cover of a tabloid 
largely, one suspects, for the titillation and amusement of readers was not considered libellous. 
The House of Lords considered that while the photograph and headline of "Strewth! What's our 
Harold up to with our Madge? " might be defamatory if viewed in isolation, this was something 
which no ordinary fair-minded reader would do, 
52 and therefore the photograph in question had to 
be considered in the light of the article as a whole. 
53 The publication condemned those originally 
responsible for manipulating the picture, and gave no impression that the unwitting claimants 
were voluntarily involved in making films of a pornographic nature, and even adopted a tone of 
righteous indignation and sympathy for the embarrassed claimants' plight 
54 Albeit somewhat 
tangential to the subject of photojournalist intrusion, this case provides valuable illustration of 
how libel makes no allowance for the loss of choice as to whom one chooses to reveal intimate 
information. The fact that the newspaper chose such a disproportionate approach to criticising the 
original manipulators of the photograph by publishing it themselves in such a sensational manner 
when there was no apparent justification doing so is not a decision which the law of libel 
questions. 55 Lord Bridge could only acknowledge his `considerable sympathy' with the victims of 
such degrading photographs 
36 In the words of the Faulk's Committee, "it must be emphasised 
a6 See Commentary, (1992) 14(7) EIPR D-137 
47 See Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, p40-41, Ch. 2, Media Law (1992, Yd Ed, Penguin) 
48 See Paragraph 9-19, p208, The Law of Journalism by Catherine Courtney, David Newell, and 
Santha Rasaiah. (1995, Butterworths) 
49 See Griffiths v Bonsor Hosiery Ltd (1935) Times, Dec 10-11 
so See Richard Shillito, "New Defamation Act procedure could backfire" (1997) 147(6774) N. L. J. 
24 
$1 Charleston v News Group Newspapers [1994] 2 A. C. 64 (H. L) 
52 Ibid, 73B per Lord Bridge of Harwich. 
s; See Alec Samuels, "Problems of assessing damages for defamation" (1963) 79 L. Q. R. 63,79 
sa See Peter Prescott, "Libel and Pornography" (1995) 58 M. L. R. 752,753 
ss Ibid. 
56 Op cit, n. 51,74B per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. Supra. 
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that bad taste is not the same as defamation... where a newspaper published a drawing of a well- 
known tennis player in the nude... [this] was in lamentable taste.. . but no reasonable reader could 
have thought any less of the unfortunate girl". 57 Sadly, this is also the case as regards the 
publication of genuine photographs published and obtained without the consent of their subject. 
Libel seeks only to ensure the flow of accurate information regarding an individual's personal 
life, whether in photographic form or otherwise, not to prohibit that flow entirely'8 and even then 
only precludes the publication of photographs whose content or context is both false and 
derogatory. 59 A newspaper which publishes an intrusively obtained photograph perhaps of a 
couple embracing through a distant bedroom is likely to simply plead justification when faced 
with a libel action. In Palmer v Sporting Club Ltd (1906)60 for example, a claimant boxer was 
unsuccessful in seeking an injunction to restrain publication of a photograph illustrating his 
somewhat ignominious defeat at the hands of an opponent on the basis of libel, for the picture 
complained of was entirely accurate and true. 
1 
Furthermore, such injunctions will not be granted at the interlocutory stage where the defendant 
newspaper intends to justify or plead fair comment so long as no wrongful act is done. 2 The 
precedent of William Coulson & Sons v James Coulson (1887)63 provides that interim injunctions 
ought only to be granted in the clearest of libel cases, a category in which privacy-based claims to 
restrain publication of photographs are unlikely to feature 64 Libel was in fact pleaded by the 
claimant in Kaye v Robertson (1991)65 who sought to restrain publication of photographs taken 
by unauthorised photojournalists on hospital private property while he was semi-conscious. 66 
Glidewell L. J. concluded, however, that although "it is certainly arguable that the intended article 
would be libellous on the authority of Tolley v Fry... I cannot say that such a conclusion is 
inevitable". 67 Glidewell L. J. felt obliged to dismiss the action therefore, despite the potential 
 See Paragraph 71, p16, "Report of the Committee on Defamation" (1975) Cmnd. 5909 
58 See Louis Blom-Cooper, "Shutting out the intruder" (1989) Times, Jan 21 
59 Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929] 2 K. B. 331,337 per Scrutton L. J. (C. A) 
provides another example of the distinction between privacy and libel. The claimant's husband 
had "achieved some notoriety in indiscriminate relations with women" thereby compromising the 
intimacy of the couple's relationship, yet his wife nevertheless was successful in her action to 
obtain damages for the publication of a photograph depicting him with another woman 
accompanied by an announcement of their forthcoming engagement. 
60 Palmer v Sporting Club Ltd [1906] See Macgillivary, "Copyright Cases" (1905-1910) 55 
61 See Commentary by Winfield, Op. cit, n. 32,32-33 
62 See Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269,284 (C. A) 
63 William Coulson & Sons v James Coulson (1887) 3 T. L. R. 46 
64 Defamation differs from most other torts in this respect, which are governed by the test in 
American Cynamid v Ethicon Ltd [1975] A. C. 396,406E-F which in the words of Lord Diplock, 
"weighs the plaintiffs need for an injunction against the corresponding need of the defendant to 
be protected from legal injury having 
bee prevented from exercising his legal rights ... the court 
must weigh one need against another and 
determine where the `balance of convenience' lies". 
65 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 
66 The reader will recall our discussion of this case in the previous chapter. 
67 Op. cit, 67 per Glidewell L. J. 
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support offered by both Tolley v Fry and Moore v News of the World and Another (1972)68 the 
latter case having involved a successful libel action for damages which falsely attributed an 
article69 to the claimant and suggested that she was a woman ready to 'wash her dirty linen in 
public' and that she would lend herself to such an article for money. 70 It has been suggested that 
the claimant should have been able to make a similar argument on the basis that the assertion that 
Mr Kaye had consented to be photographed implied that he sought to profit from his accident, 
even whilst recovering, 7' but it seems a stronger ground than this is needed for the restraint of 
photographs at an interlocutory level. 
Fair Comment 
A further defence of fair comment72 may also be invoked by a newspaper to justify its publication 
of photographic material, where (1) the opinion expressed in conjunction with it is objectively 
fair, 73 (2) based on true facts, 74 and concerns (3) a matter of public interest. 75 Photographs which 
feature in articles of bona fide public interest are likely to "affect people at large, so that they may 
be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on, or what may happen to them or 
others". 76 It is said that the fair comment test "is not whether the comment is sound, still less 
whether the tribunal of fact agrees with it... but protects matters of opinion on any matter of public 
interest", 77 which may accompany the publication of a photograph. 78 
To summarise therefore, unless a photograph has undergone digital manipulation, its publication 
represents a justifiable dissemination of true facts which cannot be restrained unless perhaps the 
context in which it is placed is likely to give rise to an innuendo exposing one to hate, contempt, 
or ridicule and the like. 
79 The publication of a surreptitiously obtained photograph which 
discloses intimate information about one's personal lifestyle is far more likely to evoke public 
curiosity or alternatively mere sympathy for the unfortunate subject. Neither of which constitutes 
an injury to reputation that would amount to an actionable libel. In essence, the award of damages 
"Moore v News of the World and Another [1972] 1 QB 441 
69 The defendants were also found liable for the false attribution of authorship contrary to s. 43(2) 
of the Copyright Act 1956 as it was then, prior to the subsequent 1988 Act. 
70 Op. cit, 447G-H and 452D per Denning and Stephenson L. J. J. 
71 See William Houseley, "The Unauthorised Commercial Exploitation of the Publicity Right" 
(1996)YMEL 263 
72 This concept is discussed in detail by P. Sutherland, "Fair Comment by the house of Lords? " 
(1992) 55 M. L. R. 278 
73 See Telnikof v Matusevich [1990] 3 W. L. R. 725,740 per Lloyd J. 
74 See Digby v Financial News Ltd [1907] 1 K. B. 502,507 per Collins, M. R. (C. A); See 
McKenna V Express Newspapers (1996) Times, Jul 23 
's See Seymour v Butterworth (1862) 3F&F 372,382; 176 E. R. 166,171 per Cockburn C. J. 
76 See London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 Q. B. 375 
77 Op. cit, n. 57, Paragraph 147-148, p38. 
78 See s. 6 of the Defamation Act 1952 which provides additional guidance on the nature of the 
defence. 
79 See William Prosser, "The Right to Privacy" 48(3) Calif. L. R. 383,389. Liability in libel arises 
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under this tort will be calculated on the basis of compensating the individual for the presence of 
libellous text accompanying such a photograph rather than distress sustained through the 
publication of the intrusively obtained photograph itself 
80 Undertaking a libel action on such a 
flimsy basis would not be for the faint hearted, for such an individual also faces other drawbacks 
such as the absence of legal aid, 
81 to take on multi-national media organisations whose corporate 
resources far outweigh those of the individual. 
82 This option is available only to a wealthy few83 
and the prudent or impecunious individual would be better advised to seek redress elsewhere. 
84 In 
this game of chance, the claimant has the most to lose. So far as the costs of pursuing a libel 
action, the Defamation Act 199685 brings both good news and bad. 
86 The new procedure it brings 
for summary disposal by a judge under s. 8(l) rather than a jury, 
87 may make more straightforward 
libel cases less costly. However, this additional stage in the libel process may well add a further 
delay88 and drive up costs of those complaints that go further. 
89 In short, the tort of libel is a 
dubious and costly means of attempting to restrain the publication of intrusively obtained 
photographs which will, in the majority of instances, prove unsuccessfu190 Not only may such an 
action necessitate a not inconsiderable amount of money, the litigation process may also serve to 
illuminate the individual's lifestyle and personal life even fiuther91 as other newspapers exercise 
their legitimate right to report on the progress of the case. If the courts were to take the unlikely 
approach of utilising libel merely to protect an individual from the disclosure of intimate 
information, there would be a risk of blurring the distinction between these two wrongs92 as 
perhaps with an emergent false light tort. 
93 At the end of the day, while honest witnesses may be 
" 95 disbelieved or vice versa, the newspaper is in all probability insured against such losses, and 
by virtue of a photograph's context rather than the personal information which the image conveys. 
80 See also Broome v Cassell [1972] A. C. 1027,1133 per Lord Kilbrandon 
81 See Legal Aid Act 1974 (c. 4) Schedule I, Part II. 
82 See Ian McBride, "Ibe case for the reform of the libel laws" (1997) 25 Times, June 25 
83 See Elliot, "Libel: Free Speech, Privacy and Reputation" (1993) 23 S. L. T. 223 
84 See Minutes of Evidence taken before the National Heritage Committee entitled "Trial by 
Newspaper? " p47-52, Fourth Report on Privacy and Media Intrusion [1992/93] HC294-II; 
Ravinder Chahal, "Murder it wrote" (1997) 11(8) Lawyer 9; and Nick Hilbourne, "Sue if you 
can" (1997) 94(8) L. S. G. 12 for the possibility of libel action given impecuniousity. 
85 See Julie Scott-Bayfield, "Defamation Update" (1997) 141(17) S. J. 405 
86 See Richard Shillito, "New Defamation Act procedure could backfire" (1997) 147(6774) N. L. J. 
24 
87 See also s. 8(5) of the Act 
88 See Patrick Milmo, "Fast track or gridlock" (1996) 146(6731) N. L. J. 222 
89 See Barbara Cotter, "A revision that further complicates awards" (1996) 10(26) Lawyer 9 
90 See Robert Wacks, p81, Ch. 2, The Protection of Privacy (1980, Sweet & Maxwell) 
91 See "Privacy or the Right to Know" (1987) 137(6306) N. L. J. 463,464 
92 In the US, it has already been suggested that the action for libel may eventually be supplanted 
by related false light privacy laws. See p79, Professor Lorenz, Butterworth Lectures 1989-90: 
Privacy and the Press -A German Experience (1990) 
93 The existence of this tort in America which prohibits casting another in a false light has proved 
controversial, having supplanted the role of 
libel to some extent. See Paragraph 70-71, Ch. 4, 
Report of the Committee on privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
94 See Michael Rubenstein, "Has libel lost its way? " (1992) 89(1) L. S. G. 2; See also Michael 
Brown, "A suitable case for treatment" (1992) 89(37) L. S. G. 22; Julie Scott-Bayfield, "Libel: 
bonanza or burst bubble? " (1993) 137(3) S. J. 45 
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will therefore shrug its shoulders, secure in the knowledge the net profit obtained from the venture 
justifies this minor, if inconvenient, expense. 
Malicious Falsehood 
Of all those torts invoked by the claimant in Kaye v Robertson (1991) who sought to restrain the 
publication of an article including photographs of him as he convalesced in hospital, taken 
without informed consent, malicious falsehood alone was successful. Malicious falsehood is 
known by several names such as slander of title, injurious falsehood, trade libel, and 
disparagement of goods to name but a few, % and encompasses "false and malicious statements 
injurious to any person's title to property and causing or likely to cause pecuniary damage to 
hire' 97 It becomes immediately apparent therefore, that as the doctrine is restricted to the 
publication of false information. The publication of intrusively obtained but authentic and entirely 
accurate photographic material therefore, cannot satisfy the requirement of falsity necessitated by 
this tort. 98 Without falsity, there will be no liability, however malicious or intrusive though the 
newspaper's intentions may be . 
99 The claimant in Kaye v Robertson (1991) was only able to 
circumvent the difficulty posed by this requirement in that the newspaper which published the 
photographs of him made an unusual and somewhat foolish assertion of consent on his part both 
to being photographed and an `interview' which he was medically in no position to give in his 
semi-conscious state. The majority of newspapers receive in-house advice from lawyers and this 
mistake of falsely asserting consent to such photographs is consequently unlikely to be repeated. 
The newspaper complied by amending the article accordingly and then in the words of Lord 
Bingham "went ahead and published the interview, boasting of the fact that it had been obtained 
without Mr. Kaye's consent". 
10° 
Malice 
A further obstacle which presents itself, were an individual to attempt a similar action to that of 
Mr. Kaye on the basis of a false assertion of consent to the publication of intrusively obtained 
photographs, is that of the requirement of malice, 
101 which must also be present on the part of a 
9s See Paragraph 9-03, p196, The Law of Journalism (1995) by Catherine Courtney, David 
Newell and Santha Rasaiah. 
96 See Paragraph 22-01, p1157, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (1995,17`h Ed, Sweet & Maxwell) 
97 See Paragraph 592, p163, Ch. 22, "Report of the Committee on Defamation" (1975) 
Cmnd. 5909. 
98 See William Coulson and Sons v James Coulson & Co. Ltd (1887) 3 T. L. R. 846; London Ferro- 
Concrete Co. Ltd vJusticz [1922] 2 K. B. 260 
99 See Pater v Baker (1847) 3 C. B. 831,868; 136 E. R. 333,348 per Maule J.; See also Burnett v 
Tak (1892) 45 L. T. 743,744-45 per Kay J. 
'°° See Lord Bingham, "Opinion: Should There Be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal privacy? " 
[1996] 5 EHRLR 450,457 
'01 See generally, Paragraph 303, p304, Ch. 9, Gatley on Libel and Slander (1981,8t' Ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell) 
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newspaper. 102 The issue of what is meant by the term `malice' is important, for in most cases, the 
journalist, editor, or publisher bears no ill feeling towards the subject of the photographs they 
obtain and publish without consent. Their only desire is to do their job, and in so doing, increase 
the circulation of the newspaper and with it, their subsequent profit. Malice in this context has 
been said to be uncertain in meaning. 103 This troublesome term has been variously interpreted as 
meaning either "contriving or intending to injure the plaintiffs", 104 implying the presence of actual 
rather than presumed malice, or alternatively as simply an indirect purpose or object. 105 For our 
purpose, of determining whether an editor can reasonably be viewed as acting maliciously in 
publishing intrusively obtained photographic material accompanied by a false assertion of 
consent, it is sufficient to note that the requirement of malice appeared to waver between these 
two standards for some time106 until more recently, the view that the recklessly indifferent malice 
of a profit driven individual was insufficient 107 finally gave way. '°8 
Kaye v Robertson (1991), was to provide a dramatic change in direction away from the traditional 
judicial view as to the meaning of malice, as Glidewell L. J. searched desperately for a legal means 
of providing the plaintiff with at least token redress to recognise that his moral claim to privacy 
had not been respected. He stated that "malice will be inferred if it be proved that the words were 
calculated to produce damage and that the defendant knew when he published the words that they 
were false or was reckless as to whether they were false or not". 109 Glidewell L. J. added that he 
had "no doubt from the evidence, including the transcript of the tape-recording of the `interview' 
with Mr. Kaye in his hospital room ... that Mr. Kaye was in no condition to give any informed 
consent to their interviewing or photographing him. Any subsequent publication of the falsehood 
would therefore inevitably be malicious". 
' 0 
102 See R. Heuston and R. Bucldey, p381, Ch. 18, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts (1996, 
21" Ed, Sweet & Maxwell) 
'o' See Paragraph 271, p133, Vol. 28, Halsbury's Laws of England (1979,4`h ed) 
104 See Western Counties Manure Co. Ltd v Lawes Chemical Manure Co. Ltd (1874) LR 9 Exch 
218,223 per Polluck B.; See also Halsey v Brotherhood (1881) 19 Ch. D 386,389 per Lord 
Coleridge, C. J. 
105 See Balden v Shorter [1933] 1 Ch. 430,447 per Maugham J.; Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 Q. B. 
524,525 per Bowen L. J. 
106 Compare the standard imposed in Royal Baking Powder Co. v Wright, Crossley & Co. (1900) 
18 R. P. C. 95,99 per Lord Davey; Greers Ltd v Pearman and Corder Ltd [1922] 2 K. B. 260,269 
per McCardie J.; Shapiro v La Morta (1923) 40 T. L. R. 39,40-41 per Lush J.; Loudon v Ryder 
(No. 2) [1955] Ch. 423,426; Serville v Constance and Others [1954] 1 W. L. R. 487,490 per 
Harman J. 
107 See McDonald's Hamburgers Ltd v Burgerking (U. K) [1986] F. S. R. 45,61 per Whitford J.; 
See also Horrocks v Lowe [1975] A. C. 135,152H-153A per Lord Diplock. 
los See Hugh Robson, "Sex, Lies and Malice: A Note on Defamation and Malicious Falsehood in 
the Light of Joyce v Sengupta" (1993) 8 EIPR 289 
109 [1991] FSR 62,67 per Glidewell L. J. 
110 Ibid, 68 per Glidewell L. J. 
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This new standard of recklessly indifferent malice has continued to flourish in subsequent 
cases, "' and so the test for malice has evolved from a subjective assessment of the defendant's 
state of mind to a more objective standpoint, ' 2 "inferred from the assertions and the cavalier way 
they were published", '" and the adequacy of any steps taken to verify them. 114 Kaye v Robertson 
does not, however, represent the beginnings of any trend towards a greater use of this doctrine to 
compensate the victims of press intrusion, but rather constitutes an isolated use of the doctrine by 
a beleaguered judiciary. It is worth stressing that it would have been medically impossible for the 
claimant Kaye to have given his consent to the intrusion, which is rarely the case in practice. 
While the standard of malice has undoubtedly grown to encompass the reckless attitudes 
prevalent amongst newspapers who publish false assertions without taking adequate steps to 
confirm their validity, "s Kaye v Robertson remains the sole application of the tort to the 
publication of intrusively obtained photographs, and if newspapers continue to be legally well 
advised, it is likely to remain so. There is nothing to prevent a newspaper publishing a intrusively 
obtained intimate photograph without any assertion of consent on the part of the subject 
portrayed, or indeed, any denial of the means through which it was obtained. 
The requirement of special damage and compensation for press intrusion 
Malicious falsehood is intended not to compensate individuals for photographs that offer the 
public glimpses of the lifestyle adopted by one who believes he enjoys seclusion. Instead, the 
purpose of this tort is to compensate an individual for the financial loss arising through injury to 
his or her trade, profession, or commercial reputation. A typical example being Ratcliffe v Evans 
(1892)116 in which `The County Herald' newspaper alleged incorrectly that the claimant's 
engineering and boiler-making business had ceased trading. "7 Unlike the wrong described above, 
special damage is central to this action which must be specially alleged and proved. l 8 In Barrett v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd (1907)119 for example, the defendant Daily Mail newspaper 
successfully appealed against an award of damages made under this tort to a house owner whose 
house, they alleged, was haunted and consequently unfit for habitation, as "there was not a 
particle of evidence, that the value of the house was affected one penny by publication... No 
111 See CvMirror Group Newspapers [1996] 2 F. L. R. 532,541D-F per Neill L. J. (C. A); Allason 
v Campbell (1996) Times, May 8 
112 See Gillian Douglas and Patricia Hargrove, Commentary, (1996) 26 Fam. Law 651,671; 
"Malicious falsehood plaintiff did not show monetary loss" (1996) Times, May 8 
113 See Joyce v Sengupta and Another [1993] 1 All ER 897,905B-C per Sir Donald Nicholls, V- 
C 
1 14 Ibid, 901E per Sir Donald Nicholls, V-C. 
115 See Peter Carey, p63, Ch. 5, Media Law (1996, Sweet & Maxwell) 
116 Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 Q. B. 524 
117 lbid, 527 per Bowen L. J. 
1s (1900) 18 R. P. C. 95,99, Paragraph 45 per Lord Davey 
"9 Burnett v Associated Newspapers Ltd (1901) 23 T. L. R. 666 
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person was called to say that he was deterred from taking the house by reading the Daily Mail". 120 
This provides a valuable indication of the nature of special damage, 121 and although the enactment 
of s. 3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 dispenses with the need of proving it, the claimant must still 
establish that "the words upon which the action is founded are calculated to cause damage to the 
plaintiff and are published in writing or... said words are calculated to cause damage to the 
plaintiff in respect of any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at 
the time of publication". It was upon this ground that the claimant in Kaye v Robertson (1991) 
succeeded, rather than upon any privacy-related claim. Glidewell L. J. concluded that "As to 
damage... Mr. Kaye's story was one for which other newspapers would be willing to pay `large 
sums of money'. It needs little imagination to appreciate that whichever journal secured the first 
interview with Mr. Kaye would be willing to pay the most. Mr. Kaye thus has a potentially valuable 
right to sell the story of his accident and his recovery when he is fit enough to tell it. If the 
defendants are able to publish the article they proposed, or anything like it, the value of this right 
would be lessened, and Mr. Kaye's story would thereafter be worth much less to him". '22 The 
court is protecting Mr. Kaye's right to selective publicity and the commercial value of his 
recollections rather than compensating him for the disclosure of photographs revealing his 
medical condition which were taken and subsequently published without consent. 
The business of selling one's recollections was viewed by the court as inextricably linked with the 
profession of the claimant actor, and this loss of potential revenue rather than actual loss or 
damage to his trade or profession is deemed sufficient. The wrong for which the claimant is being 
compensated is not the intrusion by photojournalists to which he was initially subjected or indeed, 
the publication of the information thereby acquired, but rather the decrease in value attributable to 
the intangible property of his recollections and their marketability. '23 
The victory of the claimant under this doctrine therefore, is merely a technical one. Glidewell L. J. 
granted an interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of the article, but only until the 
defendants made it clear that their version of the claimant's recollections was unauthorised, 24 yet 
surely the value of Mr. Kaye's story is still lessened by permitting the newspaper to publish it at 
all, since someone else is telling his tale and not he? In any case, malicious falsehood was 
powerless to prevent the photographs themselves from being published, or indeed to compensate 
the claimant for the publication of intimate photographs taken when he should have been enjoying 
seclusion through an award of damages, thereby deterring others from similar copy cat 
120 mid, per Cozens-Hardy, M. R. 
121 See Paragraph 6456, p595, Vol. 46, The Digest (1986) Butterworths. See also Malachy v Soper 
(1836) 3 Bing. (N. C) 371,384; 132 E. R. 453,458 per Tindall C. J. 
122 [1991] FSR 62,68 per Glidewell L. J. 
'73 See discussion in Peter Jones, "Manipulating the Law Against Misleading Imagery: Photo- 
Montage and Appropriation of Well-Known Personality" (1999) 1EIPR 28,31 
124 See Brad Sherman and Felicity Kaganas, "The Protection of Personality and Image: An 
Opportunity Lost" (1991) 13(9) EIPR 340 
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infringements. Curiously, having recognised that the value of any subsequent interviews or 
photographs Kaye might endorse had been lessened, Glidewell L. J. stopped short of the next 
logical step of awarding damages since "they would inevitably be difficult to calculate, would 
also follow some time after the event, and in my view would be in no way adequate". 125 Courts 
applying the tort tend to view these forms of mental distress as "insubstantial and shadowy, and in 
truth incapable of being estimated in money; and where words spoken, are not actionable in 
themselves, they can become actionable only when they have been followed by pecuniary or 
temporal damage". '26 
Even in Shepherd v Wakeman (1662) 127 where the defendant's false claim in writing to have had a 
close intimate relationship with the claimant by virtue of a matrimonial bond between them 
amounted to a malicious falsehood, 
'28it is possible to identify a pecuniary detriment arising from 
this falsehood. The claimant might reasonably have expected a dowry to accrue from his 
forthcoming marriage to a third party during this period, which was called off as a result. Redress 
was forthcoming therefore, not so much because of the intimate nature of the defendant's 
accusations, but rather given the loss of potential dowry revenue, together with the expenses 
already incurred by the claimant in the period prior to the wedding arrangements. The court 
nevertheless admitted that here too, malicious falsehood afforded the most amenable means to 
plug the gap in this area. 
129 
Fielding v Variety Inc. (1967) 130 provides another graphic illustration of the inability of this tort 
to recognise hurt and anguish like that caused by the publication of photographs that offer a 
window into our private lives. The claimants in this case sought an award of exemplary damages 
to reflect the mental distress they sustained through reading the defendant newspaper's highly 
critical review of their successful musical. Denning L. J. rejected their claim on the basis that 
"plaintiffs on this head of claim can only recover damages for their probable money loss, and not 
for their injured feelings". "' As Sir Donald Nicholls recently observed in Joyce v Sengupta 
(1993)132 that "so far as the reported decisions go, they show that an award of parasitic damages 
under this head have never been made for malicious falsehood". 
133 Sympathetically, he added that 
"This state of authorities suggests that damages for anxiety and distress are not recoverable for 
malicious falsehood. If this is the law it could lead to manifestly unsatisfactory and unjust results 
in some cases ... I 
instinctively recoil from the notion that in no circumstances can an injured 
12$ Ibid. 
126 See Chamberlain v Boyd (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 407,412 per Lord Coleridge C. J. albeit referring 
to damage to an individual's election to a non salaried post. 
127 Shepherd v Wakeman (1662) 1 Sid. 79; 83 E. R. 963 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Fielding and Another v Variety Inc. [ 1967] 2 Q. B. 841 (C. A) 
"' Ibid, 850B-C per Denning L. J. 
132 Joyce v Sengupta and Another [1993] 1 All ER 897 
133 Ibid, 907A per Sir Donald Nicholls, V-C 
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plaintiff obtain recompense from a defendant for understandable distress caused by a false 
statement made maliciously". 134 The judiciary have yet to use this dicta as a green light for reform 
of the tort in this area, for the majority of the precedents above would appear unfavourable to 
development. Although malicious falsehood does possess the advantage of legal aid proving 
available in contrast with libel, 135 this tort fares little better against the publication of photographs 
depicting individuals who might reasonably expect seclusion. '36 
Passine Off 
To summarise the arguments put forward so far, the doctrine of copyright in its current form 
ensures that the proprietary rights of the photographer over the use of a photograph which he or 
she has taken are protected by copyright regardless of the means by which he or she obtains it. 
The torts of libel and malicious falsehood merely protect one against the publication of false or 
misleading information which injures either an individual's reputation or causes him economic 
loss. Passing off, is based on the same premise, and for this reason it too proves ineffective 
against the publication of unaltered photographic material, howsoever obtained. 
Passing off protects the goodwi11137 developed by a trader in the course of his business, from 
damage138 through misappropriation by another such trader. '39 Clearly therefore, an individual 
seeking to utilise this tort, would need to establish that the necessary classic trinity of 
misrepresentation, goodwill and damage are present. 
" 
Misrepresentation 
For a publication to incur liability under this tort, there must be a misrepresentation by a trader 
who shares a common field of activity or market sector with another such trader, which might 
cause confusion between the goods and services they respectively offer as perceived by 
consumers. In McCulloch v May (1947) 
141 for example, Wynn-Parry J. stressed the importance of 
this requirement by emphasising that an element of confusion between the profession, business or 
goods of the claimant with those of the defendants was essential142 and refused therefore to permit 
'34 Ibid, 907B-C & 907H per Sir Donald Nicholls, V-C 
135 See Nick Hilbourne, "Sue if you can" (1997) 94(8) L. S. G. 12 
16 See Basil Markesinis, "Our Patchy Law of Privacy - Times to Do Something About It" (1990) 
55 M. L. R. 802,804 
137 Goodwill towards a product or business on the part of consumers would appear to be a 
`localised concept' and as such perhaps, precludes some foreign plaintiffs from utilising this tort. 
See Land, "Passing Of and the Foreign Plaintiff" (1984) EIPR 279 
"g See Wadlow, Paragraph 6.01, Law of Passing Off Q 995,2°d Ed, Sweet & Maxwell) 
139 See Burley, "Passing Off and Character Merchandising: Should England lean towards 
Australia? " (1991) 7 EIPR 227 
Sao See Hazel Carty, "Dillution and Passing Off: Cause for Concern" (1996) 112 L. Q. R. 632,634 
McCulloch vMay [1947] 2 All ER 845; (1948) R. P. C. 58 
142 Ibid, 849C-D; (1948) R. P. C. 58,64, paras 25-35 per Wynn-Parry J. 
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a children's television presenter to sue in passing off for the unauthorised use of his alias on the 
defendant's cereal packaging. 143 
It is possible to find many such instances where redress was similarly denied to the victims of 
commercial appropriation or exploitation of an individual's image or aspects of public 
personality. 144 They serve to illustrate the reluctance of the judiciary to invoke this tort for the 
benefit of those who are offended by the use or publication of their image. It is worth briefly 
distinguishing the wrong of appropriation from that of publication of intrusively obtained 
photographs at this point if only for the sake of clarity. Such claims seek restitution of unjust 
enrichment and a right to selective publicity rather than none at all. 145 The tort of passing off 
refuses to recognise the legitimacy of either of these claims. '46 
In E. Warnink B. V. v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (1979) 147 Lord Diplock considered it sufficient 
for an individual simply to be a trader whose goodwill might be harmed, 148 irrespective of 
whether he or she was engaged in a common field of activity. '49 However, with the exception of 
one anomalous case, '5° Lord Diplock's lower standard has been less than enthusiastically 
received. 151 Unfortunately, therefore, it is virtually impossible for any confusion to arise between 
the respective roles of newspaper and the subject of an intrusively obtained photograph which 
they publish. 
The courts have adamantly refused to recognise public persons and entertainers as `traders' for 
the purposes of an action in passing of'52 Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co. Ltd 
(1991)153 was optimistically heralded as widening the scope of afforded to the term `trader'. '54 
The reason being that the court made no distinction in this case between the four claimants, who 
were respectively a licensee, the original creators of the fictitious ninja turtle characters, and two 
143 Ibid, 851F-G; (1948) R. P. C. 58,67, paras 10-15 per Wynn-Pang J. 
'44 See Sim v Heinz [1959] 1 W. L. R. 313,319 per McNair J. (C. A); Merchandising Corporation 
of America Inc. and Others v Harpbond [1983] R. P. C. 32; Tavener Rutledge Ltd v Trexapalm 
Ltd [1975] F. S. R. 179; Stringfellow vMcCain Foods Ltd [1984] R. P. C. 501 
145 See Catherine Buchanan, "The Need for a Right of Publicity" (1988) 8 EIPR 227 
146 See Allison Coleman, "The Unauthorised Commercial Exploitation of the Names and 
Likenesses of Real Persons" (1982) 7 EIPR 189 
'47 E. Warnink B. V. v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] A. C. 731 
148 Ibid, 740C per Lord Diplock 
149 Ibid, 742C-D per Lord Diplock 
150 In Lego System Aktieselskab and Another v Lego MLemelstrich Ltd [1983] FSR 155,187 
Falconer J. granted an injunction under Lord Diplock's criteria enabling a children's toy 
manufacturer to restrain a gardening and irrigation equipment 
'S' See Harrods v Harrodian School Ltd (1996) Times, April 3 for example. 
152 See Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62,66-67 per Oliver J.; Halliwell and 
Others v Panini SpA and Others (1997) June 6, (Unreported) See Kirby, "Passing Off: Spice 
Girls Case" (1997) 18(11) Bus. L. R. 270 
153 Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co. Ltd [1991] FSR 145 
154 See Ching and Lewis, Comment, [1991] 7 EIPR 253; Elmslie and Lewis, "Passing Off and 
Image Marketing in the UK. " [1992] 8 EIPR 270 
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licensing agents. They were all collectively entitled to restrain the defendant firm from producing 
clothing bearing similar characters. However, this precedent can be of little use to an individual 
seeking to argue he is a trader in order to restrain publication of a intrusively obtained 
photograph, for the underlying grounds for this decision lay in the claimants' copyright ownership 
in the fictitious characters together with the `dual nature' of their business. 155 Even assuming that 
an individual were to take the preventative step of attempting to register his image as a trade 
mark, under the Trade Mark Act 1994 it is highly improbable that the newspaper's photograph of 
him or her could not be distinguished from that of his registered mark by virtue of shading, angle, 
perspective, content or context. Besides which, s. l(1) of the Act defines a trade mark as 'any sign 
capable of being represented graphically which is capable of distinguishing the goods or services 
of one undertaking from those of other undertakings", and is intended therefore, like passing off 
to prevent confusion between undertakings or their products. 156 This means a person as opposed 
to a company or undertaking is unlikely to be able to take advantage of this Act to assist any 
future passing off action they might undertake against a newspaper. 157 The individual's 
registration would only be valid if he or she had a genuine intention to license the use of his or her 
image in a specific commercial area. 
The tort of passing off therefore, continues to maintain that the greater the disparity between the 
claimant and the defendant's fields of activity, the lower the probability of confusion, 158 and it is 
little wonder therefore that the claimant's action under this head in Kaye v Robertson (1991) was 
summarily dismissed. 159 
As Laddie J. remarked in Re: Elvis Presley Trade Marks (1997)160 products such as newspaper 
publications are "bought by many because they [carry] the name and likeness of the [personality] 
not because they come from a particular source". 
16' Accordingly, the successors in title to the 
King's merchandising activities were unable to restrain sales of the defendant's unofficial 
memorabilia, 162 given that "Elvis did not own his appearance... during his life, he could not 
prevent a fan from having a tattoo put on his chest or a drawing on his car which looked like the 
musician simply on the basis that it was his appearance which was depicted or exploitation of any 
us Op cit, 156 
156 See Paul Harris and Paul Garland, "Making its Mark? " (1997) 2 Amicus Curiae 9 
1" See William Houseley, "The Unauthorised Commercial Exploitation of the Publicity Right" 
(1996) YMEL 263,276 
158 See Morcom, "Developments in the Law of Passing Off' (1991) 10 EIPR 380,382 
159 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62,69 per Glidewell L. J. 
160 Re Elvis Presley Trade Marks [ 1997] RPC 543 
161 See Hazel Carty, "Character merchandising and the limits of passing off' (1993) 13(3) Legal 
Studies 289,294 
162 See Sarah Schaefer, "Scented soap seller wins right to put Elvis on his bars" (1997) 9 Daily 
Telegraph, Mar 18; Clive Thomas, "Commercial Law and the Media" (1990) 87(23) L. S. G. 19 
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of the myriad of photographs, including press photographs", 163 simply by virtue of the depiction 
of his likeness. 164 
The premise upon which the law of torts rests is the restraint of false or misleading information 
which causes injury to reputation or commercial interests, to which passing off is no exception. i's 
In the subsequent chapter, our discussion moves on to assess, the equitable doctrine of breach of 
confidence, which has tort-like qualities which may enable it to provide redress where the law of 
torts itself has failed in this context. 
163 Op. cit, n. 160,547, Paragraphs 40-50, per Laddie i 
164 See Brian Cordery and Justin Watts, "Character Merchandising - All Shook Up? " (1997) 8(4) 
Ent. L. R. 145,147 
165 While in an article entitled "Media Law: The Big Picture" (1997) (Sep) Olswang Magazine 2 
it was suggested that a series of unduly 
intrusive stories or pictures might constitute harassment 
contrary to s. 3(1) of the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1998, the courts will surely be reluctant 







Chapter Four: The Expanding Doctrine of Breach of Confidence 
One may be indirectly compensated for the majority of photojournalist intrusions through a parasitic 
claim under another pre-existing tort. Nevertheless, this thesis has sought to argue that our law might 
still benefit from the introduction of a new tort of intrusion into seclusion. Current remedies provide 
an imperfect degree of protection against singular or transient forms of intrusion and at best, tacit 
recognition that a photojournalist has unjustifiably transgressed the claim of an individual to 
seclusion. Consequently, the previous chapter considered whether the case for a tort of public 
disclosure of personal information has also been made out. Torts such as libel, malicious falsehood 
and passing off were found to prohibit only the publication of false and misleading information. 
Accordingly, these torts can be of little assistance in restraining the publication of true personal 
information through photographs, particularly as they focus on protecting one's reputation, profession, 
or trade goodwill from injury. 
Unsurprisingly, the publication of genuine photographic material for inclusion within the pages of a 
newspaper rarely attracts any form of criminal liability either. In Johnson v Walton (1990)1 the 
defendant gave an undertaking not to molest his former lover yet curiously the press later published a 
photograph depicting her in a semi-nude state he had allegedly taken. The court suggested that had he 
deliberately supplied the photograph to the press with the intent of causing distress to the claimant, 
that behaviour would have breached his undertaking not to molest her. However, few individuals are 
likely to have given such an undertaking, least of all photojournalists. Further, in CvC (application 
for non-molestation order) (1998)2 the court observed that while there was no legal definition of 
molestation under s. 42 of the Family Law Act 1996, the word implied quite deliberate conduct. Only 
if this were aimed at a high degree of harassment would the intervention of the court be justified. ' 
Newspaper editors are prohibited only from publishing photographic material that compromises the 
anonymity of individuals who might then be shunned or otherwise suffer detriment. The criminal law, 
for example, seeks to conceal the identity of those involved in divorce proceedings, 4 or the trial 
process, ' former offenders, 
" and rape victims.? This protection is primarily intended to ensure the 
'Johnson v Walton [1990] 1 F. L. R. 350 (C. A. ) 
2CvC (application for non-molestation order) [1998] 1 F. C. R. 11 
3 Discussed in Ruth Arlow, "A redefinition of molestation? -CvC" (1998) N. L. J. 256 
4 See Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 
See s. 4(1) and s. 41(2)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1925; See also s. 39 and s. 49 of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933; Tom Crone, p140, Ch. 10, Law and Media - An Everyday Guide for 
Professionals (1995, P Ed, Focal Press); Rv Daily Mirror (Editors and Proprietors) and Others ex 
pane Smith [1972] All ER Rep 503 
6 See Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974; s. 97(2) of the Childrens Act 1989; and s. 12 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 (as amended by Paragraph 14 of Schedule 13 of the Childrens Act 
1989) all in relation to the identification of young offenders. 
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proper administration of justice and to protect individuals from persecution, harassment or publicity, 
which might prove detrimental. The court's inherent jurisdiction over minors, for example, protects 
children who are considered more vulnerable and susceptible to adverse publicity than their adult 
counterparts! Only in this respect, it seems, does the criminal law recognise that "the media has both 
the power and the tendency to intrude into the privacy of individuals and that such intrusion can cause 
distress and psychological harm An immature child will often be unable to judge when it is truly to 
his advantage to invite the media into his life; he may not appreciate the distress and harm it may 
cause him and not be able to cope when it occurs" .9 However, the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction 
over minors may be distinguished from the wrong of publicly disclosing sensitive personal 
information, for the former prohibits only the disclosure of a minor's identity and not the information 
itself. In Re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication) (1992)10 publication of a Daily 
Mirror article describing a local authority's decision to place a boy with a disturbed background in the 
care of two homosexual foster parents was permitted but in a form which precluded the risk of 
harassment through identification. Restrictions are also imposed upon publication in part to uphold 
public confidence in the wardship jurisdiction itself. " It is the welfare of the child, '2 therefore, and 
not his or her freedom to choose the recipient of personal information that is weighed against freedom 
of expression and the right of the press to publish. 13 In this instance, Neill L. J. concluded, "Any 
restraint on publication which is imposed and intended to protect the ward and those who care for the 
ward from the risk of harassment.... It also follows that, save perhaps in an exceptional case, the ward 
cannot be protected from any distress which he may be caused by reading the publication himself'. " 
The courts are similarly unwilling, therefore, to suppress the publication of sensitive personal 
information, whether in photographic form or otherwise, simply because an individual's offspring may 
be distressed to learn of it. 15 Thus in ReX (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1975)16 an application 
made by the stepfather of a young girl for an injunction to restrain publication of a book revealing 
details of her late father's sexual preferences was refused. Lord Denning was to remark "The passages 
7 It is an offence to identify the female victim of rape under s. 4 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Act 1976 
8 Indeed, some commentators argue that privacy needs vary with age and that privacy may prove 
especially vital for adolescents. See Jaclyn Moriarty, "Children, privacy and the press" (1997) 9(3) 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 217,218 
9 See Re W (Wardship: Discharge: Publicity) [1995] 2 F. L. R. 466,476 per Hobhouse L. J. (C. A) 
10 Re W (A Minor) (Wardship: Restrictions on Publication) [1992] 1 W. L. R. 100 (C. A) 
" See Moira Wright, "The Press, Children and Injunctions" (1992) 55 M. L. R. 857,862 
12 The welfare of a child is also paramount by virtue of s. 1(1) of the Children Act 1989. See Re Z (A 
Minor) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [1996] 2 W. L. R. 88 (C. A) 
13 Op. cit, n. 10,103A-E per Neill L. J. 
14 Ibid, 103F-G 
IS For this reason, in Mv British Broadcasting Corporation [1997] 1 F. L. R. 51 (F. D) an injunction to 
restrain a documentary which revealed embarrassing details of a father's infertility, and that his 
children had been through donor insemination was not to prove available. Contrast Re C (A Minor) 
(Wardship: Medical Treatment) (No. 2) [1989] 2 All ER 791 
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describe conduct by him which was done in private and which he would wish to keep private and not 
disclosed to anyone except to his close friends. They expose his depravity to the view of the whole 
world... the reason why in these cases the law gives no remedy is because of the importance it attaches 
to the freedom of the press; or better put, the importance in a free society of the circulation of true 
information". '7 On a practical note, it is difficult to see the particular benefits brought to the public by 
this truth, '8 although it does seem sensible for the relatives of the child themselves to shield her from 
exposure to the contents of the book. " It is one's anonymity and identity that are protected and not 
intimate or personal information or images one would rather keep secret 20 As Ward J. put it, "The 
public may know the facts but public interest turns to public curiosity as soon as information is sought 
as to the identity of the parties". 21 Of the doctrines examined so far, therefore, the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court over minors is the least likely to be subjected to favourable development by the judiciary. 
In his own words, Lord Denning said "I say nothing on the question whether there is a cause of action 
in respect of infringement of privacy - [but it] cannot in my view be made good by resort to wardship 
procedure". u Similarly, some years later, fellow judge, Hoffmann L. J. felt the matter as rather `more 
appropriate' for the legislature than the judiciary. 
23 
Breach of confidence bears a certain resemblance to the wrong of disclosing personal information 
about a particular individual without his or her consent 24 This equitable doctrine of breach of 
confidence is capable of restraining the publication of true facts where it would be unethical to permit 
the recipient of information which he or she knows, or ought to have known to be confidential to 
subsequently disclose it. There are three main elements which must be present if the doctrine of 
confidentiality is to restrain the publication of a photograph obtained through intrusion by a 
newspaper. Firstly, the photographic material in question must have the "necessary quality of 
16 ReX (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) [1975] Fam. 47 
17 Ibid, 58D-G per Lord Denning M. R. 
'a See discussion in Ian Cram, "Minors' privacy, free speech and the courts" [1997] P. L. 410,415 
19 Op. cit, 58H-59A 
20 Examples of which include Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] F. L. R. 846,849H (F. D) 
where the anonymity of one of the first children ever to be conceived through a process of artificial 
insemination was concealed to preclude injury to her psychological health through taunting or the like. 
Similarly, in Re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Injunction) [1984] 1 W. L. R. 1422 (F. D) an injunction was 
granted precluding any article from being published which revealed the new identity of a woman 
found guilty of manslaughter as a child together with her husband and offspring. 
21 See Re H-S (Minors) (Protection of Identity) [1994] 1 W. L. R. 1141,1148F (C. A) In this particular 
instance, a transsexual parent was precluded from pursuing dealings or interviews with the media in 
the presence of her children. 
22 [1975] Fam. 47,60E 
23 See Rv Central Independent Television plc [1994] 3 W. L. R. 22,31G-H per Lord Hoffman where 
an appeal against an injunction preventing a television company from broadcasting pictures of a 
child's pedophile father was allowed. The parental jurisdiction of the court could only be invoked to 
restrain publications relating to the care, upbringing and welfare of children. 
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confidence about it' . 25 Secondly, the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the photograph 
must give rise to an obligation of confidence between the photographer and his subject. Finally, a 
breach of that obligation must have, or be likely to, take place through the publication of that 
photograph by the photographer himself or a third party such as a newspaper. 
The publication of photographs taken contrary to a reasonable expectation of seclusion: where 
is equity likely to intervene? 
There is, naturally enough, a strong similarity between breach of confidence and our desire to 
personally select those individuals to whom we reveal intimate information and place our trust. The 
former doctrine already offers us some degree of protection against the kiss and tell stories which 
readers of tabloids find so entertaining. 26 The courts have made it clear they consider details of past 
sexual relationships to be highly confidential. 27 More recently, in Michael Barrymore v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd (1997)28 Jacob J. considered that, "Common sense dictates that, when people enter 
into a personal relationship of this nature, they do not do so for the purpose of it subsequently being 
published in The Sun, or any other newspaper. The information about the relationship is for the 
relationship and not for a wider purpose29... The fact is that when people kiss and later one of them 
tells, that second person is almost certainly breaking a confidential arrangement' 9.30 Accordingly, 
Jacob J. granted an injunction to protect the details of a homosexual relationship between the claimant 
entertainer and another individual from publication in the Sun newspaper. Similarly, the Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair and wife, Cherie were able to restrain publication of an account of their family 
life by nanny, Rosalind Mark. Referring to his children, Mr Blair was said to be "fearful that any and 
past, present and future is liable to become open to public scrutiny' 31 every aspect of their lives, . 
However, "equity will not intervene unless the circumstances are such as of sufficient gravity; equity 
ought not to be invoked merely to protect trivial title-tattle, however confidential" . 32 
24 See R. Singh, "Privacy and the unauthorised publication of photographs" (1995) 139(2) S. J. 771; 
Scott J., "Developments in the Law of Confidentiality" [1990] Denning L. J. 77,87 
25 Seager v Copydex [ 1967] 1 W. L. R. 922,931 per Denning L. J. 
26 Duchess ofArgyll v Duke ofArgyll [1967] 1 Ch. 302 
27 For example, see Stephens vAvery [1988] 2 All ER 477 which is discussed infra. 
Z$ Michael Barrymore v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 600 (Ch. D) 
29 Ibid, 602 per Jacob J. 
30 Ibid, 603 
31 See Tim Reid, James Landale and Paul McCann, `Blair `poised' to sue over nanny book" (2000) 
Cover, The Times, Mar 6 The account consisted of a lengthy 451 page manuscript, written contrary to 
a written confidentiality agreement signed 
by the nanny. 
32 See Coco vA. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41,48, paragraph 25 per Megarry J. 
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In practice, this may mean that the publication of a surreptitiously obtained yet mundane photograph 
of an individual such as Princess Diana sitting on the diving board beside a private swimming pool33 
cannot be restrained. A duty of confidence will not apply to trivia, 34 no matter how distressing its 
publication may be to the individual concerned. 35 The courts may be more reluctant to grant an 
injunction where the claimants are unable to identify the confidential aspects of the image they seek to 
restrain. 36 
Having shown how breach of confidence and the public disclosure of personal information are related, 
it is important to discuss how they differ. Breach of confidence is concerned not so much with the 
protection of the information itself as reinforcing the moral duty or conscience of the individual who 
receives it 37 This equitable doctrine restrains the publication38 of true facts where it would be 
unethical to permit the recipient of information which he or she knows, or ought to know is 
confidential from subsequently disclosing it. H. R. H. Princess of Wales v MGN Newspapers Ltd 
(1993)39 illustrates how this may be distinguished from the conceptual basis of a public disclosure 
tort. The late Princess sought an interim injunction to restrain the publication of a photograph 
depicting her working out in a private gym she used to frequent, without her knowledge by the gym's 
proprietor. If we examine this case purely from the perspective of whether the Princess had a 
legitimate expectation of seclusion in these surroundings, the answer would seem to be that she did 
not as she shared the resources of the gym with others with equal access to them The picture itself 
merely depicted the Princess in athletic attire as she sat astride a weights machine exercising, and as 
such was fairly innocuous. In short, there is little one can point to in this scene which readily appears 
confidential. It disclosed no obviously personal information40 and revealed a scene already visible to 
any other users of the gym who were present at that time. Despite this, the Princess succeeded in 
obtaining an interim injunction before the case was settled eventually out of court. 
41 She succeeded 
because in taking the photograph, the gym owner breached the trust and reliance his client, the 
33 This example is taken from real life. See "Di's legover" (1997) Cover, The Sun, Aug 29 
34 A restriction known as the second limiting principle. See Attorney-General v Guardian Newspaper 
(No. 2) [1990] 1 A. C. 109,282D per Lord Goff. 
35 See Peter Watson, "Can you keep a secret? " 20 I. C. L 22,23 
36 See Service Corp International and Assoc. Funeral Directors v Channel 4 Television Corp. & 
Hardcash Productions (1998) 17 Lawyer, May 19 
37 [1988] 2 ALL ER 477,482E per Sir Thomas Browne-Wilkinson, V-C 
3' Note that a distinction may be made between mere limited disclosure and wider publication 
necessary for breach of confidence. See Raymond Wacks, "The Poverty of Privacy" (1980) 96 
L. Q. R. 73,82 
39 H. R. H. Princess of Wales v MGN Newspapers Ltd (1993) 8/11/93 Transcript available from Assoc. 
Official Shorthand Writers 
40 Indeed, members of the press that regularly lay in wait for her already knew even the fact that the 
Princess frequented that particular gym The location of the gym itself could not, however, have been 
discerned purely from the image. 
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claimant had placed in him, and not because its publication posed any threat to her privacy. In the 
example, given earlier, of the same individual being photographed by a complete stranger, she 
enjoyed no such prior relationship of reliance or trust 42 In these circumstances, the claimant must be 
able to point to something obviously confidential about the photograph he or she wishes to restrain. 
Breach of confidence may protect one in some circumstances from the publication of a photograph, 
which has been intrusively obtained, and which discloses personal information about one, but it is by 
no means synonymous with a public disclosure tort. 
Photographs with the Necessary Quality of Confidence and the Public Domain 
The first principle declares "that the principle of confidentiality only applies to information to the 
extent to which it is confidential. Once it has entered the public domain (which means no more than 
the information is so generally accessible) it cannot be regarded as confidential, and then the principle 
of confidentiality can have no application to it' . 
43 In practical terms, this means that unauthorised 
photographs taken by a photojournalist of an individual walking about in public or in a vehicle upon a 
public highway are unlikely to have the necessary quality of confidence about them. In Woodward v 
Hutchins (1977)44 for example, Denning L. J. held that the details of a pop singer's inebriated 
behaviour on board an aircraft could not form the subject-matter of a confidence given the presence of 
numerous others besides the alleged confidant 
45 Doubtless, Denning L. J. would have similarly 
viewed a photograph of the incident or indeed those of an individual upon public property such as a 
park or shopping mall as similarly unlikely places for an obligation of confidence to arise, under a 
doctrine whose very title implies a degree of secrecy and intimacy. 
It has been suggested that the public domain limitation has exhibited signs of some degree of 
flexibility however, 46 given that the presence of a small number of individuals other than the 
photographer or confidant does not necessarily preclude an action on the basis of breach of 
confidence. 47 In HRH Princess of Wales v MGN Newspapers Ltd (1993)48 to which I referred earlier, 
41 See Anna Pukas and Liz Lightfoot, "How the snoop won the photo finish" (1995) 13 Sunday Times, 
Feb 12 
42 This line of argument is discussed in "Media Law: The Big Picture" [1997] (Sep) Olswang 
Magazine, generously supplied by Julia Palca. 
43 See Attorney-General v Guardian Newspaper (No. 2) [1990] 1 A. C. 109,282C-D per Lord Goff 
44 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 W. L. R. 760 
45 lbid, 7640-D per Lord Denning L. J., M. R. 
46 See Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, "Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination" (1996) 
53(3) C. L. J. 447,448-449 
47 For example, see Prince Albert v Strange 
(1849) 2 De Gex & Sm 652,692,64 ER 293,310 where 
the dissemination of some etchings to a small group of close personal friends was insufficient to 
destroy their confidentiality. The Vice Chancellor was to remark that the right to restrain their 
publication was not limited to "those 
instances where he has kept them in a state of entire privacy and 
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the Princess had undoubtedly given her implied consent to indulge in physical exercise in a place 
where she might be observed by a limited number of fellow gym users. The court however, drew a 
distinction between this and wider dissemination of a permanent photographic record of her activities 
to the general public. This case may be distinguished from Woodward v Hutchins in that publication 
would bring no benefit to the public in dispelling a false image. Doubtless the status of the claimant 
herself and the threat of creating a precedent for the restraint of such photographs was instrumental in 
the case eventually being settled out of court, before it could proceed further. 
Another key point to be drawn from this case is that although Princess Diana had been photographed 
previously on numerous occasions, both with and without her consent and sometimes even at official 
functions, the court was nevertheless willing to entertain a breach of confidence action on her behalf. 49 
While other similar photographic material must logically have been circulating around the public 
domain at this time, S° their existence would only be relevant to her action if firstly, their content was 
strikingly similar in nature to the gym photograph she wished to restrain, and secondly, was fairly 
contemporary. The latter argument is particularly important where for example, an individual such as 
Brigitte Bardot who has consented to be photographed nude many times during the sixties, 51 seeks to 
restrain an unauthorised photograph taken some time later. It would seem difficult to sustain the view 
that pre-existing photographs taken many years ago such as these amount to an implied consent on her 
part for the publication of intrusively obtained photographs taken many years later. For the existence 
of similar photographic material to have any bearing on an individual claim of confidentiality, such a 
photograph would need to have been taken comparatively recently, at least in the last five years or so, 
and bear a highly similar content to that he or she wishes to restrain. 52 
The late Princess of Wales' decision to grant a televised interview to Panorama on the subject of her 
private life, marriage break up and an affair may, however, have precluded her from restraining the 
secrecy before the invasion complained of. The right is not lost by partial and limited communications 
not made with a view to general publication". This important case is discussed further later in this 
chapter. 
48 HRHPrincess of Wales VMGNNewspapers Ltd and Ors [1993] 8/11/93 Assoc. Official Shorthand 
Writers. This case was eventually settled out of court and is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
49 The alleged use and manipulation of the media by the Princess to her own ends did not appear to 
affect her rights to make use of this equitable doctrine. See Rob brown and Nicole Veash, "Diana's 
dangerous game of flirtation with the press" (1997) 11 The Independent, Oct 24 
50 See M. P. Thompson, "More Judicial Support for Privacy" [1995] Conv. 404,408 
S' The effect of posing for a photoshoot is also discussed by Raymond Wacks, p2, Privacy and Press 
Freedom (1995, Blackstone) 
$2 Doubtless, the decision of the Princess to `retire' from public life assisted her claim. See pIX, Mark 
Saunders and Glenn Harvey, Dicing with Di - the amazing adventures of Britain's royal chasers 
(1996, Blake) 
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publication of photographs whose subject-matter is synonymous with that of her interview. 53 In 
Lennon v News Group Newspapers and Twist (1978)54 for example, the claimant musician was unable 
to obtain an injunction to restrain publication of marital confidences as he had openly discussed 
details of his relationship in public on numerous occasions, like Diana. The announcement that she 
was voluntarily to take part in a television interview "was greeted with a clamour for pictures the like 
of which we [the photojournalist industry] had never known.. . any titbit of information or hazy picture 
was being bought for astronomical prices". SS The right to sue under this equitable doctrine therefore, 
is dependant on the plaintiff not having previously chosen to volunteer information through interviews 
on the same subject area depicted by the photograph he or she wishes to restrain. 
The Obligation of Confidence 
Whether an obligation of confidence might arise between photographer and subject in the absence of a 
prior contractual or interpersonal relationship of trust and reliance is a topic of some debate. During 
the formative years of the growth of this doctrine in the Victorian period, 56 it would appear that an 
obligation of confidence could arise in either of two ways. 7 It might arise through an individual 
directly imparting the confidential information to his or her confidant on an express or implied basis 
of confidentiality. Alternatively, and more importantly for our purposes, it might also arise purely 
through the circumstances under which the defendant obtained and utilised the information. It was 
under this latter limb that former employees were prevented from surreptitiously copying receipts of 
information, which had not been deliberately imparted to them, 58 and had, in all probability, been 
59 
obtained through more underhanded means 
The existence of this latter limb is particularly important as it might enable an obligation to arise 
between photographer and subject. Although obligations of confidence could alternatively arise not 
through information being imparted or intentionally communicated to a specific individual but simply 
53 See Christopher Leake, "Diana risks her right to privacy" (1995) Cover, Mail on Sunday, Nov 19; 
Paul McCann, "Shy girl who fled from the cameras became a supreme manipulator" (1997) 5 The 
Independent, Sep 1 
54 Lennon v News Group Newspapers and Twist [1978] F. S. R. 573 
55 Op. cit, n. 52, Saunders and Harvey p213-215. 
56 One of the earliest examples of the doctrine being Duke of Queensbury v Shebbeare (1758) 2 Eden 
329 
57 See Steven Hildreth, "Coming to Terms with Confidentiality" [1992] (Nov) L. Ex 12 which 
discusses what I have termed the dual limb theory under which obligations of confidence may arise, 
albeit in the context of contractual confidence unrelated to privacy. 
" See Yovatte v Winyard (1820) 1J&W 394; 37 ER 425 
59 Tipping v Clarke (1843) 2 Hare 383; 67 ER 23 
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by virtue of the underhanded or surreptitious means used to acquire it, 6° the vast majority of such 
cases arose through the indiscretions of employees or persons in a fiduciary position. 61 That is, until 
Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v Campbell (1948)62 in which Lord Greene held that although "there was 
no question of a confidential relationship between the defendants and either of the plaintiffs ,, 63 an 
obligation of confidence had nevertheless arisen and been breached by the defendants when they 
utilised the plaintiffs technical drawings for unauthorised purposes. Lord Greene added that "If a 
defendant is proven to have used confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from a 
plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff's rights" TM While involving an 
intellectual property dispute, this case is relevant to the present discussion in that it provides a strong 
precedent for an obligation of confidence to arise between parties without any contractual relationship 
such as photojournalist and subject 65 
A Change in Direction 
However, the doctrine was to make a radical change in direction in the period following Saltman so 
that this second limb through which an obligation of confidence may arise without the confider 
intentionally imparting information to his confidant was briefly to become severed. This development 
became apparent in Seager v Copydex (1967) 66 where Denning L. J. stated that "the information must 
have the requisite degree of secrecy and confidence attached to it and must be imparted in 
circumstances in which the confidant ought reasonably to have known it was subject to an obligation 
of confidence". 67 Similarly, in Coco v A. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd (1969) Megarry 1. felt that the 
"information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence" 68 The 
dicta in both these cases appear slightly ambiguous in that both might be construed as requiring the 
confider to `impart' his information to a confidant intentionally through verbal or written 
communication. Such an interpretation would preclude the use of breach of confidence as a means of 
restraining intrusively obtained photographic material. Fortunately, Megarry J. acknowledged in the 
60 For example, see Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1H& TW 33,40; 47 E. R. 1313,1317 per Lord 
Chancellor Eldon 
61 See Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch. 469,475 per Swinfen Eady L. J. 
62 Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v Campbell [1948] RPC 203 hereafter referred to as the 'Saltman' 
case. 
63 lbid, 211, paragraphs 35-40 per Lord Greene M. R. 
64 Ibid, 211, paragraph 25 per Lord Greene, M. R. 
65 See Megan Richardson, "Breach of Confidence Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained 
Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law" (1994) 19 MULR 673,692 
66 Seager v Copydex [ 1967] 1 W. L. R. 922 
67 Ibid, 931 per Denning L. J. 
68 [1969] RPC 41,48, paragraph 15 per Megarry J. 
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latter case that he had "stated the propositions in the stricter form", 69 thereby implying that at this 
point in time the requirement was intended to be flexible. 
Interestingly, in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1979)70 this `stricter form' approach 
continued to prevail and it is worth discussing this case in so far as it provides an unfavourable 
precedent for the victim of a photojournalist intrusion to argue that an obligation of confidence has 
arisen between him and his photographer. The claimant in this case alleged that his privacy had been 
infringed by the police who had tapped his telephone and accordingly sought to restrain the use of 
confidential information acquired in this way through an action for breach of confidence. Megarry V- 
C rejected his claim after concluding that confidential information must be imparted. Since the 
claimant did not intend to communicate the information on a confidential basis to the defendant who 
had merely overheard it, this second element was not present and no obligation of confidence arose on 
the part of the eavesdropper. 
7' This decision effectively severed the second limb whereby an 
obligation of confidence may arise through the circumstances under which the confidential 
information was acquired and later utilised, despite the precedent of Saltman to which I referred 
earlier. 
Megarry J. was to add "It seems to me that a person who utters confidential information must accept 
the risk of any unknown overhearing that is inherent in the circumstances of communication", 72 before 
proceeding to cite examples of lip reading passengers on buses, unseen neighbours in toolsheds and 
the like, who upon accidentally overhearing confidential information should not, in his view, be 
subject to any duty. " In my view, it is difficult to sustain the logic of this argument for Megarry J's 
dictum fails to make any distinction between accidental and deliberate eavesdropping. Intrusive 
photojournalism, of course, falls into the latter category. It has been suggested that the common 
denominator in Megarry J's examples is the inherent risks in communication with one another. 74 if 
this is so, then surely one would expect the risk of being overheard, or indeed photographed in one's 
own home or private residential property of another as being very low. If an individual cannot expect 
his or her behaviour there not to be monitored or recorded by others, where can he or she talk and act 
freely, and be secure from the prying eyes of society and the state? In any case, it seems irrational for 
a photojournalist, spy or covert eavesdropper not to be bound by an obligation of confidence where 
they ought reasonably to be aware of the confidentiality of the material to which they have had access, 
69 Ibid, 48, paragraph 35 per Megarry J. 
70 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] 1 Ch. 344 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, 357 per Megarry J. 
73 Ibid. 
7' See George Wei, "Surreptitious Takings of Confidential Information" (1992) 12 Legal Studies 302, 
306 
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photographic or otherwise. As Scott J. remarked, "Why should the thief be in a better position than 
the [designated] recipient of confidential information? Malone should in my opinion no longer be 
75 regarded as good law". One would have to agree. 
Fortunately, however, the decision in Malone would appear to be something of an aberration from the 
second limb principle that an obligation of confidence may arise from the circumstances surrounding 
the acquisition of confidential information not merely where it is deliberately imparted to intentionally 
specified individuals. In direct contrast to Malone, the claimant in Francome v Mirror Group 
Newspapers (1984)76 successfully sought an interlocutory injunction under breach of confidence to 
restrain the defendant newspaper from publishing information recorded by an unidentified third party 
who had tapped his home phone calls. While clearly, the claimant had not intended to impart 
confidential information to the eavesdropper, Fox L. J. distinguished the Malone case, and stated that 
"the Vice Chancellor was only dealing with a case of unauthorised tapping by the police... Illegal 
tapping is another matter". 77 The potential for Malone as a barrier to confidence actions against the 
publication of photographs obtained through unreasonably intrusive surveillance, was thus removed. 
While there is nothing `illegal' about taking photos, Francome illustrates how, despite an absence of 
direct communication between the plaintiff and an unknown overhearer required by Malone, an 
obligation of confidence might nevertheless arise where it is reasonable for an individual to be aware 
of the confidentiality of the information he or she has acquired. It now appears therefore, that the pre- 
existence of any relationship, whether contractual or otherwise, between two individuals such as a 
press photographer and subject is unnecessary, 78 although it may support an individual's action. 79 
An Obligation between Strangers 
Both Lord Greene M. R. in Saltman80 and Megarry J. in Coco81 agreed some time ago that the 
presence of a contractual relationship is not necessary in order for an obligation of confidence to arise. 
Having said that, in the majority of actionable cases there is some form of pre-existing interpersonal 
relationships between confider and confidant which supports an individual's claim that an obligation 
75 See Scott J., "Developments in the Law of Confidentiality" [ 1990] Denning L. J. 77,85 
76 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 1 W. L. R. 892; 2 ALL ER 408 
77 Ibid, 900; 415 per Fox L. J. 
78 See Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd v Phillip Morris Ltd (No. 2) (1984) 156 C. L. R. 414,434 per Deane 
J. and Franklin v Giddins [1978] 1 QdR 
79 See p67, Ch. 2, Raymond Wacks, Personal Information - Privacy and the Law (1989, Clarendon 
Press) 
8° [1948] RPC 203,211, Paragraphs 35-45 per Lord Greene M. R. 
81 [1969] RPC 41,47, Paragraph 5 per Megarry J. 
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of confidence has arisen. 82 Increasingly, over the past decade, however, there has been a trend towards 
the imposition of an obligation of confidence between strangers who are as unrelated as 
photojournalist and subject. This development may be traced back, perhaps, to the Australian case of 
Franklin v Giddins (1978)83 in which Dunn J. felt himself "quite unable to accept that a thief who 
steals a trade secret, with the intention of using it in commercial competition with its owner, to the 
detriment of the latter, and so uses it, is less unconscionable than a traitorous servant". 84 This idea 
that an obligation of confidence may arise between complete strangers has now filtered its way into 
our domestic courts. In Stephens v Avery (1988)85 the claimant confided details of her homosexual 
activities to a friend on an express understanding of their confidentiality. The friend proceeded to 
reveal these facts to a newspaper which was restrained from disseminating the information to the 
wider public and thereby betraying that trust. 86 Stephens v Avery provides an interesting contrast to 
the case of Bowley v The Sun Newspaper87 which immediately preceded it. In this case, Garland J. 
refused to restrain the publication of the homosexual claimant's intimate letters written to a lover, on 
the basis that a `transient' sexual relationship could not form the subject-mater of a confidence 
without an express undertaking as to its confidentiality. 
88 Surely in Stephens v Avery the claimant's 
extra-marital affair had a similarly transitory nature? The primary difference between these two cases 
seems to be that the claimant in Bowley did not expressly impart his information on a confidential 
basis whereas Stephens did. However, in Stephens v Avery, the Vice Chancellor considered that 
"Although the relationship between the parties is often important in cases where it is said there is an 
implied as opposed to express relationship between the parties is not the determining factor. It is the 
acceptance of the information on the basis that it will be kept secret that affects the conscience of the 
recipient of the information". 
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Is it reasonable to impose an obligation of confidence to restrain publication of intrusively obtained 
photographic information by virtue of a photojournalist's conscience? The judiciary would seem to 
think so for they went a step further in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1990) 90 During his 
evaluation of a Government attempt to restrain publication of a notorious autobiography written by a 
former security agent from revealing details about his profession, Lord Goff stated his view that an 
92 See William Wilson, "Privacy, Confidence and Press Freedom: A Study in Judicial Activism" 
(1990) 53 M. L. R. 43,47 
83 Franklin v Giddins [1978] 1 QdR 
84 Ibid. 
85 Stephens v Avery [1988] 2 ALL ER 477 
86 See L. M. Wise, "Calcutt: a reply" (1993) 137(3) S. J. 60 
87 See Commentary, Marcel Berlins, "Anne Diamond and the homosexual QC" (1988) Feb 5, 
Law. Mag 17 The case itself is unreported. 
88 See also M. and N. v Kelvin MacKenzie and News Group Newspapers (1988) Jan 18, Unreported. 
LEXIS. 
89 [1988] 2 All ER 477,482E per Sir Thomas Browne-Wilkinson, V-C. 
90 [1990] 1 A. C. 109 
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obligation of confidence could "arise in circumstances where he [the defendant] had notice or is held 
to have agreed, that the information is confidential, with the effect that he should be precluded from 
disclosing the information to others". 91 Lord Goff was to consider this notion that an obligation of 
confidence might arise between strangers and gave it his seal of approval by suggesting that "Where 
an obviously confidential document is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, 
or where an obviously confidential document, such as private diary is dropped into a public place, and 
is then picked up by a passer by", such an obligation would arise-92 Not only does this dictum provide 
a stark contrast to Megarry J's views on accidental overhearing in Malone as discussed earlier, it 
would seem to suggest that an obligation of confidence should arise where a photographer takes a 
picture of an obviously confidential place such as a bedroom or the interior of private property of 
which he or she ought reasonably to be aware. 
The Public Interest Defence 
Perhaps the defence upon which newspaper editors frequently rely the most is that of the public 
interest in order to justify a decision to publish a photograph to which another objects 93 However, this 
defence requires more than a casual interest on the part of readers in viewing the photographic 
material published and refers instead to the presence of a stronger competing interest whose benefit to 
society outweighs the relative importance of preserving the confidence enjoyed by the individual. 94 
The burden of proof, of course, lies with the newspaper to prove this. 
Originally, this defence was confined to iniquity where the individual seeking redress had behaved 
almost as unconscionably as the defendant95 but the defence has long since blossomed into much 
larger proportions, " balancing the public interest in preserving confidence 97 The benefit to society 
through the publication of information or photographs, whether photographic or otherwise, must 
91 Ibid, 281 per Lord Goff of Chieveley 
92 Ibid. 
93 The motive of a newspaper for publishing a photograph is irrelevant for the purposes of the defence 
even though they may lie in profit rather than free speech. See Lion Laboratories v Evans [1985] Q. B. 
526,536G per Stephenson J. Discussed further in M. W. Bryan, "The Law Commission Report on 
Breach of Confidence: Not in the Public Interest? " (1982) P. L. 188,189 
94 [1990] 1 A. C. 109,282E-G per Lord Goff 
95 See Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ. Ch 113 
96 See Meena Sayal, "Copyright and Freedom of the Media: A Balancing Exercise? " (1995) 6(7) 
Ent. L. R. 263,265 
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outweigh any detriment to society through its failure to observe and preserve individual 
confidentiality. The judiciary therefore, must weigh these two public interests against one another 
rather than those of the individual against society for otherwise the needs of the latter would tend 
always to outweigh the needs of a lone individual. 98 
An example of confidential information which might be of legitimate interest to the public and 
capable of significantly benefiting society is that of information pertaining to the exposure of crime" 
or the protection of health and safety yet even here the public are not always the most appropriate 
recipients of such information. 
100 The courts have, for example, concluded that free and informed 
debate on AIDS among members of the medical profession could take place without identification of 
specific sufferers or the details of their medical records. 1°' Similarly, while there is a public interest in 
the disclosure of a psychiatrist's unfavourable report on an individual whose hobby is bomb-making, 
given the confidentiality of the psychiatrist's relationship with his patient, disclosure was accordingly 
restricted to the proper authorities. 
102 However, the public interest served by publishing a photograph 
of a scantily clad member of royalty or photographic evidence of a relationship between a public 
person and another innocuous individual of which the public were not previously aware is less easy to 
identify. An interesting spin to the public interest defence often put forward by newspapers can be 
seen where the Sunday Times published a photograph of Lord Denning, who at the time was 
investigating security questions arising out of the Profumo affair. The picture depicted Lord Denning 
seen through a distant open window, perusing an open file of letters whose contents had been 
magnified with the aid of a long lens. The paragraph underneath read: `It is ironic to say the least that 
the gentleman dedicated to investigating security leaks should have been so unlucky with his own". 103 
The newspaper thereby sought to justify the publication of an intrusively obtained photograph on the 
basis that the original intrusion should not have been possible. Such a publication of a photograph 
taken of an individual upon private property without his or her consent would seem intended not so 
much for public enlightenment as public titillation.! 
" In Woodward v Hutchins (1977) however, 
Denning L. J. considered that the publication of a sensationalist story of the inebriated behaviour of 
pop singers on board an aircraft might benefit the public interest of dispelling a false image. 
Conceivably the publication of some photographs may be justified on this basis also. In addition to 
basing his decision on the very public environment of the airborne incidents which the proposed 
newspaper article related, Denning L. J. also considered that "if a group of this kind seeks publicity 
" See Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, p184, Ch. 4, Media Law (1992, Penguin) 
98 See n. 9, Wacks, p72, Ch. 3. 
99 See Cork v Mc Vicar [1984] Times, 31 Oct for example. 
10° See Prestataire, "AIDS, confidentiality, and the freedom of the press" (1988) 39 L. S. G. 34 
101 See Xv Yand Others [1988] 2 All ER 648 
102 See Wv Egdell [1990] 2 W. L. R. 471,488A per Bingham L. J.; [1989] 2 W. L. R. 689,710E 
103 See Paragraph 508, p157, Ch. 19, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
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which is to their advantage, it seems to be that they cannot complain if a servant or employee of theirs 
afterwards discloses the truth about them. If the image they fostered was not a true image, it is in the 
public interest that it should be corrected. In this case the balance comes down in favour of the truth 
being told, even if it should involve some breach of confidential information... there should be some 
truth in publicity. The public should not be mislead". 105 Those who indulge in media manipulation, 
perhaps by tipping off photographers at times when publicity would be advantageous and who later 
seek to restrain them when they do not suit their wishes are unlikely therefore to be able to avail 
themselves of this remedy. The courts have been far from sympathetic to those who they feel have 
attracted press attention voluntarily to promote a misleading self-image for their own ends. In 
Khasoggi v Smith (1980) for example, Roskill L. J. and Sir David Cairns agreed that "There is much to 
be said for the view that if someone allowed herself to get into the public eye to the extent that the 
plaintiff had, she ran the risk of the truth being made public". 106 Nevertheless, the publication of 
intrusively obtained photographs which reveal previously unknown aspects of an individual's 
personality or private environment represent "a gain in knowledge [which] is simply an addition rather 
than substitution of the true for the false". 107 In such cases, there is usually an absence of knowledge 
rather than a misconception on the part of the public. 
A Fourth Limiting Factor: Confidence, Privacy and the Clean Hands Maxim 
Breach of confidence, is of course, an equitable doctrine, and for this reason, it is also worth 
considering whether the individual who seeks to use it to restrain publication of an intrusively 
obtained photograph must come to equity with clean hands and the extent to which this requirement 
limits the applicability of this doctrine to individuals who are the subject of scandal. In Duchess of 
Argyll v Duke of Argyll (1967)108 Ungoed-Thomas J. stated that "A person coming to equity for relief 
and this [doctrine] is equitable relief which the plaintiff seeks, must come to equity with clean hands; 
but the cleanliness required is judged in relation to the relief sought", "' which would seem to suggest 
that a higher standard of cleanliness may be required for the award of damages as opposed to an 
injunction. 
Ungoed-Thomas J. considered however, that in this instance, an extra-marital affair on the part of the 
claimant did not affect her clean hands for the purposes of the doctrine and found that "The plaintiffs 
adultery, repugnant though it may be, should not in my view license the husband to broadcast the most 
104 See A-G v Guardian Newspapers [1990] 1 A. C. 109,283A per Lord Goff 
'os [1977] 1 W. L. R. 760,763H-764B per Denning L. J., M. R. 
106 Khasoggi v Smith (1980) 130 N. L. J. 168 
107 See Raymond Wacks, p29, Ch. 2, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995, Blackstone) 
108 Duchess ofArgyll vDuke ofArgyll [1967] 1 Ch. 302 
109 Ibid, 332A per Ungoed-Thomas J. 
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intimate confidences of earlier and happier days". 110 It would certainly appear therefore, that the 
confidentiality of marital relationships prior to infidelity remains in force thereafter, and it may be that 
some so-called 'kiss `n' tell' stories and accompanying photographs whose publication cannot be 
justified on public interest grounds may amount to actionable breaches of confidence. 
It seems that the claimant would need to be guilty of something more sinister than mere infidelity so 
as not to come to equity with clean hands. By way of illustration, in Hubbard v Vosper (1972)111 a 
member of the Church of Scientology who sought an injunction to restrain another former member 
from publishing a book criticising and revealing the cult's activities was unsuccessful given evidence 
that he and his fellow members had "been protecting their secrets by deplorable means such as 
evidenced by [their] code of ethics; and that being so, they do not come with clean hands to this court 
in asking for this court to protect those secrets by the equitable remedy of an injunction". 112 This 
doctrine therefore, is unavailable only to those who use excessively forceful or disproportionate 
means to prevent confidential information or photographs from being published. 113 
Publication and the necessity of pecuniary detriment in order for equity to intervene 
For an obligation of confidence which has arisen between photographer and subject to be breached, 
the photograph obtained in circumstances giving rise to confidentiality must have been or be likely to 
be published. 114 Not only is the original recipient of confidential information such as a photographer 
bound by an obligation of confidence, a third party such as a newspaper in possession of such 
information may also be restrained providing it ought reasonably to be aware that the information is 
the subject of a confidence. ' 
5 Of course, a newspaper might argue that it was a bona fide purchaser of 
the photographs or had irrevocably changed its position through its reliance upon that information. 
116 
In order to rely upon this defence, however, the newspaper would need to show that it was reasonable 
to assume in the circumstances that the photographic material had been obtained through means which 
did not give rise to an obligation of confidence having taken reasonable steps to examine its 
uo Ibid. 
111 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 K. B. 84 
"2 Ibid, 10 IA per Megarry J. 
113 Those who distribute material inciting revolution are also unlikely to come to equity with clean 
hands for example. See Litvinof v Kent (1918) 24 T. L. R. 298 per Neville J. See also The Church of 
Scientology of California and Others v Kaufman [1973] RPC 627 
114 See examples of privacy infringement which do not involve publication in David Pannick's article 
entitled "Resist pressure for a rushed law" (1997) 33 The Times, Sep 9 
iu See Raymond Wacks, p119, Ch. 3, Personal Information - Privacy and the Law (1989, Clarendon 
Press) 
116 See Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v MacDonald and Evans (1951) 68 RPC 190, see also 
J. Williams, p47, Ch. 2, The Law of Defamation (1976, Butterworth) 
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provenance and to ascertain the means by which it was acquired. A newspaper could also argue that it 
had irrevocably changed its position in the wake of publication which if successful might limit the 
extent to which an individual might obtain an account of profits from the publication, although this is 
far less likely unless the photographer in question has vanished with the money. This is also unlikely 
as most newspapers deal only with photographers who have acquired a certain reputation and are 
well-known to them or through agencies. An obligation of confidence is only breached by publication 
and it is worth emphasising the word `published' for a limited disclosure of the pictures so obtained to 
an editor or another journalist would not be enough. "7 Sometimes an individual is more concerned 
about an intrusively obtained photograph being made available to a specific member of the public 
rather than the public as a whole, 'IS and it is here that confidentiality and privacy differ in that the 
former requires a level of publication or threatened publication beyond a mere limited disclosure to a 
few selected individuals. 
Perhaps a more controversial question concerns whether the publication objected to must give rise to 
some financial detriment to the claimant in order to prove actionable under breach of confidence as 
some have suggested. "9 Clearly, as the effect upon an individual caused by the publication of 
intrusively obtained photographic material tends to be largely intangible and rarely economic, the 
issue of the extent to which a financial detriment is necessitated by the doctrine is an important one. 
Doubtless, the conception that a claimant must show some pecuniary detriment is derived from cases 
such as Seager v Copydex (1967) where the claimant inventor was held entitled to damages for the 
defendant's manufacture of his unpatented design on the basis that they had thereby used the 
confidential information as a "springboard for activities detrimental to him". 120 However, breach of 
confidence is a doctrine which may arguably be thought of in terms of two broad categories of 
intellectual property or commercial confidences and personal confidences which are not the product 
of creative thinking. 121 In my opinion, the so-called "springboard doctrine" which requires the 
confidential information to be used to the claimant's detriment properly belongs to the former 
category of commercial confidence and not the latter, with which this thesis is concerned. Yet even 
here Megarry J. was to remark in Coco vA. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd (1969) that while "At first sight, 
"' Publication of an intrusively obtained photograph upon the Internet is likely to constitute a breach 
of confidence, providing of course the site on which they reside has had a suitable number of hits. See 
p106, Ch. 4, Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Loyalty Edited by Peter Birks. (1997, SPTL/Clarendon 
Press) 
s See Gareth Jones, "Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another's Confidence" (1970) 86 
L. Q. R. 463,477 
"' Op. cit, Phillipson and Fenwick, n. 46. 
120 It is possible to divide this doctrine into two species of intellectual property orientated confidence 
and personal confidences arising perhaps through 
fiduciary relationships or the circumstances through 
which information is obtained. 
Naturally this thesis will concentrate on the latter sphere. See 
G. Fridman, Paragraph 20.03, p529, Fridman on Torts (1990) Waterlow. 
. Z` See Steven Hildreth, "Coming to Terms with confidentiality" [1992] (Nov) L. Ex 12 
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it seems that detriment ought to be present if equity is to be induced to intervene; But I can conceive 
of cases where a plaintiff might have substantial motives for seeking the aid of equity and yet suffer 
nothing which could fairly be called detriment to him". 122 Certainly, it would appear that "detriment in 
the use of information is not a necessary precondition to injunctive relief', 123 and its presence, like 
that of a pre-existing interpersonal relationship is merely an added incentive for equity to intervene. 
The speed at which intrusively obtained photographic material may be bought and processed by 
newspapers means however, that in most cases, an individual is looking not so much at restraining 
publication as being compensated with damages where it has already rapidly taken place. Although 
any pecuniary detriment suffered by the plaintiff undoubtedly plays a part in the calculation of 
damages arising from the offending publication, I would argue that the absence of this form of loss 
does not preclude such an action for damages. 124 Lord Keith for example, in A-G v Guardian 
Newspapers (No. 2) (1990) felt that "the right to personal privacy is clearly one which the law in this 
field should protect. If a profit has been made through the revelation of breach of confidence of details 
of a person's private life it is appropriate that the profit should be accounted for to that person. 
Further, as a general rule it is in the public interest that confidences should be respected, and the 
encouragement of such respect may in itself constitute a sufficient obligation even where the confider 
can point to no detriment to himself'. 
125 Lord Keith went on to suggest that preventing an individual 
from profiting by publishing intimate details of another's life through a breach of confidence was one 
appropriate example. 126 It would seem therefore that any financial detriment is a factor to be taken 
into account12' rather than a necessary precondition for the award of damages128 in lieu of an 
injunction under s. 2 of Lord Cairn's Act 1858.129 
The conceptual basis of breach of confidence and the doctrine's potential for continued 
expansion 
122 [1969] RPC 41,48, Paragraphs 25-30 per Megarry J. 
123 See Xv Yand Others [1988] 2 ALL ER 648 per Rose L. J. 
124 For a contrary view, see Raymond Wacks, op. cit, n. 79, p109, Ch. 3. 
125 [1990] 1 A. C. 109,255H-256A per Lord Keith of Kinkel 
126 Ibid, 256A-C per Lord Keith of Kinkel 
127 Op. cit, Wilson, n. 82,50 
128 For other examples of persuasive dicta supporting the argument that financial detriment is not 
necessitated by an action in breach of confidence. 
See Lord and Lady Percival v Phipps (1813) 2 
Vers & B. 19; 35 E. R. 225; Commonwealth ofAustralia vJohn Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 C. L. R. 
39,52 
129 See David Capper, "Damages for breach of the equitable duty of confidence" (1994) 14 Legal 
Studies 313,321 The Act to which I refer enables the modem court of chancery with a discretionary 
power to award damages instead of an 
injunction where appropriate. 
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As the reader will recall, the case of Kaye v Robertson (1991)130 arose where several photojournalists 
burst into a private hospital room and photographed the patient therein without his informed consent. 
Curiously enough, breach of confidence was not among the actions with which the claimant sought an 
injunction to restrain the photograph's use together with a newspaper article based on the encounter. 
The absence of a prior interpersonal relationship of trust between the claimant and those 
photojournalists, as we have seen, would not seem to preclude an obligation of confidence from 
arising. It would seem feasible that the photojournalist in question ought to have been aware of both 
the obvious confidentiality of this setting and that a photographic image recording the extent of his 
injuries might violate the confidentiality of his medical record during treatment. 
Nevertheless, Lord Bingham recently expressed the view that "so far as Kaye v Robertson is 
concerned, a claim for breach of confidence could not have been successfully made, at any rate 
without doing impermissive violence to the principles upon which that cause of action is founded". 131 
His Lordship's reasoning is undoubtedly derived from a distinction between the wrong of publishing a 
photograph obtained through intrusion which reveals personal information about one and 
confidentiality. At any rate, this argument merits further discussion, if only because it would appear 
the judiciary have set about `doing violence' to these principles already. Perhaps the most striking 
evidence of this came in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire (1995)132 in which Laws J. held 
that an obligation of confidence could arise between the police and a suspect with regard to their use 
and publication of that individual's photograph. Were the police to unduly publicise his image to third 
parties such as newspapers without good reason, that obligation could be breached, although here the 
reproduction of an individual's photograph for the purposes of crime prevention was unassailable. 
Importantly, Laws J. was to state per curiam, that "If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from 
a distance and with no authority a picture of another engaged in a private act, his subsequent 
disclosure of the photograph would surely amount to a breach of confidence-In such a case, the law 
would protect what might reasonably be called a right to privacy, although the name accorded to the 
cause of action would be breach of confidence". 
133 Laws J. unfortunately, did not elaborate further 
upon the nature of a `private act' although presumably the information revealed in the photograph 
would need to be of sufficient importance to merit equitable intervention. As Feldman suggests, "In 
practice, this means that the information must arise from or be significant to a relationship or activity 
which the law recognises as particularly worthy of support". 
134 A picture of that individual reading or 
130 [1991] F. S. R. 62 (C. A) 
131 See Lord Bingham, "Opinion: Should There Be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal privacy? " 
[1996] 5 EHRLR 450,457 
'32 Hellewell V Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 W. L. R. 804 
133 Ibid, 807G-H per Laws J. 
134 See p435, David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (1993, 
Oxford) 
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engaged in some other innocuous activity is unlikely to qualify despite the means through which it 
was obtained. Interestingly enough, in the scenario envisaged by Laws J., there is no relationship of 
trust between peeping tom and subject to protect, yet Laws J. still argues that equity ought to intervene 
nonetheless. This obiter dictum in Hellewell is something of an anomaly for as yet, in all actionable 
instances of breach of confidence, there has been an intention on the part of the claimant either to 
communicate information to another or to record that information for his own use. 135 In the example 
given by Laws J. where he argues breach of confidence should prove applicable, there is neither of 
these elements present. Members of the judiciary such as Laws J. have already begun to challenge the 
traditional boundaries of breach of confidence therefore. 136 It is with regard to breach of confidence 
that the courts have come closest to acknowledging the potential for a tort of publicly disclosing 
personal information, including photographs, to evolve through the medium of the common law. The 
dictum of Laws J. remains to be seized upon, however, by another enthusiastic member of the 
judiciary as a green light for development. In the subsequent case of Creation Records v News Group 
Newspapers (1997)137 a music record company was able to successfully obtain an injunction to 
restrain the publication of a Sun photographer's unauthorised picture of Oasis. Nevertheless, the pop 
group had deliberately assembled for the specific purpose of being photographed for an album cover 
on private property. Lloyd J. found "It was well arguable that the nature of the operation, together 
with the imposition of security measures made it an occasion of confidentiality, at any rate as regards 
photograph y". 138 Had the Music Company failed to take these security measures to preclude 
photography, whether the learned judge would still have chosen to grant an injunction appears less 
certain. Besides which, publication was restrained not so much because of the privacy-related 
motivations espoused by Laws J. but rather because the picture the Sun proposed to publish 
threatened sales of the claimant's identical poster. There is still some way to go therefore, before the 
courts have developed this doctrine to the extent that Laws J. would advocate. It should also be 
remembered that all those cases where breach of confidence has proved applicable to personal 
information obtained through surveillance139 are of an interlocutory nature to which Creation Records 
proves no exception. 140 
135 The Younger Committee suggested in the early seventies that "the point at which.. . the expansion 
of the remedy would stop is when the information ceases to be in any sense a communication by the 
plaintiff to another, actually or by intention, or even to himself'. See Paragraph 32(iii), p297, 
Appendix I, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972) Cnmd. 5012. 
136 The significance of this dicta is emphasised by NG-Loy Wee Loon in "Emergence of a Right to 
Privacy from within the Law of Confidence" (1996) 18(5) EIPR 307 
137 Creation Records v News Group Newspapers [ 1997] EMLR 444 (Ch. D) 
138 Ibid. See Commentary, (1997) 8(5) P. L. C. 79 
139 A use of this doctrine suggested by Joseph and Robin Jacob, in their article, "Confidential 
Communications" (1969) 119 N. L. J. 133 
140 Another example being Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 W. L. R. 892 The 
Prince of Wales also apparently "obtained an injunction against the publication of purported tape- 
recordings of pre-marital and long-distance conversations with Lady Diana". This case appears to be 
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Breach of confidence is undoubtedly capable of being altered and distorted to afford greater 
protection against the dissemination of photographs which show a blatant disregard for individual 
privacy. The question therefore becomes not whether the doctrine can be so developed but whether it 
should be. Lord Bingham's unease, one suspects, stems from the notion of "appropriating causes of 
action to purposes quite alien to their original object". '4' 
The precise conceptual basis upon which breach of confidence rests unfortunately, like many entirely 
judge-made laws, has been the subject of much debate. 142 This is mainly because the doctrine began 
life as a creature of many heads, 143 which developed from a chimerical hybrid parentage of contract, 
trust and property-144 Sir Brian Neill remarks that "it remains uncertain whether, leaving aside cases 
where information may be protected by contract, the claim for breach of confidence is based on the 
idea that confidential information can be regarded as a form of property or whether it is based on the 
notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances through which the information as 
communicated or obtained". 145 There are those who argue that the origins of the doctrine are entirely 
'in rem' given the frequent references in early cases to 'property' in letters, information and the 
like. '46 It has been suggested for example, that an individual retains a certain interest in his 
correspondence after it has changed hands known as a special property or interest. 147 Supporters of 
this view even go so far as to suggest that it was upon this proprietary basis that the Princess of Wales 
restrained publication of the gym photos discussed earlier. 149 This thesis takes a contrary view, 
however, for s. 4(l)(c) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 unequivocally assigns 
ownership of any given photograph to the photographer in question or his employer. The Act makes 
unreported and it seems fairly safe to assume that it too took an interlocutory form p98, Ch. 2, 
Freedom, the Individual and the Law (1989,6t' Ed, Penguin) 
141 Op. cit, n. 131,461 per Lord Bingham 
"42 See Trevor Cook, "Privacy, confidentiality and royal photos" (1993) (Dec) 35 M. I. P. 3 Megan 
Richardson describes the precise jurisdictional basis for extending the breach of confidence action as 
unresolved, albeit broadly framed in terms of `unconscionability'. See "Breach of Confidence, 
Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law" (1994) 19 
MULR 673,695 
143 A phrase employed by the Hon. Mr. Justice Scott in "Developments in the Law of Confidentiality" 
[1990] Denning L. J. 77 
'44 See Francis Gurry, Ch. 11, Breach of Confidence (1984, Clarendon press) 
145 See Brian Neill, p8, Ch. 1, Protecting Privacy (1999, Oxford University Press) Edited by Basil 
Markesinis. 
146 See S. Ricketson, "Confidential Information -A New Proprietary Interest? Part 1" (1978) 11 
MULR 223; G. Robertson and A. Nicol, p210, Ch. 4, Media Law (1992,3rd Ed, Penguin) 
"' See Pope v Curl (1741) 2 Atk. 342,26 E. R. 608 Writer of a letter had a property right in his words 
so as to preclude publication by a bookseller 
into whose hands they had fallen; Millar v Taylor (1769) 
4 Burr. 2303,98 E. R. 201; Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 1H& TW 33,47 E. R. 1313 A surgeon's 
lectures were his own property so as to preclude their publication in the Lancet; Phillip v Pennell 
[1907] 2 Ch. 577,590 per Kekewich J. 
148 See Michael Nash, "The nature of Royal contracts" (1995) 145(6684) N. L. J. 282 
100 
no reference to any residual proprietary rights being vested in the subject of a photograph in the 
absence of consideration. 
Nevertheless, there would appear to be a number of authorities in which breach of confidence has 
apparently been applied in terms of a proprietary right. In Gee v Pritchard (1818)149 for example, 
Lord Eldon granted an injunction to restrain the publication of private letters, and added "the 
substance of this complaint was or course, essentially a personal one, a matter of feelings hurt and 
privacy threatened but1S0... [I do] not forbid publication because the letters were written in confidence 
or that they might injure the plaintiffs feelings but rather ... on grounds of property to prevent their 
mischievous effects". 'S' Ascertaining the reasons for this apparently in rem application of the doctrine 
is an important question to resolve for otherwise, if equity relies on the presence of a proprietary 
interest in information to intervene, it cannot legitimately be invoked to restrain photographic 
material. 
It is possible that the references to property were merely metaphorical and were never intended by 
those early judges to be taken literally. 152 A more plausible explanation exists, however, for these 
frequent judicial references to property in information during early examples of the doctrine are more 
likely to constitute attempts to remedy the deficiencies of the Copyright Acts of the period. 153 Closer 
examination of these cases reveals that the majority of these cases would today lend themselves to 
copyright actions. Let us consider The Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd v Howard (1906) for example, in 
which the defendants and their agents were restrained from obtaining or copying cricket news 
transmitted by the claimants. Buckley J. granted the injunction since "The knowledge of a fact which 
is unknown to many people may be the property of a person in that others will pay the person who 
knows it for information as to that fact. The plaintiffs here use not copyright at all, but in respect of 
that common law right of property in information which they had collected and were in a position to 
sell, the defendant has stolen their property, he has surreptitiously obtained that which belongs to 
them". '5' Breach of confidence was simply filling in for copyright, which at that time only became 
operative after publication. 
'ss This is particularly visible in the celebrated case of Prince Albert v 
149 Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swan 402; 36 E. R. 670 
'50 Ibid, 424 per Lord Eldon 
151 Ibid, 426 per Lord Eldon 
152 Op. cit, n. 144, p47 
l53 See Kevin Garnett and Alistair Abbott, "Who is the `Author' of a Photograph? " (1998) 20(6) EIPR 
204 for some examples. 
154 The Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd v Howard and Manchester Press Agency (1906) 22 T. L. R. 375 
per Buckley J. 
ss See Walter Pratt, p24, Ch. 1, Privacy in Britain (1979, Associated Newspaper Press) The royal 
couple confessed that copies were periodically given to friends of the etchings concerned and that 
Strange had directed the Queen's attention to his intention to exhibit. See p14, Ch. 1, Morris Ernst and 
Alan Schwartz, Privacy - The Right to Be Let Alone (1962, Macmillan) 
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Strange (1849). 156 The Royal claimant'57 in this case was awarded a perpetual injunction to restrain 
the publication of etchings drawn both by himself and Queen Victoria. These hitherto unseen works of 
art had mysteriously entered the possession of the defendant and his confederates allegedly through 
the co-operation of a third party in the employ of the claimant. The defendant was thereby precluded 
from displaying the etchings in a public exhibition, '58 in order to "preserve the privacy of [the 
claimant's] unpublished works". 159 Numerous similar references abound in this case, both to 
information as property and to the privacy of the claimants which Warren and Brandeis erroneously 
mistook for the manifestation of a right to privacy. 16° What was protected, however, was not privacy 
at all but rather the unpublished artistic works of an author from unauthorised use. 161 The Vice 
Chancellor's decision was simply a response to the fact that "In the case of pictures there is no perfect 
copyright or statutable protection. In literary property, the copyright dates from the time when the 
author gave it to the world. But in the case of etchings and prints the copyright is not called into legal 
existence until certain conditions are performed; and there seems to be no statutory protection against 
copying a painting. It appears to be an omission in the Act". 162 It seems no coincidence that the 
references to property in breach of confidence largely died out as the subsequent successive Copyright 
Acts of 1911,1956, and 1988 came into force. No longer needed to mitigate the deficiencies of 
intellectual and artistic property law, the doctrine was then free to concentrate on other emerging 
problems. The conceptual basis of this action does not lie in the exercise of some residual proprietary 
right therefore, and the references to property in this case merely represent the application of the 
doctrine in circumstances where copyright could not be relied upon to defend one's rights of 
authorship. 163 
Breach of confidence, therefore, does not act in rem at all, but instead circumvents the obstacle of a 
photojournalist or newspaper's ownership of intrusively obtained photographs of a personal nature 
indirectly. '" An obligation of confidence is said to affect the conscience of the recipient of 
156 Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De Gex & Sm. 652,64 E. R. 293 
157 The Lord Cottenham was to remark later that "the importance which has been attached to this case 
arises entirely from the exhaulted station of the plaintiff'. (1849) 1 Mac. & G. 25,40; 41 E. R. 1171, 
1177 (C. A) 
158 Op. cit, n. 155, p26. 
159 Op. cit. 
160 Op. cit, n. 155, p24, Ch. l. 
161 See Walter Pratt, "The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right of Privacy" [1975] P. L. 161, 
176 
162 Op. cit, n. 156,672; 302 where the Vice Chancellor remarked that "ideas are free; but when the 
author confines them to his study, they are 
like birds in a cage, which none but he can have a right to 
let fly; for till he thinks proper to emancipate them, they are under his own dominion"" 
163 Ibid, 671; 302 per Vice Chancellor 
'64 See Keith Schilling, "Privacy and the Press: Breach of Confidence - The Nemesis of the 
Tabloids? " (1991) 2(6) Ent. L. R. 169,173 
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confidential information, and accordingly acts in personam. 165 As the Vice Chancellor emphasised in 
Morrison v Moat (1851)' "Different grounds have indeed been assigned for the exercise of this 
jurisdiction. In some cases it has been referred to as property, in others to contract, and in others, 
confidence meaning as I conceive, that the court fastens the obligation of performing a promise on the 
faith of which the benefit was conferred. But, upon whatever grounds the jurisdiction is founded, the 
authorities leave no doubt as to the exercise of it". 167 Subsequent courts have since clarified the 
position by stating unambiguously that breach of confidence "like most heads of equitable jurisdiction 
[whose] rational basis does not lie in proprietary right [but] lies in the notion of an obligation of 
confidence arising through which the obligation was communicated or obtained". 168 The original 
objectives of confidence therefore, lie not in the protection of privacy but rather to prevent breach of 
trust or good faith, together with the exploitation of trade secrets. 169 The former doctrine focuses on 
"The preservation of confidence rather than the possible harm to the claimant caused by its breach' .1 
70 
Subjecting breach of confidence to further development to ensure our private lives are respected 
remains feasible. To do so, however, breach of confidence must move beyond the protection of "any 
relationship within which there is a recognised public interest in fostering free exchange of 
information between the parties". "' The courts will be required to focus increasingly upon whether 
the information itself is of such a nature as to give rise to an obligation of confidence. The policy 
considerations underlying the public disclosure of personal information obtained by a photojournalist 
through surveillance has little in common with the protection of commercial or government secrecy. 172 
Contrary to such a tort, "there is no single purpose which the law on breach of confidence seeks to 
realise". 173 The problem is that judicial development of one area of confidentiality to prohibit 
abhorrent forms of covert private sector surveillance may have ramifications for the doctrine as a 
whole. Adopting breach of confidence to combat the publication of photographs surreptitiously 
obtained in this manner may also unwittingly alter the boundaries of commercial or industrial 
confidentiality unconnected with the disclosure of such information. These are the risks involved in 
developing a doctrine whose parameters extend well beyond those of the public disclosure of personal 
information to the protection of trade secrets and intellectual property. Accordingly, commentators 
165 See Fraser v Evans [1968] 1 Q. B. 349,361B per Denning L. J. 
'66 Morrison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241,68 E. R. 492 
167 Ibid, 256; 499 per Sir G. J. Turner, V-C. 
168 See Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons (1980) 147 C. L. R. 39,50-52 Approved by 
Bingham L. J. in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No. 2) [1988] 2 W. L. R. 805,904B 
169 See Samuel Stoljar, "A re-examination of privacy" (1984) 4 Legal Studies 67,83 which discusses 
the distinction between privacy and confidentiality. 
170 Discussed further by Raymond Wacks, p56, Ch. 3, Privacy and Press Freedom (1995, Blackstone 
Press) 
171 Op. cit, n. 50,435. 
172 See David Eady, "Opinion: A Statutory Right to Privacy" [1996] 3 EHRLR 243,249 
173 See Raymond Wacks, "Breach of Confidence and the Protection of Privacy" (1977) 127 N. L. J. 
328 
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such as Raymond Wacks argue that for the law to impose an obligation of confidence upon newspaper 
editors to be of good faith is a rather artificial approach to the prohibition of surveillance by the 
press. 174 In so doing, this attempt to squeeze `new' problems such as the publication of personal 
information obtained through surveillance into old categories such as confidentiality is an 
uncomfortable exercise, 175 that denies this privacy related wrong's independence as a separate 
concept. 176 
Conclusions 
To summarise, there are sufficient persuasive authorities for one to make a strong argument that an 
obligation of confidence may plausibly arise between a photojournalist and an unwilling subject upon 
private property even in the absence of any pre-existing interpersonal relationship between the two. A 
newspaper which ought to have been aware of such a photograph's confidentiality but chooses 
nonetheless to publish it should prove liable for a breach of that obligation in the absence of any 
justifiable public interest. Although the speed of modem image processing equipment makes it 
unlikely for such an individual to prevent publication altogether, '77 breach of confidence offers the 
potential to compensate him or her indirectly for the public disclosure of any personal information 
therein. Generally speaking, most actions tend to be retrospective, seeking redress for an event, which 
has already occurred. This proposition, of course, is inevitably subject to certain provisos. Equitable 
redress is an option only for those who have not invited the justifiable interest of the press by speaking 
openly of their private life in the same area as the photograph they seek to restrain. Providing the 
photograph itself has the necessary quality of confidence about it with no other contemporary 
photographs of a similar content circulating in the public domain, damages should prove available 
albeit in a reduced form where the individual pictured suffers no pecuniary detriment. 
This chapter of the thesis has also contributed to the academic debate surrounding the uncertainty as 
to where the conceptual basis of this equitable doctrine lies. Is breach of confidence based on the idea 
that confidential information (including photographs) can be regarded as a form of residual property 
or alternatively consist of a duty to be of good faith? In examining whether the conceptual basis of 
this equitable doctrine facilitates the restraint of paparazzi obtained photographs that reveal 
confidential aspects of a person's lifestyle and relationships, the discussion has gone some way to 
resolving this uncertainty. It would seem plausible to argue judicial references to property in early 
cases of breach of confidence represent attempts to remedy the deficiencies of copyright during this 
174 Ibid, 329 
175 See Raymond Wacks, "Pop Goes privacy" (1978) 41 M. L. R. 67,68 
176 Op. cit, n. 173,330 
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period. As such, they represent an application of the doctrine to another contemporary legal problem 
and not a reference to its origins. Breach of confidence, therefore, does not act in rem at all, but to 
reiterate, circumvents the obstacles of ownership indirectly by imposing upon a photojournalist or 
newspaper a duty to be of good faith. That duty arises where he or she ought reasonably to be aware 
of the confidentiality of the setting in which that photograph is taken, and where it would therefore 
prove unconscionable for them to profit from its public disclosure. The versatility of this action once 
enabled it to mitigate the deficiencies of the copyright of old and today ahs done much towards 
meeting the challenge posed by our modern mass media society. Conglomerations of smaller 
publishing groups into today's multi-nationals has flourished under the leadership of tycoons such as 
Rupert Murdoch and perhaps encouraged courts to develop this doctrine against any abuse of that new 
found power. If the courts are to develop this common law principle further, they are likely to do so, 
"in accordance with contemporary and ethical values ... interstitially and by molecular rather than 
molar motions, case by case". '78 By emphasising the tort-like qualities of the doctrine from which it 
derives such flexibility in terms of application, 179 breach of confidence may come to partially negate 
the need for any public disclosure tort. This approach would require the courts to make an assessment 
of whether a reasonable man in the same position as a photojournalist ought to have been aware of the 
confidentiality of his subject-matter. This would not seem impossible, particularly as Megarry J. 
remarked "it may be that that hardworking creature, the reasonable man, may be pressed into service 
once more; for I do not see why he should not labour in equity as well as law". 180 Some commentators 
have suggested that legislation might ensure that ongoing development continues in this area of law, '8' 
but this shows no signs of abating and might indeed petrify or limit further adaptation. 182 
Breach of confidence, therefore, is now readily attaining a position from which it can compensate 
those who are the subject of photographs taken through surveillance whose publication threatens to 
reveal personal information about us. The remarks of Denning L. J. in British Steel Corporation v 
Granada Television Ltd (198 1)193 to the effect that "the court will always be ready to grant an 
"' See Jonathan Ames, "Privacy law forced back onto the agenda" (1992) 89(6) L. S. G. 8 who argues 
that one can rarely "put the genie back into the bottle". 
178 See Anthony Lester, "English Judges as Law Makers" [1993] P. L. 269,285-286 
19 See Paragraph 6.37, Law Commission Report No-110 entitled "Breach of Confidence" (1981) 
Cmnd. 8388; James Michael, p107, Ch. 3, Privacy and Human Rights: An international and 
comparative study with special reference to developments in information technology (1994, 
Dartmouth) 
180 [1969] RPC 41,48 per Megarry J. 
181 See Sarah Spencer, p131, Ch. 11, Human Rights in the United Kingdom (1988, Pinter Publishers) 
See also Paragraph 50, p13, National Heritage Committee's Fourth Report on Privacy and Media 
Intrusion, Vol.!, Report and Minutes of Proceedings HC(1992/93) 294-I 
182 See Gareth Jones, "The Law Commission's Report on Breach of Confidence" (1982) C. L. J. 40,47 
and Helen Fenwick, Paragraph 73.1, p173, Ch. 7, Civil Liberties (1993, Cavendish) 
183 British Steel Corporation v Granada Television Ltd [1981] A. C. 1096 
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injunction to restrain a publication which is an infringement of privacy", 184 seem overly optimistic. 
Nevertheless, favourable applications of the breach of confidence doctrine by a judiciary very much 
aware of privacy related considerations18S should do much to protect private and confidential aspects 
of our lives from exposure in photographic form within newspapers. However, like much of the law 
capable of compensating individuals for the public disclosure of such information, the potential use of 
this doctrine in this context is theoretical, rather than proven at this stage. 186 Imposing an obligation of 
confidence where there is no pecuniary detriment, prior interpersonal relationship of trust or reliance 
or even a deliberate attempt to record or communicate information does tend to push breach of 
confidence to its limits. Admittedly, breach of confidence provides what is perhaps an imperfect 
solution'87 that does not directly address the fundamental issues at stake in relation to information and 
photographs acquired through surveillance. '88 An award of damages under the doctrine, however, is 
usually assessed on the basis of the market value of confidential information on sale between a willing 
seller and a willing buyer. The subject of a photograph obtained surreptitiously, who is perhaps 
embracing his fiancee in a bedroom, which is subsequently published without consent, is anything but 
willing seller. Essentially this equitable doctrine protects both the trade secrets of a business and the 
intimate details of an individual's personal life for the same reason, to maintain confidentiality, 
without distinction. It may be, therefore, that an award of aggravated damages may be necessary if 
breach of confidence is to tacitly acknowledge the wrong of publicly disclosing personal information 
against the wishes of another. 
184 Ibid, 1129H-1130B per Denning L. J. 
185 For an example of judicial awareness of privacy in breach of confidence cases, see Marcel v 
Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [1992] Ch. 225,234C in which Sir Nicholas Browne- 
Wilkinson stressed the importance of privacy. 
186 Indeed, the Younger Committee felt that "it wold not be satisfactory simply to leave this branch of 
the law, with this many uncertainties to await further development and clarification by the courts". See 
Paragraph 630, p193, Ch. 2 1, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
187 A view shared by Geoffrey Robertson who describes the use of the doctrine in this manner as a 
form of judicial `back-door' protection. See p262, Ch. 7, Freedom, the Individual and the Law (1989, 
6th Ed, Penguin) 
188 As discussed in the inaugural chapter of this thesis. See also p47, Ch. 2, David Feldman, Privacy 







The influence of the European Convention upon domestic laws relating to photojournalism 
and their future evolution 
The preceding chapters of this thesis have clearly established that domestic laws are able only to 
compensate one indirectly for the violation of a justifiable expectation of seclusion from one's 
fellow man. An inventive and enthusiastic judiciary is constrained by the limited range of torts at 
their disposal. Inevitably, there are gaps in the protection existing remedies can offer, particularly 
so with regard to transient use of long lens or surveillance equipment by photojournalists for the 
purposes of intrusion. Accordingly, we fmd a strong case for the introduction of a tort prohibiting 
an individual from observing, monitoring or recording the activities of another whom he knows or 
ought to know has a reasonable expectation of seclusion. The need for a tort prohibiting the 
public disclosure of personal information is less pressing, but here the approach of the courts is 
much the same. They are able to recognise the importance of protecting individuals against this 
wrong only on a tacit rather than overt basis, by fitting the circular peg of the public disclosure 
wrong into the square hole of a broader more loosely defined principle such as confidentiality. 
The judiciary have shown themselves willing to impose this duty to be of good faith upon 
photojournalists who surreptitiously acquire pictures of an obviously personal and confidential 
nature. ' Arguably, the most important objective is that one is protected from these wrongs at the 
hands of the press regardless of the name attached to that protection. 2 Understandably, there are 
those however, who shudder at what they perceive as a relegation of these privacy issues to a 
second division interest unworthy of specifically directed legal protection. 3 It seems curious for 
one to have to rely on parasitic claims under so many disparate torts for what are essentially just 
two fundamental wrongs. Particularly so, when the United Kingdom is a signatory to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950) which recognises a single right to respect for 
correspondence and private, home, and family life. Although the author has sought to avoid the 
use of the nebulous term `privacy' for the reasons explained in the formative chapter of this thesis, 
we cannot abandon all reference to it altogether. For as Feldman suggests, our "English law falls 
to be evaluated in the light of these privacy related standards" under Article 8 of the European 
Convention. 4 
The Convention itself was modelled with the primary aim of combating public sector violation of 
human rights in the wake of the turbulent period of the second world war in which the rights of 
See Oliver Goodenough, "A Right of Privacy in the United Kingdom: Why Not the Courts? " 
(1993) 15(7) EIPR 227,228 
2 An argument associated with the Latin motto `ubi jus remedium' put forward by Peter Prescott 
in "Kaye v Robertson -a reply" (1991) 54 M. L. R. 451,452 
3 See Raymond Wacks, "The Poverty of Privacy" (1980) 96 L. Q. R. 73,75 
4 See p453, Ch. 10, David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 
(1993, Oxford) 
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many individuals had been trampled underfoot by oppressive regimes. 5 As such, the right to 
respect for correspondence, family, home, and private life contained within Article 8 is not 
directly enforceable against the press or indeed other members of the private sector. The growth 
and conglomeration of multi-national media organisations and the capacity of both themselves 
and their employees to violate the same interests encompassed by Article 8 was only realised 
much later. The solution has been to require that member states such as the UK, satisfy Article 1 
of the Convention by not only according respect for the rights of an individual to privacy but also 
to take positive action to secure Convention rights and freedoms such as Article 8 so that redress 
is available irrespective of who violates them. 6 The underlying argument being that since "the 
private sphere itself is constituted by the state in the sense that it is dependent on the state for the 
provision and enforcement of the norms which regulate relations within that sphere.... it becomes 
artificial and dishonest to constrain the reach of fundamental rights protection by limiting it to the 
so-called public sphere". 7 Accordingly, one may ask whether an individual might argue that the 
UK has failed to fulfil its positive obligation to provide adequate protection against 
photojournalists who seek to interfere with this right. 
What does the right to respect for correspondence, private, home, and family life encompass 
and does it include freedom from intrusion by the photojournalism industry? 
Without question, the European Convention's conception of respect for correspondence, 8 family, 9 
home and private life is considerably more far reaching than the specific wrongs identified in this 
thesis that are perpetrated by the photojournalism industry. The scope of Article 8, like privacy 
itself is typically described in vague terms, such as a right to "Develop relationships with other 
human beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfilment of one's own 
personalitys10. Elsewhere we are told that "there are limits to the personal sphere. While a large 
proportion of the law existing in a given State has some immediate or remote effect on the 
individual's personality or developing his personality by doing what he wants to do, not all of 
these can be considered to constitute an interference with private life in the sense of Article 8 of 
the Convention". 't The precise boundaries of this right are not certain given the same problems 
S See Walter Pratt, p87, Ch. S, Privacy in Britain (1979, Associated Newspaper Press) See David 
Harris, Michael O'Boyle, and Chris Warbrick, p19, Ch. 1, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1995, Butterworths) 
6 See Marclcx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330,342, paragraph 31; and Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 
EHRR 305,319, paragraphs 29-32 
7 See Murray Hunt, "The `Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act" (1998) (Aut) P. L. 423, 
425 
8 See Silver and Others v UK (1980) 3 EHRR 475 in which censorship of prisoners' letters 
represented a prima facie violation of Article 
8. 
9 See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471,494-495, paragraphs 59-60 
lo See Application No. 6825/7, Vol. 5, Decisions and Reports of the European Commission of 
Human Rights 86 Undoubtedly freedom from interference with one's sexual relationships is 
central to the right, see Dudgeon v 
U. K. (1981) (No. 45) 4 EHRR 149 
11 Bruggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany (1977) 3 EHRR 244,252 
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described earlier in the first chapter of this thesis with regard to the legitimate parameters of 
privacy. 12 While we may speculate as to what might be included under the right to respect for 
private life, the parameters of the concept remain nebulous13. It was upon these grounds that Lord 
Denning expressed reservations about incorporating the Convention, which he described as 
"framed in a style, which is quite contrary to anything to which we are accustomed. There are 
broad statements of principle and broad statements of exceptions - which are so broad that they 
are capable of giving rise to an infinity of argument"14. If Lord Browne-Wilkinson is correct in his 
assertion that the decisions of our domestic courts are likely therefore, to be based on moral, not 
legal, factors, which are perhaps not articulated in the judgement, reflecting the morality of the 
individual judge and to an extent, reflect the values of contemporary society". 15 At the core of 
European jurisprudence, however, is the prevention of unreasonable interference with sexual 
autonomy, 16 and the protection of "physical and moral integrity of the person, including his or her 
sexual life". 17 
There would seem to be a fear of excluding any interest that legitimately belongs to the sphere of 
privacy protection or of failing to identify precisely what it is that unifies all claims to privacy in 
such disparate areas of correspondence or private life. For example, in Niemietz v Germany 
(1992)18 the issue of what privacy should encompass arose when an applicant lawyer objected to a 
search conducted by the German Police. They were attempting to identify an individual guilty of a 
minor offence and the European Court considered the search was a disproportionate method of 
identifying a comparatively minor miscreant. "There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of 
principle why this understanding of the notion of `private life' should be taken to exclude 
activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their working 
lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing 
relationships with the outside world. This view is supported by the fact that, as was rightly 
pointed out by the Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which of an 
paragraph 55-56 
2 The European Court has taken a wary view of the inclusion of peripheral liberties within the 
Convention right to respect for private life. See App. Np. 10083/82 v UK (1982) 6 EHRR 140,144 
(euthanasia); Bruggeman and Scheuten v Federal Republic of Germany (1977) 3 EHRR 244, 
253, paragraphs 59-61 (abortion); Rees v UK (1986) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v UK (1990) 13 EHRR 
622, paragraphs 36-42; Sheffield and Horsham v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 163 (recognition of 
transsexual identity, concealment of birth certificate) Contrast Bv France (1992) 18 EHRR 1, 
paragraph 52 where a different system of birth certificates was in place affording fewer obstacles 
to the recognition of transsexuality. 
13 See Loukis Loucaides, "Personality and Privacy and the European Convention on Human 
Rights" (1990) 61 BYBIL 175 
14 See Lord Denning, p291, What next in the law? (1982, Butterworths) 
15 See p22, Ch. 4, The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English law (1998, Oxford University 
Press) Basil Markesinis, Ed. 
16 For example, see Dudgeon v UK (1980) 3 EHRR 40,58, paragraph 58; Modinos v Cyprus 
(1993) 16 EHRR 485, paragraphs 20-24; Norris V Ireland (1989) 13 EHRR 186, paragraph 38 17 See X and Yv Nederlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235,239, paragraph 22 
'8 Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97, Series A, No. 251-B, Application No. 13710/88 
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individual's activities form part of his professional or business life and which do nots19. Rather 
than attempt any more delicate distinction, the European Court therefore chose to embrace many 
claims to privacy at home and work in this way. The reason for that judicial `reluctance to decide 
what is private arises from a recognition that we are a very diverse society with widely different 
behavioural norms. [Expectations of private life] differ among communities, between generations, 
among ethnic, religious or other social groups When we ask courts to decide what is private, we 
are asking them to step into the maelstrom of popular culture and impose an orthodoxy. i20 A 
difficult task indeed for a court at European Convention level where there is perhaps a need to 
compromise between the various member states' views of what is and ought to be protected by the 
Convention. 21 
Whatever else the European Convention right encompasses, it is certainly arguable that the more 
ruthless elements among the press and photojournalist fraternity may impair the development of 
an "individual's sphere within which he can freely pursue the development of his personality"22. 
The Commission has taken the view, however, that "it does not interfere with a person's right to 
respect for private life to photograph him where there is no intrusion in the `inner circle' of his 
private life' . 23 Quite rightly, the subject matter of the photograph and the nature of the property 
where the subject resides are key factors. Feldman suggests that the future development of Article 
8 case-law is likely to focus on ensuring an individual's moral integrity is maintained and that he 
or she is treated as someone worthy of respect. 24 If this is indeed the case, there is an argument 
that even entertainers who are often targets for photojournalist intrusion deserve equal respect for 
their core private lives due to any other human being. It might also be possible to argue that where 
press intrusion makes individuals reluctant to leave their homes, the state must ensure the law 
enables their right to freedom of movement under Article 5 of the Convention is also protected. 2s 
Exhausting Existing Domestic Remedies 
The claimant in Kaye v Robertson (1991)26 did not seek leave to apply to the European Court of 
Human Rights despite the apparent failure of the English law to protect his privacy. 27 Had he 
sought to do so, the first hurdle he would have faced would have been in satisfying the 
19 [bid, Paragraph 29,111 
20 See p148-149, Ch. 6, David Anderson, Protecting Privacy edited by Basil Markesinis. Oxford 
University Press. 
21 See p28, Ch. 2, David Feldman, Privacy and Loyalty [1997] edited by Peter Birks. (1999, 
SPTUClarendon Press) 
22 See Andre Declerk v Belgium, Application No. 8307/78, D. R. 21,116 
" See David Feldman, "Me Developing Scope of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights" [1997] 3 EHRLR 265 
24 Ibid, 271 
2$ See Ralph Beddard, "Photographs and the Rights of the Individual" (1995) 58(6) M. L. R. 771, 
777 
26 Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (C. A) 
27 See p47, Ch. 2, David Feldman, n. 21, supra. 
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requirements of Article 26. Article 26 requires a claimant to demonstrate that all applicable 
domestic remedies in the UK have been exhausted and were incapable of providing redress for the 
violation of his rights under Article 8. Mr Kaye, would therefore have needed to pursue his case 
right through to the House of Lords within six months of their decision if unfavourable, before 
making a complaint to the European Court. 28 It is understandable therefore, why the claimant in 
Kaye v Robertson chose not to take his grievance any further. Few such individuals are willing to 
make such an investment of their time and money to facilitate a change in the domestic law 
relating to intrusive photojournalism. The prospect of undertaking litigation against a state must 
be daunting to an even greater extent than taking action against a newspaper or media 
organisation. This in part, at least, explains why the UK has not been compelled by the 
Convention right to respect for private life to introduce the wrong of unreasonable intrusion 
advocated by this thesis. Where, as here, a certain amount of doubt exists, as to whether forms of 
photojournalist intrusion are prohibited by law, it is up to the individual concerned to bring a test 
case before the domestic courts. Only in this way can such a claimant ascertain the extent of such 
protection and ensure that such remedies have truly been exhausted before applying to the 
European court. 29 In Whiteside v UK (1994)3° for example, a victim of harassment alleged that she 
was afforded no practical remedy by the courts, as harassment like photojournalist intrusion was a 
wrong for which only piecemeal rather than specific remedies existed at that time. 1 Accordingly, 
the claimant argued that her rights under Articles 1,8, and 13 of the Convention had been 
violated. Article 13 provides that "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity". This Article, 
therefore, which presupposes the existence of other convention rights, requires that there should 
be some remedy available for a breach of the right to respect for private life. The European court 
however, chose to accept the Government's argument that the torts of trespass to the highway, 
conduct calculated to impair health, and nuisance afforded some potential for redress, which had 
not been exhausted in accordance with Article 26.32 The court remarked by way of explanation 
that "in a common law system, where the courts extend and develop principles through case-law, 
it is generally incumbent on an aggrieved individual to allow the domestic courts the opportunity 
to develop existing rights by way of interpretation' . 33 For the victim of unreasonable intrusion by 
the press, this means leaving no stone unturned in the quest for redress under some other avenue 
28 See Paragraph 1.14, p7, of the Governmental Consultation paper entitled "Rights brought 
Home: The Human Rights Bill" Cm. 3782. See also Piers Gardner and Chanaka Wickremasinghe, 
p112, Ch. 3, Human Rights and the European Convention on the United Kingdom and Ireland 
edited by Brice Dickson. (1997, Sweet & Maxwell) 
Z9 See Application No. 6271/73, Dec 13/5/76 D. R. 62 
30 Whiteside v UK (1994) 76A D. R. 80, Application No. 20357/92 
31 For a discussion of the period immediately prior to the enactment of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1998 by the author, see Peter Jones, "Stalking the tortfeasor" (1997) 31(2) Law 
Teacher 252 
32 Op. cit, 87 
33 Ibld, 88 
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of existing law. It was for this reason, when Earl Spencer and his former wife alleged Article 8 of 
the Convention had been violated by the absence of a suitable means of restraining the publication 
of photographs obtained through unreasonable intrusion, they did not succeed. Both the Countess 
and her husband had objected to the publication of a photograph depicting her in the gardens of a 
private eating disorder and alcoholism clinic, taken surreptitiously with a long lens. The 
newspaper in question published the picture as part of a series of articles relating to the 
applicants' private lives to which they also objected. The European Commission of Human 
Rights34 chose to dismiss the application on the grounds that "the two parties had not exhausted 
ways of resolving their dispute in the British courts given the potential, albeit more specialised 
remedies of defamation and breach of confidence were available". 3' This decision exhibits a 
certain degree of naivety on the part of the Commission in its appreciation of the law of libel. As 
we have seen, libel is unlikely to have been a valid alternative for the Spencers. The photograph 
and articles of which they complained were neither untrue or derogatory in nature. Breach of 
confidence would have proved ineffective, however, as a means of prior restraint unless the 
Spencers knew in advance of the publication and an award of damages after publication would 
have been hardly inevitable. Nevertheless, the Commission felt that "insofar as relevant doubts 
remain concerning the financial awards to be made following a finding of a breach of confidence, 
they are not such as to warrant a conclusion that the breach of confidence action is ineffective or 
insufficient but rather a conclusion that the matter should be put to the domestic courts for 
consideration". 36 An interesting observation one may draw from the Spencer case is that the 
European Court chose solely to examine the domestic law relating to the publication of personal 
information through intrusively obtained photographs. The initial unreasonable intrusion into the 
Countess' seclusion by the photojournalist and his long lens camera seems to have been 
conveniently overlooked. Nevertheless, it would seem that if a claimant is to seek the help of the 
European Court of Human Rights in reforming the law to protect him or her from photojournalist 
intrusion, he or she must conclusively prove those laws have failed in this context. On a practical 
level, this means the claimant is saddled with the onerous burden of pursuing all those avenues of 
legal argument discussed in the second chapter of this thesis through the domestic courts. 
The reason for the Commission's shallow analysis of the effectiveness of existing laws in Spencer 
v UK (1998) are visible in the earlier precedent of Winer v UK (1986)37 In somewhat of a role 
reversal, we fmd a British photojournalist objecting to the publication of a book, the contents of 
which he alleged 'intruded upon his and his wife's privacy'. The applicant journalist had received 
a settlement in respect of a libel action but argued that the damages he received did not reflect the 
publication of true facts and personal information pertaining to both himself and his wife. Despite 
34 See Earl Spencer and Countess Spencer v UK (1998) Application No. 28851/95 and 28852/95 35 See also case commentary, Claire Dyer, "Spencer loses privacy laws battle" (1998) 2 The 
Guardian Jan 17 and Charles Bremner, "Spencer loses fight to challenge privacy law" (1998) The 
Times, Jan 17 
36 Op. cit. 
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the absence of a specific British remedy, here also, the Commission found the remedies of libel 
and breach of confidence to be sufficient protection for his rights under Article 8. In reaching this 
decision, the Commission also pointed to the applicant's partial success in obtaining financial 
redress in respect of those libellous parts of the book. For this reason, and the applicant's liberty 
to publish his own version of events, his complaint failed to progress any further to the European 
Court of Human Rights. However, a further and very revealing statement was made by the 
Commission, which explains this reluctance to examine domestic legal protection for the right to 
respect for private life in more detail. The Commission admitted being "reluctant to call for a 
positive obligation to be imposed on States to interfere with other individual's rights to free 
expression". 3ß Elsewhere, in Convention jurisprudence, we find similar views expressed that "it is 
not for this Court, nor for the national courts for that matter to substitute their own views for those 
of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists". 39 It is submitted 
that it is this reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs of a member state coupled with a 
generous margin of appreciation granted to the UK, which has contributed to the limited impact of 
Article 8 upon domestic law until now. 
The Margin of Appreciation 
The margin of appreciation enables the European court or indeed the Commission, to take into 
account the `traditional and cultural valuesi40 of a particular state before reaching a conclusion as 
to whether the level of protection for an individual's private life is insufficient. For this reason, 
the very standard by which cases are judged will vary according to the particular state charged 
with failing to secure the rights encapsulated within Article 8.41 The UK has traditionally tended 
to place more emphasis on freedom of expression particularly in the context of its press, as 
opposed to personal privacy. Our continental neighbour, France, on the other hand, has taken a 
radically different approach with a civil code which may afford redress for paparazzi victims, and 
for this reason, the margin of appreciation afforded to the UK as compared with France may well 
be greater in relation to compliance with Article 8. It is conceivable that the European Court has 
shown a certain degree of lenience towards the UK given the absence of any written code of 
fundamental rights that might be directly enforced between individuals. The case ofX and Yv The 
Nederlands (1983)42 has much to tell us about the margin of appreciation doctrine. The facts of 
which concerned the failure of the Dutch public prosecutor to bring a criminal prosecution against 
B for the sexual abuse of the applicant's daughter. The Court found that those domestic laws 
37 Winer v UK(1986) 48 D. R 154 Application No. 10871/84 (Admissability decision of 10/7/86) 
38 Ibid, 170-171 
39 See also Jersild v Denmark (1994) 19 EHRR 1, Paragraph 31,26, Series A, No. 298 
40 Discussed by David Locke in "An answer to Lord Wakeham" (1997) 147(6817) N. L. J. 1681 
41 See Claire Ovey, "The Margin of Appreciation and Article 8 of the Convention" (1998) 19(1) 
HRLJ 10,11 
42 X and Yv The Nederlands (1983) 6 EHRR 311, Series A, No. 9 1, Application No. 8978/80 (For 
admissability decision, see 27 D. R. 106) 
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made no provision for his mentally handicapped daughter who was unable to personally file a 
complaint against her abuser so as to constitute a breach of her rights under Articles 3,8,13, and 
14 (discrimination) of the Convention. 43 During the case, the Court was to make some interesting 
observations on the extent of the positive obligation on a member state such as the UK to ensure 
its laws afford protection for an individual's right to respect for private life. The Court 
recognised that such a positive obligation might "involve the adoption of measures designed to 
ensure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between 
themselves" 44 However, "the choice of the means calculated to secure compliance with Article 8 
in the sphere of relations of individuals between themselves is in principle a matter that falls 
within the contracting states' `margin of appreciation'. In this connection, there are different ways 
of ensuring respect for private life, and the nature of the state's obligation will depend on the 
particular aspect of the private life that is at issue"45 . The Court added "it is in no way the task of 
the European Court of Human Rights to take the place of competent national courts in the 
interpretation of domestic law". 46 This statement is significant, as it seems to imply an 
unwillingness to question how a Member State such as the UK exercises its discretion as to how it 
ensures photojournalists respect an individual's private life. Arguably therefore, the United 
Kingdom's decision to rely predominantly on the indirect application of existing laws to protect 
privacy from photojournalists together with a press industry self-regulatory system will be 
deemed sufficient to fulfil the UK's positive obligation to ensure individual privacy is not 
compromised. 
The Court can therefore, provide a stimulus for change, but it is unwilling to intervene directly to 
remedy deficient areas of the law of contracting states for fear of being seen to usurp national 
sovereignty. It is this fear of becoming embroiled in politics that is likely to prevent the European 
Court from taking a more questioning view of the United Kingdom's approach to the provision of 
redress and recognition for those whose private life is not respected by the press. Powell and 
Rayner v UK (1990)47 illustrates the reluctance of the European Court to examine a decision to 
ensure respect for one's private life by means of industry self-regulation rather than by legal 
means. Here, the applicant objected to the persistently loud noise of aircraft passing over his 
property en route to and from Heathrow Airport. Since s. 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 
precluded any possibility of redress, he alleged that his rights to a fair trial and respect for private 
and home life had been compromised. The Court felt that it had "no jurisdiction to entertain the 
applicant's complaints under Article 6(1) and 8 of the Convention' . 48 "It is certainly not for the 
Commission or the Court to substitute for the assessment of what might be the best policy in this 
43 Ibid, Paragraph 30,242 
44 Ibid, Paragraph 23,239-40 
45 lbid, Paragraph 24,240 
46 Ibid, Paragraph 29,241-42 
47 Powell and Rayner v UK (1990) 12 EHRR 355, Series A, No. 172, Application No. 9310/81 
(For admissability decision, see 27 D. R. 106) 
48 Ibid, Paragraph 46,370 
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difficult and technical sphere"49 . The European Court therefore, 
is unwilling to question a 
decision by the UK to use a system of self-regulation to minimise aircraft noise as opposed to 
providing a civil law alternative. This would seem to suggest that the same would seem to be true 
of the decision by the UK to rely heavily on the use of press self-regulation and indirectly 
applicable laws to protect privacy from errant photojournalism. 
It would appear then that a contracting state need only demonstrate that it has provided some 
protection for privacy, however generalised or basic that level of protection may be50. The 
European Court of Human Rights therefore, has sought to avoid any detailed consideration of the 
adequacy of the domestic doctrines discussed in this thesis, which cumulatively afford indirect 
protection for such interests, preferring instead to leave such matters entirely to domestic courts to 
remedy. The European Court itself views its role as "subsidiary to the national systems 
safeguarding human rights. The Convention leaves to each contracting state, in the first place, the 
task of securing the rights and freedoms it enshrines. This margin is given both to the domestic 
legislators and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and apply 
the laws in force"sl 
Perhaps, the "margin of appreciation simply reflects a reluctance by the Strasbourg organs to 
substitute their own assessment of the necessity for a restriction on a Convention right for that 
states52 or is designed to "accommodate this desire for a reasonable amount of national 
autonomyi53. Sceptics consider that the doctrine is far from being "a 'test' in the conventional, 
dispositive sense", 54 and is really merely "a conclusory label which only serves to obscure the true 
basis on which a reviewing court decides whether or not to intervene in a particular case is 
justifiable". 55 Another explanation for the European Court's reluctance to intervene in such 
matters may be that even they do not know the right answer, if indeed there is one. The European 
Court may simply be unwilling to impose a particular solution to an ambiguous problem for which 
there may be several right approaches. In either case, the very existence of the margin of 
appreciation concept may cause some disparities across Europe as to what constitutes acceptable 
media behaviour and adequate protection from intrusion. Given fears of sparking controversy 
among europhobes, the European Court's view continues to prevail that "especially so far as those 
positive obligations are concerned, the notion of `respect' is not clear cut: having regard to the 
a9 Ibid, Paragraph 43,369 
so See p187, Ch. 10, "Human Rights - NOMOS XXIII" (1981) Edited by Pennock and Chapman. 
New York University Press. 
sl See also Handyside V UK, 1 EHRR 737, Series A, No. 24 
52 See Francesca Klug and Keir Starma, "Incorporation through the back door? " [1997] (Sum) 
P. L. 223,230-231 
53 Op. cit, n. 28, p221, Ch. 7, of Brice Dickson's "Human Rights and the European Convention" 
54 See Aileen McHarg, "Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems 
and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the ECHT' (1999) 62 M. L. R. 671,688 
ss See Rabinder Singh, Murray Hunt, and Marie Demetrious, "Is there a Role for the Margin of 
Appreciation in National Law after the Human Rights Act? " [1999] 1 EHRLR 15,20-21 
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diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the 
nation's requirements will vary considerably from case to case"56 
The Newspaper plays its Trump Card - The Balance between Articles 8 and 10 
The limited impact of Article 8 to reform domestic media law therefore, is attributable, at least in 
part, to the generous margin of appreciation enjoyed by the UK together with the difficulties of 
complying with the Article 26 requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted. A farther 
explanation may be found in the balance between the right to respect for private life and its 
antithesis, the right to freedom of information granted by Article 10. The former right granted by 
Article 8(1) is, of course, subject to the exceptions listed in Article 8(2) which adds that "There 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others". One of those rights and freedoms is freedom of expression, which is enshrined within 
Article 10(1). This article states that "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information or ideas without 
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers". Article 10(2) affords a member 
state scope to limit this freedom by reference to various public interests such as the prevention of 
crime or for the "protection of the reputation and rights of others, and to prevent the disclosure of 
information received in confidence". What becomes immediately apparent is the distinction 
between the right to freedom of expression and the less emphatic right to respect for one's private 
life s7 The very terms in which the court in Sunday Times v UK (1979)58 remarked that "freedom 
of expression... is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted"59 tells us 
something of the way in which Article 10 is viewed in relation to other rights. This perception of 
other rights as merely a number of exceptions rather than rights of equivalent rank and status 
tends to favour a newspaper, which is entrusted with providing us with a steady flow of 
information. The Court felt that "not only does the media have the task of imparting such 
information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive thems60. Thus aruling of contempt for 
prejudicing ongoing trials for the applicant newspaper's series of articles aimed at assisting 
parents to obtain better settlements in respect of thalidomide side-effects was an interference with 
Article 10. Admittedly, the European Court was, in this instance, examining the balance between 
56 See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471, Paragraph 67,497, Series 
A, No. 94 
57 See p21, Ch. 1, Sir Brian Neill, Protecting Privacy edited by Basil Markesinis. (1999, Oxford 
University Press) 
58 Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245, Series A, No. 30 
59 Ibid, Paragraph 65,281 
60 Ibid, Paragraph 65,280 
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Articles 6 and 10, but it would seem that the right to freedom of expression is viewed of 
paramount importance rather than as a right of equivalent status 61 
For this reason, the constraints on freedom of expression, including those required to ensure 
respect for one's correspondence, private home, and family life, are confined to those absolutely 
necessary to provide the minimum protection necessary for an individual. In each case, the 
European Court seeks to determine whether privacy protection alleged to interfere with freedom 
of expression is (1) prescribed by law; (2) with an aim that is legitimate under Article 10(2); and 
(3) is necessary in a democratic society for the aforesaid aim or aims. The practical significance 
of these criteria is that were the judiciary to develop existing laws in line with the right to respect 
for private life, they would need to ensure this restriction on freedom of expression was 
adequately prescribed. 62 So far as the latter criterion or `necessity' is concerned, this is said to 
"imply the existence of a pressing social need... The Court must determine whether the 
interference at issue was proportional to the legitimate aim pursued"63 . The standard applied since 
the Belgian Linguistic Case (1968)M to evaluate state-imposed restrictions on respect for privacy 
is that of the principle of proportionality' which requires a "reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means and the aim sought to be realised"65 . 
This principle may be 
utilised by a state such as the UK to legitimise the limitations it chooses to place upon a 
Convention right. In Lingens v Austria (1986)66 the state afforded disproportionate protection to a 
politician's reputation. The applicant magazine publisher chose to print two articles accusing the 
Austrian chancellor of being a Nazi sympathiser, and was convicted of criminal defamation. The 
European Court deemed the subsequent penalty of a fine, compulsory publication of the 
judgement text and confiscation of all offending magazines was unduly harsh, thereby violating 
Article 10(1) through the disproportionate means used to secure the right to reputation under the 
exceptions in Article 10(2). The Court added "the limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly 
wider as regards a politician than a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and 
knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and 
the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerances67. The balance 
between Articles 10 and 8 will vary therefore according to the nature of the individual whose 
privacy has been violated or threatened, particularly as regards politicians68. 
61 See Colin Munro, "Press Freedom - How the Beast was Tamed" (1991) 54 M. L. R. 104 
62 Op. cit, n. 58, Paragraph 35,416-417 
63 Op. cit, n. 58, Paragraph 39-40,418 
64 Belgian Linguistic (1968) 11 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights p832 
65 For examples of proportionality in action, see Handyside v UK (1979) 1 EHRR 737, Paragraph 
49,754; Gaskin v UK (1989) 12 EHRR 36, Series A, No. 160, Application No. 10454/83; Soering 
v UK (1989) 11 EHRR 439, Series A, No. 161, Application No. 14038/88; Leander v Sweden 
(1987) 9 EHRR 33, Series A, No. 116, Application No. 9248/81 
66Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, Series A, No. 103, Application No. 9815/82 
67 lbid, Paragraph 42,419 
68 See Andrew Clapham, p134, Ch. 5, Human Rights in the Public Sphere (1993, Oxford) 
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The Court also remarked that `whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the 
protection of the reputation of others, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and 
ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of political interest. Not only does the press 
have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a right to receive 
thems69. Upon further examination of this statement it is possible to see why the European Court 
favours Article 10 over other rights such as Article 8. It seems that the right to respect for private 
life is balanced against two competing rights contained within Article 10; namely the right to 
receive information as well as the right to impart it. It is possible therefore to see why Article 10 
has played a much greater part in our law than Article 8 and why references to freedom of 
expression derived from Article 10 of the Convention would certainly appear more numerous than 
the scarce references to its privacy counterpart. 7° Thus, a form of interest jurisprudence is to be 
found in the emphasis placed on Article 10 over other Convention rights by the European Court 
which is mirrored by our own courts 
71 Privacy is viewed as an exception to freedom of 
expression rather than a right of equivalent status. 
72 Similarly, in the Observer and the Guardian v 
UK (1991)" the European Court stated that "Freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, is 
subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity 
for any restrictions must be convincingly established"74. The Court remarked that "... the dangers 
inherent in prior restraint are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the 
Court. This is especially so as far as the press is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity 
and to delay its publication, even for a short period, may well deprive it of all value and 
interest"75. In so doing, the court has protected perhaps not merely democratic freedom, but the 
economic interests of powerful media entities. 6 Nevertheless, the press "are in a better position to 
69 Op. cit, n. 58, Paragraph 41,418 
70 Op. cit, n. 28, pl0l, Ch. 3, Piers Garnder and Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Human Rights and the 
European Convention cited above. For an example of one of the few instances where the 
Convention right to privacy has been emphasised during a judgement. See Morris v Beardmore 
1981] A. C. 446,462F, 465A-B, 465F per Lords Keith, Scarman and Roskill respectively. 
See Rv Central Independent Television plc [1994] 3 W. L. R. 22,30E in which Lord Hoffman 
remarked that "there is no question of balancing freedom of speech against other interests. It is a 
trump card which always wins". The right to privacy was merely viewed as a legitimate exception 
to 
freedom of speech. 31G-H. See Jacon McCue, "A judicial cry for freedom" (1994) S. J. 798 
72 This may be because of the wording of Article 8 which provides a `right to respect' for privacy 
rather than a straightforward right to privacy. See p29, Ch. 2, ref. no. 28, supra. 
73 Observer and the Guardian v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 153, Series A, No. 216, Application 
No. 13585/88 Paragraphs 52-64,189-194 The case concerned the propriety of an extension of the 
interlocutory injunction restraining publication of the infamous Spycatcher book containing 
memoirs of a former MI5 agent. Given publication in the United States and a failure by the British 
Government to prevent imported versions of the text from entering the public domain, the court 
found the extension of the original injunction disproportional and consequently a breach of 
Article 10. The court felt that "there was no pressing need to prevent the British public reading 
about something which the rest of the world was free to read by then". See Opinion, 14 EHRR 
229,236, Paragraph 75 
74 Ibid, Paragraph 59,191 
ýS Ibid, Paragraph 60,191 
76 See Keith Schilling, "Privacy and the Press: Breach of Confidence - The Nemesis of the 
Tabloids" (1991) 2(6) Ent. L. R. 169,170 
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communicate the information to the public. To that extent journalists are legitimately accorded 
greater rights of free speech than other members of the population". 77 In the future, however, the 
Internet may facilitate the expression of information, ideas and opinions by non-commercial 
individuals on a hitherto unprecedented scale to a potential audience of millions. 78 The emphasis 
placed upon freedom of expression in Convention jurisprudence, however, together with the 
generous margin of appreciation granted to the UK with regard to how the right to respect for 
private life is secured, provide an explanation, for the limited impact of Article 8 upon domestic 
English law until now. 79 The record of the UK courts in using Article 8 to protect privacy until 
now has been described as `uniformly unimpressive". 80 The Convention has enjoyed merely 
persuasive force referred to only upon matters of ambiguity81 or where our own laws are silent. 
Where Convention rights such as Article 8 have clashed with our law, domestic law prevailed" 
unless the European Court declared those laws a violation of the Convention. 
It is submitted however, that the emphasis placed upon freedom of expression in accordance with 
Article 10 cannot be used as an excuse for failing to provide specific protection against press or 
private sector intrusion. For while in order for one to express information one must first acquire 
it83, there is no positive right to obtain information implied within Article 10. The press may 
solicit photographs, but they do so not as of right but merely in so far as they are not prohibited 
from doing so under domestic or European law. In Leander v Sweden (1987)84 the European 
Court clearly held that the right to receive information granted under Article 10 did not give the 
applicant a right of access to the information upon the basis of which he had been denied 
permanent employment as a Naval museum technician on the grounds he was a potential security 
risk8s. If therefore, there is no right of access to `public' information, a fortiori there can hardly be 
such a right to obtain private information. 
One of the more well-known instances where the positive obligation on the United Kingdom to 
secure respect for one's correspondence, private, home and family life has resulted in an 
increased level of protection against intrusive surveillance, is to be found in Malone v UK 
77 See p72, PtII, Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (1985, Oxford University Press) 
7$ See p102, Ch. 4, Raymond Wacks, ref. no. 3, supra. 
79 See p132, Ch. 11, Sarah Spencer, Human Rights in the United Kingdom edited by Paul 
Sieghart. (1988, Pinter Publishers) 
80 See Ian Leigh, "Horizontal rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: lessons from the 
Commonwealth? " (1999) 48 ICLQ 57,85 an important article to which I shall refer again below. 
81 See A-G v B. B. C. [1981] A. C. 303,354; 3 W. L. R. 109,130 per Lord Scarman; See also 
Garland v British Rail [1983] 2 A. C. 751 
$Z See Rv Khan (Sultan) [1996] 3 ALL ER 289,300D & 301C-F per Lord Nolan, Paul Tain, 
"Covert Surveillance, Rv Khan and the European Convention" (1996) 140(31) S. J. 785 and more 
generally see Taylor v Co-op Retail Services [1982] ICR 600; Rv Greater London Council ex 
Parte Burgess [ 1978] ICR 991 
83 See argument developed in "The Right of the Press to Gather Information" (1971) 71 Columbia 
Law Review 838,843 albeit in the context of American free speech. 
84 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433, Series A, No. 116, Application No. 9248/81 
11 Ibid, Paragraph 74,456 
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(1984)86. The applicant antique dealer in this case suffered the indignity of intrusion through the 
interception of his telephone calls by police given suspicion of handling stolen goods, and alleged 
that his rights under Article 8 had been violated. The European Court accordingly found that the 
applicant's right to respect for private and home life had indeed been violated given both the 
insufficient protection available against such conduct and domestic laws that made it unclear as to 
the circumstances in which the state might exercise such draconian powers87. This case is often 
cited with approval as evidence of the positive impact of the Convention upon English law in this 
context, but while the obvious solution would have been to adopt legislation against unperceived 
surveillance, in general without lawful authority for disproportionate aims, this approach was not 
taken. Instead, the reluctant legislature chose instead to enact the Interception of Communications 
Act 1985, which prohibits only the tapping of phones linked to the public telecommunication 
system. The UK government should have taken a wider approach of prohibiting unlawful 
surveillance per se without reference either to specific forms of equipment or technology that will 
become outdated or replaced in a comparatively short space of time. The result of this case is that 
the photojournalist is still free to eavesdrop, observe and record the movements of another, so 
long as he does not do so via the public telecommunication system. Already, the deficiencies of 
the Act which has failed to keep pace with the advent of mobile telephones and pagers, which are 
not public forms of telecommunication for the purposes of the Act have become apparent 88 
Further, the tribunal appointed to adjudicate on complaints under the Act lacks investigative 
powers89. 
Indeed, one of these loopholes in the 1985 legislation lead to the successful case of Halford v UK 
(1997)90 in which the applicant former Assistant Chief Constable of Merseyside argued that the 
interception of her office telephone calls by police in connection with sex discrimination 
proceedings violated Article 8. " The Court concurred that Article 8 had been violated together 
with her right to effective redress under Article 13 which could be provided neither by the 1985 
Act which did not apply to internal telecommunication systems operated by public authorities92 
nor by the common law which did not recognise privacy in this context93. The applicant was duly 
awarded a generous sum of £10,000 in respect of the distress caused, 94 together with a further 
86 Malone v UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14, Series A, No. 82, Application No. 8691/79 
87 Ibid, Paragraphs 69-80,41-45 
88 Discussion of other deficiencies may be found in p78, Ch. 3, Your Rights - The Liberty Guide 
(1998,6's Ed) Edited by John Wadhani, Philip Leach and Penny Sergeant. Pluto Press. 
89 See Peter Bailey, p90-91, Ch. 6, Bringing Human Rights to Life (1993, Federation Press). 
90 Halford v UK (1997) 24 EHRR 523, Application No. 20605/92 
91 See summaries by Philip Leach, "Recent Developments in European Convention Law" (1997) 
Jan Legal Action 18,19; (1997) Times Law Report, July 3; Compare Klass v Federal Republic of 
Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 214, Series A, No. 28, Paragraph 36,228-229 
92 Op. cit, Paragraph 51,544 
93 Ibid, following the Commission's Opinion at Paragraph 37,532 
94 Ibid, Paragraphs 74-76,550 The European Court, did however, find it difficult to discern 
whether the applicant's medical treatment for stress was the result of learning that her office 
phone had been bugged or was attributable to the sexual discrimination litigation process. 
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£25,000 towards her legal expenses. It is interesting to note that here too the applicant was found 
to have a legitimate expectation of privacy even at work95, although her allegation of interference 
with home phone calls were dismissed for lack of evidence. 6 This case, however, like Malone is 
likely to engender a minimal response from our domestic legislature that does not afford wider 
protection against surveillance by the press. 
The Human Rights Act 
s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 199897 states that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way which is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights including of course, 
Article 8 which provides a right to respect for one's correspondence, private, home, and family 
life. The state and related public sector are obliged accordingly to respect privacy and interfere 
with this right only where necessary and in accordance with the law. Press or private sector 
organisations are subject to this duty, however, only where they exercise functions of a public 
nature so as to constitute a public authority for the purposes of s. 6(3)(b) of the HRA. Public 
authorities with a duty to act in a way compatible with the Convention right to respect for private 
life under s. 6(l) are said to include "any person certain of whose functions are functions of a 
public nature", under s. 6(3)(b). Privatised and state-funded bodies, together with organisations to 
whom Government has delegated tasks for which the state previously took responsibility may all 
be included within this category. However, s. 6(5) of the Human Rights Act goes on to add that 
"In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection 
(3)(b) if the nature of the act is private". The HRA would seem therefore, to attempt a difficult 
distinction between public bodies, private bodies with public functions, and private bodies with 
no public functions98 or indeed hybrid bodies with both. 
99 Accordingly, we must consider into 
which of these categories newspapers are likely to fall and discuss what legitimately constitutes a 
public authority or public function. 
1°° Determining which multi-national media corporations 
constitute public authorities for example is less readily apparent than one might think. The press 
certainly does perform an important public function of imparting valuable information to educate 
and inform the masses but on would hesitate in identifying the Sun or other tabloid as a public 
authority. 1°' The term `authority' implies an organisation, which has been specifically designated, 
95 Ibid, Paragraph 45,543 
96 Ibid, Paragraph 54,545 
97 Hereafter referred to as the HRA 
98 See Ann Sherlock, "The Applicability of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Bill: Identifying 
`Public' Functions" (1998) 4(4) European Public Law 593,602 
99 See Ian Leigh, "Horizontal rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: lessons from the 
Commonwealth? " (1999) 48 ICLQ 57,77 
10° Indeed, Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten describe the refusal of the legislature to list hybrid 
public authorities as practically "an invitation to continue the wrangling over the public/private 
boundary". See "Making Rights Real: The Courts, remedies, and the Human Rights Act" (1999) 
58 M. L. R. 509,519 1 
101 See Kevin Maguire, "Our tanks are off the lawn.. . and dismantled" (1998) 16 The Mirror, 
Feb 
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authorised or entrusted with a public function by Government in most cases. 102 The majority of 
media organisations arise purely by virtue of natural market forces. Bodies such as the BBC, 
however, are regarded as more likely to constitute public authorities. 103 We are faced therefore, 
with the untidy prospect of some media organisations proving subject to an obligation to respect 
our privacy while others enjoy comparative freedom. A new tort of intrusion to which all the 
media are equally subject might go some way to simplifying things. Direct horizontality or a right 
to respect for one's private life that is equally enforceable against the press as the public sector is 
unlikely as it would require an "idiosyncratic interpretation of the scope of the Convention rights, 
different from that of the European Commission or Court of Human Rights". 104 So far as the press 
are concerned, their independence of the press from the actions of the public authorities they 
scrutinise has long been emphasised. One suspects, therefore, that the courts would be reluctant to 
include media organisations other than perhaps the anomalous BBC within the category of public 
authorities which are subject to a directly enforceable right to respect for privacy as this may be 
perceived as the first step towards censorship. Geoffrey Marshall comments that "it is important 
that public law should embody a clear conception of what constitutes a public function but I do 
not think that at present it does. "105 Admittedly, the distinction between public and private entities 
is elusive'06 and we are faced with a danger of bifurcation between those organisations expected 
to respect privacy and those, which are not. 
Bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) or Data Protection Registrar (DPR)107 
which might regulate the press are likely to be subject to the obligations of this section of the 
Human Rights Act. 108 Having said that, the PCC is likely to be affected by the Act only to the 
extent that the propriety of its decisions might be subjected to judicial review. Nevertheless, 
someone who is directly affected by the processing of intrusively obtained photographic material 
102 Key issues include "whether the body under review is elected or is otherwise accountable to 
the electorate". See Rabinder Singh, Murray Hunt, and Marie Demetrious, "Is there a role for the 
Margin of Appreciation in National Law after the Human Rights Act? " [1999] 1 EHRLR 15,22 
103 Op. cit, n. 98, Sherlock. 
104 See Leigh, n. 99, p87. Elsewhere Leigh adds, that even if "the HRA did purport to create such 
rights against private citizens, it would simply beat the air: because the content of those rights 
does not impose obligations on private citizens". See Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten, 
"Making Rights Real: The Courts, remedies, and the Human Rights Act" (1999) 58 M. L. R. 509, 
536 
105 See p19, Ch. 3, The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English law (1998, Oxford University 
Press) Edited by Basil Markesinis. 
1°6lbid, p19, Ch. 3, Marshall. Elizabeth Paton-Simpson also warns of these difficulties in her 
article, "Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of Privacy by the Publication of 'Private 
Facts"' (1998) M. L. R. 318 
107 Section 6(1) of the Data Protection Act provides that the "office of data Protection registrar 
shall continue to exist for the purposes of this Act but shall be known as the office of the Data 
Protection Commissioner". To avoid any confusion, this thesis refers to this organisation by its 
traditional name of the Data Protection Registrar or DPR. 
'°8 See Santha Rasaiah, "Current legislation, privacy and the media in the UK" (1998) 3(5) 
Comms. L. 183,185 Contrast Ann Sherlock, "The Applicability of the United Kingdom's Human 
Rights Bill: Identifying `Public' Functions" (1998) 4(4) European Public Law 593,602 who 
argues that the PCC should constitute a public authority. 
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could, in theory, request the DPR under s. 53(l) to assess whether the press are acting in 
accordance with data protection principles. 109 The DPR has indeed stated that she "can foresee 
circumstances in which a member of the public would ask her to investigate the publication of a 
newspaper story containing particularly sensitive information. Issues of fair obtaining and 
processing and of the accuracy and relevance of the information would undoubtedly arise in such 
a case"! 10 The DPR would be unlikely to intervene on an independent basis, however, for she 
"does not think it right to interfere in people's personal affairs"! 11 It seems unlikely for the DPR 
to be compelled to intervene in such matters by virtue of s. 6(1) of the HRAtu therefore unless "a 
matter of substantial public importance" arises under s. 53(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Where a private individual or press organisation that does not constitute a public authority for the 
purposes of the HRA unreasonably intrudes or publishes intimate information, the individual 
concerned must look elsewhere for redress. He or she must rely instead on an incomplete jigsaw 
of pre-existing laws, which afford cumulative if fragmented protection against the torts identified 
in this thesis. This begs the question of why an individual should have a single right to respect for 
his correspondence, private, home, and family life enforceable against the state yet have to 
depend on a parasitic claim under related doctrine when that same wrong is perpetrated by a 
private sector individual instead! 13 As Hunt cogently reasons, "Once it is recognised that 
relations between private individuals as well as relations between individuals and the State are 
moulded by both legislation and common law, and the State lurks behind both forms of law, it 
becomes artificial and dishonest to constrain the reach of fundamental rights protection by 
limiting it to the so-called public sphere". 114 This attempt to draw a difficult distinction between 
public bodies, private bodies with public functions and private bodies with no public functions' 15 
represents a curious dichotomy, which is hard to justify. Greer cogently reasons that "the most 
important issue is not the formal status of a media organisation, but the institutional power it 
possesses and the capacity this confers, not merely to invade the private domain, but to damage 
the lives which are affected by such intrusions". ' 16 Others such as Markesinis go even further, in 
suggesting that "journalists exercise more power than Members of Parliament and, I suspect, most 
109 See Paragraphs 6.2.11-13, p116, "Questions To Answer - Data protection and the EU 
Directive 95/46/EC" (1996) Available from the Data Protection Commissioner's Office. Section 
46(1) of the Data Protection Act, however, precludes the DPR from serving an enforcement 
notice on a newspaper unless of substantial public importance has arisen and except where the 
case if one of urgency, the newspaper has been given notice of the application for leave. 
110 See letter by John Davies, entitled "Invasion of Privacy" (1998) 162(6) J. P. 111 
111 Even then, the DPC does not have to reveal the result of her inquiries to the individual who 
requests her intervention. Op. cit, n. 108,185 
112 As suggested by Leigh, n. 99, p79. 
113 A point made by the author of this thesis in an earlier article. See Peter Jones, "Privacy and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 - Damp squib or firecracker? " (1999) 18(6) Litigation 30 
114 See Murray Hunt, p161, Ch. 12, The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English law (1998, 
Oxford University Press) Basil Markesinis, Ed. 
115 See Ann Sherlock, "The Applicability of the United Kingdom's Human Rights Bill: 
Identifying `Pubic' Functions" (1998) 4(4) European Public Law 593,602 
116 See Steven Greer, "A Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998" (1999) 24 E. L. Rev 3,10 
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Ministers". '" In this respect, there would seem to be a consensus that "in some cases private 
bodies may be able to inflict a great harm. .. Newspapers actually 
have more power than 
Governments to disseminate abroad private information and near-equal powers to obtain it 
surreptitiously in the first place. They also have greater motivation to carry out such 
dissemination". 118 It would certainly seem a dubious proposition for the protection accorded to an 
individual's private, home, and family life to be entirely dependent upon the identity of the other 
that infringes it. Such an approach implies that respect for one's private, home and family life is 
only of consequence if it is the state or an organisation performing one of its functions, which 
attempts to deprive one of it. The current use of haphazard mosaic of laws to protect us from what 
is essentially a single wrong of unreasonable intrusion into one's seclusion by the press still seems 
unduly complex. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 may also have a `horizontal 
effect"19 by encouraging courts to develop existing laws in line with Article 8 with the aim of 
providing comprehensive protection for our private lives. 12° The reason being that s. 6(3) of the 
HRA includes the courts as public authorities, which must therefore act in accordance with 
convention rights. s. 6(6) adds that an `Act' for the purposes of s. 6(1) includes a failure to act. '21 
This courts may be obliged therefore to consider the right to respect for private life whenever it 
has an obvious bearing on the case at hand. Should they fail to do so, the individual concerned 
might then bring proceedings under s. 7 of the Act with the aim of seeking a reversal of that 
court's decision. 'u s. 8(1) enables a subsequent court to "grant such relief or remedy, or make 
such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate". 123 Privacy based or motivated 
applications of existing remedies will not, however, take the form of "a distinct body of 
constitutional law, hierarchically superior to ordinary common law" as some commentators might 
1 17 See Basil Markesinis, "Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Horizontal Effect of the 
Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany" (1998) 115 L. Q. R. 47,78 
118 See Gavin Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, `Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a 
Bang or a Whimper? " (1999) 62(6) M. L. R. 824,847 
119 See discussion in Murray Hunt, "The `Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act" [1998] 
P. L. 423 Murray Hunt suggests that Act will take a position somewhere between direct and 
indirect horizontal effect. - p175-176, Ch. 12, Basil Markesinis, The impact of the Human Rights 
Bill on English law (1998, Oxford University Press) 
120 s. 6(4) of the Act, however, exempts the House of Lords in its judicial capacity from the 
obligation under s. 6(1). 
121 Indeed, the Government consultation paper expressly states that the "acts or omissions of such 
public authorities may be challenged" under this section of the Act. Op. cit, n. 28, Paragraph 2.2, 
p8. 
122 Indeed, Nicholas Bamforth argues that higher courts might allow damages under s. 8(l) of the 
Act for serious judicial failures to protect Convention rights such as Article 8 See "The 
Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private Bodies" (1999) 
C. L. J. 159,164-175 
123 See Patrick Milmo, "Human rights, privacy and the press" (1997) 147(6815) N. L. J. 1631, 
1632 See also the remarks of Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Column 779, Hansard (H. L) text for 16 
Feb, 1998 
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advocate. 124 The decisions of the judiciary will be subject to appeals and the threat of being 
overruled at some later date by a higher court as ever. Admittedly, section 6 fails to clarify 
whether the duty of a court to act compatibly with Convention rights concerns merely its own 
procedure or also extends its application to the law". 125 The HRA does not specifically empower 
the Courts to create any entirely new torts126 of intrusion or the unauthorised publication of 
intimate information but they may be required to develop common law remedies where they are 
uncertain, unclear or incomplete. 127 Article 13, which provides the right to an effective remedy 
before a national authority for the violation of one's Convention rights, include the right to 
respect for private life is conspicuous in its absence from the Act's schedule. 128 Nevertheless, 
while this may curtail the judiciary's ability to conjure up new remedies, this does not preclude 
the judiciary from reworking old ones, particularly as the positive obligation to provide redress 
for the violation of Convention rights is inherent in the specific articles themselves. In other 
words, the Act may have an indirect horizontal effect so that "whilst the rights cannot be applied 
directly to the law governing private relations and are not actionable per se in such a context, they 
may be relied upon indirectly, to influence the interpretation and application of pre-existing 
law". 129 Unfettered by the margin of appreciation doctrine described earlier, 130 it seems hopeful 
that Article 8 will come to have a greater influence upon domestic laws. 131 Fortunately, "the 
Court's case law makes it clear that it primarily regards the concept of margin of appreciation as 
defining the relationship between a supranational court and national authorities (including 
national courts). " This would seem to suggest that national courts will not apply the margin of 
appreciation when reviewing the decisions of other national authorities. t32 
The Common Law Route 
s. 2(1) of the HRA requires the courts to take into account relevant judgements, decisions, or 
opinions of either the European Court or Commission of Human Rights, including those relating 
124 See p136, Ch. 6, Roderick Bagshaw, Privacy and Loyalty (1997, SPTL/Clarendon Press) Peter 
Birks, Ed. 
125 Op. cit, Leigh, n. 99, p80. 
126 In the words of one academic, the "courts do not make new laws but enforce those that exist". 
See "The Right of Privacy" (1902) 2 Columbia Law Review 437,444 
127 See Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Development of Human Rights in Britain under an Incorporated 
Convention on Human Rights" (1998) (Sum) P. L. 221,227 
128 As indeed is Article, which also "weakens the argument that the HRA was intended to achieve 
fill incorporation, so as to place a consequent duty on the state via its courts". See Gavin 
Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, `Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a Bang or a 
Whimper" (1999) 62(6) M. L. R. 824,836 
129 See Gavin Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, `Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a 
Bang or a Whimper? " (1999) 62(6) M. L. R. 824,826 
130 Op. cit, n. 102,16 per Singh, Hunt and Demetrious. Were this to happen, "the primary purpose 
of incorporation (i. e. to make Convention rights more effective and accessible in national courts 
and tribunals) could be frustrated". 
131 See p94, Ch. 8, in The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English law, per Christopher 
McCrudden. (1999, Oxford) 
132 Op. cit, n. 102,17. 
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to Article 8.133 Admittedly, these precedents will be of limited assistance to domestic courts 
deliberating the issue of photojournalist intrusion for the bulk of Convention jurisprudence is 
concerned with State intrusion. Those comparatively few cases, which do provide useful guidance 
as to where a state ought to fulfil its positive obligation to provide legal protection for privacy 
against third parties are tempered by a generous margin of appreciation. The absence of a doctrine 
of binding precedent under Convention law means that the European Court "does not have to 
attempt to explain and synthesise previous cases to create a coherent body of jurisprudence. , 134 
ECHR decisions tend to be "frequently constructed in such a way as not to be particularly useful 
guides for the resolution of further disputes", 135 and since judgements are typically phrased in 
such broad terms, our judiciary enjoy a free hand to some extent 136 Nevertheless, the judiciary 
has indicated great enthusiasm for this task, and is described by the Lord Chancellor as "pen- 
poised regardless of incorporation of the Convention to develop a right to privacy to be protected 
by the common law" 137. He continues "I would not agree with any proposition that the courts as 
public authorities will be obliged to fashion a law on privacy because of the terms of the Bill... I 
believe the true view is that the courts will be able to adapt and develop the common law by 
relying on existing domestic principles in the laws of trespass, nuisance, copyright, confidence, 
and the like, to fashion a common law right to privacy". 138 The extent to which the judiciary are 
duty bound to undertake the proactive role envisaged by Lord Irvine in developing common law 
remedies in line with Article 8 as remains unclear, particularly as such decisions may be 
distinguished if deemed irrelevant as they are persuasive and not binding. 139 However, "it would 
seem safe to predict that the courts will wish to provide at least as high a protection for the 
Convention rights as has cautious Strasbourg. " 140 Accordingly, it would seem that while the 
judiciary can utilise sections 2 and 6 of the Human Rights Act as a catalyst justifying the 
application of those torts discussed earlier to the problem of unreasonable press intrusion, they are 
not absolutely compelled by the Act to do so. There is still a strong argument even now therefore 
that there should be a tort prohibiting unreasonable intrusion like that proposed in the inaugural 
133 This duty is applicable to courts at all levels, irrespective of whether they have jurisdiction to 
issue a duty of incompatibility. See Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten, "Making Rights Real: 
The Courts, remedies and the Human Rights Act" (1999) 58 M. L. R. 509,511 
134 See Aileen McHarg, "Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems 
and Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR" (1999) 62 M. L. R. 671,673 
135 Op. cit, n. 28, p216, Ch. 7, Brice Dickson's "Human Rights and the European Convention" 
136 See Francis Bennion, "Which sort of HRA? " (1998) 148(6834) N. L. J. 488 
137 See Column 784, Lord Hansard text for 24 Nov, 1997 (971124-11) per Lord Irvine. Claire 
Dyer, "Irvine argues for privacy restraint on the press" (1998) Cover, The Guardian, Feb 5; 
Frances Gibb, "Irvine calls for curbs that would suppress Cook story" (1998) Cover, The Times, 
Feb 5; See also Robert Shrimsley, "Judges likely to impose curbs on press intrusion" (1997) 12 
Daily Telegraph, Nov 4 
138 See Lord Chancellor, p12-13, Ch. 2, The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English law 
(1998, Oxford University Press) Basil Markesinis, Ed. 
139 Op. cit, n. 28, Paragraph 2.4, p8 of the Government Consultation paper. "The courts of this 
country need only `take account' of those judgements or opinions and are not bound by them". 
Discussed also by Sydney Kentridge, p29, Ch. 5, n. 137 supra. 
140 See Phillipson, n. 128, p841 who points out that any duty of positive intervention is accordingly 
restricted in its scope and its substantive content is largely within the states's discretion. 
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chapter of this thesis. 
Influential American theorists, Warren and Brandeis were among the first to suggest that existing 
common law remedies could, in their `eternal youth' be made to evolve and recognise the wrongs 
of press intrusion and public disclosure of intimate information in 1890.141 This view, while 
enthusiastically received in the United States, has until now failed to equivalently inspire English 
Courts. Throughout earlier chapters, this thesis has questioned the practicality of adapting torts 
such as trespass and nuisance to afford individuals with a comprehensive level of protection 
against press intrusion. The Human Rights Act does little to assuage these doubts. "The 
individual-must have some other cause of action - some other alleged unlawful act - for the 
court to adjudicate upon in order to get Article 8 into play at all". "Z Trespass, for example, is 
intended to protect property from unjustifiable physical encroachment whereas nuisance ensures 
the enjoyment of property. For this reason, the tort of nuisance is unlikely to repeat its brief frolic 
in Khorasandjian v Bush (1993) 143 which permitted a licensee to sue in respect of harassing 
telephone calls despite the fact she had no proprietary interest in the properties in which she 
received them. The enjoyment of property has since been reaffirmed as the true basis of this 
action in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997)144 which overruled the preceding case. "One of the 
difficulties of the common law system of precedent is that it makes it harder for a creative judge 
to refresh old law than it is for him to create new law". 145 The indirect horizontal effect of the Act 
"raises some potentially intricate questions about the doctrine of precedent. What for example, is 
the status of decisions made before the commencement of the Act which are otherwise binding but 
which (if applied) would lead to results incompatible with Convention rights? s146 Indeed, "the 
common law has been built up on a case-by-case basis. As the process continues each judge's 
freedom of decision is limited by the precedents set by earlier decisions". 147 For this reason, the 
horizontal impact on the common law of the HRA in this regard is considered As a "matter of 
great uncertainty" compounded by the Act's silence as to its effect on the common law. 148 
Certainly, decisions such as Kaye v Robertson (1991)149 present obstacles if the common law 
14' See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard law Review 
193. A view more recently echoed by David Seipp, "English Judicial Recognition of A Right to 
Privacy" (1983) O. J. L. S. 325,370 
142 See Gavin Phillipson, `The Human Rights Act, `Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a 
Bang or a Whimper? " (1999) 62(6) M. L. R. 824,828 
143 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 W. L. R. 476, 
1" Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] 2 ALL ER 426 (H. L) 
145 See p143, Ch. 6, Roderick Bagshaw, Privacy and Loyalty (1997, SPTL/Clarendon Press) Peter 
Birks (Ed) 
146 See Christopher Baker, p29, Ch. 1, Human Rights Act 1998: A Practitioner's Guide (1998, 
Sweet & Maxwell) who argued that the Act must therefore generally abrogate the binding effect 
of such decisions. 
147 Op. cit, n. 138, p21, Ch. 4, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
148 See Gavin Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, `Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: a 
Bang or a Whimper? " (1999) 62(6) M. L. R. 824,825 
149 Kaye v Robertson [1991] F. S. R. 62 (C. A) 
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doctrine of precedent overrides any express statutory obligation on the courts under the HRA. '50 
In this instance, Bingham L. J. admitted, "It is this invasion of his privacy which underlies the 
plaintiff's complaint. Yet it alone, however gross does not entitle him to relief in English law". 's' 
Unfavourable precedents such as these would seem to suggest that the horizontal effect of the 
HRA is still likely to be limited by the constraints of a pre-existing legal environment. Clearly, 
"the rules and principles which make up the very tort the plaintiff is seeking to rely upon may be 
in conflict with [this] right. "2 If the Convention were always to override inconsistent common law 
rules, this could seriously unbalance the common law, which has attempted to reconcile a more 
comprehensive set of individual interests than has the Convention". 153 Lord Irvine's optimism 
seems misplaced in relation to the flexibility of a doctrine such as nuisance to afford scope for 
further development in line with the right to respect for private life. 
Of the options available to the judiciary, the tort of Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 154 would seem 
the most conducive for development as a remedy for transient forms of unreasonable intrusion by 
photojournalists. The precedents of Khorasandjian v Bush (1993)'55 and Burnett v George 
(1992)156 have already given rise to a more flexible interpretation of this doctrine where a mere 
risk of psychiatric harm may be sufficient to impose liability for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. An award of damages on the other hand, has yet to be made for conduct giving 
rise to a mere risk of psychiatric harm, 157 let alone a single act giving rise solely to distress. Hunt 
points out that "The distinction the Human Rights Act requires to be drawn is between the 
evolution of existing causes of action over time and the creation of entirely new causes of 
action... It is a matter of degree, and precisely where the line is drawn between legitimate judicial 
development of the common law and illegitimate judicial `legislation' is largely a matter of 
taste". 158 The judicial conversion of Wilkinson v Downton to a tort of mere intrusion, however, 
arguably represents the latter. Here too, however, ongoing development would necessitate further 
dilution of both requirements of intention and probable psychiatric harm. As Phillipson observes, 
"such an approach cannot be glossed as `development' of the common law: one does not 
`develop' something when one uses it purely as a wholly malleable vehicle for forwarding 
constitutional rights". 159 All of these torts therefore would require considerable distortion if they 
are to offer an increased level of protection against press intrusion or surveillance. The HRA 
provides the will but not the way for the judiciary to reform existing laws to protect individuals 
iso This argument is also made by the author in a spin-off article entitled "Privacy and the private 
sector: law at the crossroads of evolution" (2000) 6(2) European Public Law 275,279-284 
151 Ibid, 70 per Bingham L. J. 
152 See Phillipson, n. 148,839 supra. 
1s; lbid, 840 
154 Wilkinson vDownton [1897] 2 Q. B. 547 
Iss Op. cit, n. 143,482A-B per Dillon L. J 
156 Burnett v George (1992) 1 F. L. R. 525,527H-528A per Sir John Arnold P 
"' As opposed to actual psychiatric harm that manifests itself in palpable outward symptoms. 158 Op. cit, n. 138, p179, Ch. 12, per Murray Hunt in Markesinis' Impact of the Human Rights Bill. 159 See Phillipson, n. 148,839 supra. 
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from arbitrary press interference with their private lives. 
Similarly, if the judiciary chose to continue their ongoing development of breach of confidence to 
combat unjustifiable newspaper publication of personal information, they would need to ensure 
that the parameters of this doctrine were clarified to avoid conflict with Article 10160. Given the 
status of Article 10 in Convention jurisprudence, 161 we can see that the potential for domestic 
English remedies such as breach of confidence for further development towards greater protection 
for privacy will also be curtailed in this context by the newspaper's right to freedom of 
expression. The enthusiasm of the judiciary will be somewhat curbed by s. 12(1) of the Act which 
"applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the 
exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression". This section effectively prevents the 
grant of an ex parte injunction against newspapers given that the applicant must have "taken all 
practicable steps to notify the respondent" of any such action and provides that "No such relief is 
to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial". This means that redress for the publication 
of true but intimate photographic material or facts without consent would have to take the form of 
damages after the intrusion had already taken place. Furthermore, s. 12(4) requires that the court 
have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression where 
the proceedings relate to journalistic, literary or artistic material". The court must consider in 
particular (1) whether the information has or is about to enter the public domain; (2) the extent to 
which publication is justified in the public interest; and (3) finally any relevant privacy code. The 
most significant of which would be the Press Complaints Commission's code of practice, which is 
set to take on even greater significance therefore. 162 So far as the public disclosure of intimate 
information is concerned, the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence does provide a 
reasonably amenable basis for judicial activism in line with Article 8.163 Nevertheless, one can 
only reiterate the reservations made earlier in chapter four about the use of confidentiality in this 
context. Breach of confidence provides an imperfect solution at best and is stretched to its limits 
where there is no prior relationship of trust and reliance between the parties, any intention to 
communicate or record information and finally no pecuniary detriment. All of which are 
traditional indicators as to whether equity ought reasonably to intervene. 
The Statutory Interpretation Route 
160 See Maurice Frankel, p96, Ch. 9, Human Rights in the United Kingdom edited by Paul 
Sieghart. (1988, Pinter Publishers) 
161 See Georgio Malverni, "Freedom of Information in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1983) 4(4) HRLJ 443, 
456 
162 Discussed in the penultimate chapter, infra. 
163 Stephen Todd in fact, remarks on the similarities between breach of confidence and the public 
disclosure tort developed in the United States. See P192, Ch. 6, Torts in the Nineties edited by 
Nicholas J. Mullany. (1997, LBC Information Services) 
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An alternative route by which some degree of positive change to the current levels of privacy 
protection enjoyed by UK citizens might be possible is through s. 3(1) of the HRA. This section 
requires a court, in so far as it is possible to do so, to interpret primary and subordinate legislation 
to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights. The legislature 
have attempted to distance themselves from the potential ramifications of the Act in this context, 
particularly given that they did not intend that Convention rights be `directly justifiable between 
individuals". 164 Nevertheless, in the Lord Chancellor's own words, Clause 3 "does more than ask 
the courts to interpret legislation compatibly with the Convention. It imposes on them a duty to 
act compatibly with the Convention". 165 As Leigh comments, section 3 gives rise to direct 
statutory horizontality in that "nothing in the text [of the Act] limits these judicial duties to 
legislation applying only between public authorities and the individual". 166 Although some 
statutes such as s. 85(1) of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988 provide little scope for 
development given their narrow wording, others, such as the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 appear more promising. The tort of harassment is barely a year older than the Human Rights 
Act and as such, still amenable to favourable interpretation in line with Article 8 to combat 
multiple or repeated forms of photojournalist intrusion. Section 13(3) of the Data Protection Act 
1998167 also lends itself favourably as a means of compensating an individual for unwarranted 
substantial distress or damage arising from a newspaper's processing of personal data. s. 10(1) of 
the DPA provides an individual with a right exercisable in writing to prevent processing likely to 
have such consequences, although s. 32(4) precludes the use of this section to restrain media 
publications. Prior restraint is also precluded by s. 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 unless a 
court is satisfied that the applicant in question is likely to establish publication should not be 
allowed. 168 For these reasons, the use of the DPA would be limited to an award of damages for 
redress after publication. Any journalistic, literary or artistic material which is reasonably 
believed to be in the public interest given the special importance of freedom of expression would 
however, be exempted under s. 32(1) of this Act 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty faced by the judiciary is that they are expected to apply a statute 
such as this in line with a right to respect for one's private life which is still being developed, 169 
164 See Rachel Sylvester and George Jones, "Irvine rebuked over privacy code" (1998) Cover, 
Daily Telegraph, Feb 6; Ewen MacAskill and Kamal Ahmed, "Anger over Irvine's `blunders"' 
(1998) Cover, The Guardian, Feb 6 
165 See Lord Chancellor, p12, Ch. 2, The impact of the Human Rights Bill on English law (1998, 
Oxford University Press) 
166 Op. cit, Leigh, n. 99, p75-76. 
167 Hereafter referred to as the DPA. 
168 Furthermore, the applicant must take all practicable steps to notify the respondent that an 
application for such relief is being sought in accordance with s. 12(2) of the HRA. 169 Indeed, as Leigh and Lustgarten observe, " legislation may have to be re-interpreted at a later 
stage in the light of developments in the Convention jurisprudence since the last decade of 
review". See Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten, "Making Rights Real: The Courts, remedies, 
and the Human Rights Act" (1999) 58 M. L. R. 509,511 
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and suffers from the inherently nebulous qualities of terms such as privacy or private. 170 The 
reader will recall the reservations expressed regarding the use of privacy as a legal term of art 
earlier in this thesis. The fact remains however, that the concept of such a wide and indefinite 
right as privacy is all very new and alien to the English law'" which has, for many years, sought 
to create narrow remedies for very specific forms of mental distress. 172 The political sensitivity of 
such decisions is likely to mean that the judiciary take a hesitant approach at first to the 
development of existing remedies in line with Article 8 than the initial remarks of Lord Irvine 
might suggest. 173 Even the Lord Chancellor has come to realise that the judiciary will face 
increased public scrutiny and media comment "about judges' political and social values as they 
interpret controversial decisions". 14 For these reasons, it may be that the Act is greeted with 
apprehension by the press until a body of case law is developed which prescribes clear limits to 
Article 8, which ensures compliance with the rule of "stare decisis, the need for certainty and 
predictability in the law and the need to do justice in the instant case". 175 
The idea that statutes such as these with clearly delineated boundaries might come to reflect a 
much broader right to respect for one's private life similarly appears unrealistic however. It is, of 
course, "no usurpation but a proper judicial function for judges to do their best to give effect to 
the will of parliament by seeking to interpret legislation in accordance with its true purpose". 176 
The legislature, however, stopped short of enacting a directly enforceable right to respect for 
private life between individuals. It is by no means certain therefore that the judiciary can truly be 
said to be giving effect to the will of parliament by applying existing remedies so as to create 
some broader right between individuals. The courts are likely to be "alert to see whether the 
complaint is objectively based in law". '77 What we can expect from the HRA, is at best a much 
greater propensity on the part of the courts to employ existing laws, which are already capable of 
theoretical protection to be utilised against these wrongs at the hands of the press. For this reason, 
as Leigh points out, "this approach will generally be of little assistance in the case of privacy 
where the legal defect is an absence of an existing legal remedy, not an inhospitable or inadequate 
statutory one". 17' The obligation upon a court under s. 6(1) does not apply if, under s. 6(2)(b) of 
the HRA, "primary legislation... cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible 
10 See David Eady, "Opinion: A Statutory Right to Privacy" [1996] 3 EHRLR 243,249 
171 Op. cit, n. 127,224. 
172 Judges and magistrates have undergone a five million pound training programme, however. 
17 Indeed, Lord Irvine advised the judiciary of "the need to temper judicial activism with 
appropriate restraint.. . [for] the typology of change 
in English public law is one of evolution, not 
revolution". See Lord Irvine of Lairg, "Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and the 
Interpretative Process" [1999] 4 EHRLR 350,371 
174 See Frances Gibb, "Judges will face fiercer scrutiny" (1998) Cover, The Times, Dec 14 and 
19, "Lord Irvine's Empire", ibid. 
ýs Op. cit, n. 28, p99, Ch. 3, Piers Gardner and Chanaka Wickremasinghe, Human Rights and the 
European Convention cited supra. 
176 See Anthony Lester, "English Judges as law Makers" (1993) P. L. 269,273 
'n Op. cit, n. 127,257 
178 Op. cit, Leigh, n. 99. 
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with.... Convention rights". If the prophesised horizontal effect of s. 3(1) of the HRA does indeed 
manifest, the judiciary are unlikely to conjure up comprehensive protection against press intrusion 
or unauthorised disclosure of intimate information fashioned entirely from re-working older 
statutes. 179 The HRA should encourage the judiciary to favourably interpret the principles of data 
protection and confidentiality, doing much to assuage demands for a wrong prohibiting the public 
disclosure of personal but even in the wake of the HRA, the need for a tort prohibiting 
unreasonable press intrusion remains. 
Conclusions 
The incorporation of Article 8 directly into our law may enable the judiciary to explicitly 
recognise the importance of protecting individuals against intrusion by the press and other 
members of the private sector. It may also encourage the courts to apply the laws of 
confidentiality and data protection in a unified fashion as part of the wider underlying claim of an 
individual to preclude the public disclosure of intimate information about him in accordance with 
Article 8. As Dworkin once suggested "the law may contain further rights which have not yet been 
recognised by statute or in any judicial decision.. . if that right is consistent with the bulk of 
existing law". 180 Doubtless, we will see the judiciary attempt to bring the dreams of Warren and 
Brandeisig' to fruition by adapting old doctrines to meet new problems in so far as they can. It is 
ironic to note that the solution to the highly specific lacuna identified by this thesis should 
ultimately be afforded potential indirect effect of so wide and nebulous a concept as the European 
Convention right to respect for private life. In any case, the Human Rights Act 1998 is unlikely to 
prove a sweeping wind of change through the law relating to either press intrusion or the public 
disclosure of intimate information by newspapers. The effects of the HRA are also unlikely to be 
felt immediately, but rather gradually over a comparatively long period of time as pioneering 
plaintiffs contemplating such a line of argument will be discouraged by the absence of legal aid182 
to pursue such an action. "' This may in itself violate Article 6 by restricting the access of 
impecunious claimants to the courts who are unable to secure legal aid or a lawyer prepared to 
enter into a conditional fee arrangement. 184 Ultimately, one may only speculate until such time as 
some intrepid individual brings a test case in relation to either photojournalist intrusion or a 
newspaper publication of surreptitiously obtained photograph depicting intimate aspects of an 
individual's lifestyle with a reasonable expectation of seclusion. In strict law, the Human Rights 
179 A view confirmed by the Lord Chancellor's Department Press Notice 287/97, (1998) 19(1) 
Bus. L. R. 17,18 
180 See discussion in Helen Fenwick, p19, Part 1, Civil Liberties (1994, Cavendish) 
181 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard Law 
Review 193 
182 Although an applicant may apply to the European Commission of Human Rights itself for legal 
aid, only some four percent of applicants are said to receive funding. Op. cit, n. 28 p215, Ch. 7 per 
Brice Dickson. 
183 See Helen Fenwick, "The Human Rights Bill 1998" (1998) 23 (Spr) S. L. R. 15 
184 See David O'Sullivan, "Legal aid and human rights" (1998) 148(6823) N. L. J. 43 
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Act probably changes little but it may provide the catalyst for change among an enthusiastic 
judiciary. 185 Even an enthusiastic judiciary will be constrained from radical development of 
existing remedies whose fundamental purposes lies elsewhere in the protection of property or 
confidentiality. 
Admittedly the HRA would seem to emphasise the curious dichotomy between the different 
modes of enforcing one's right to respect for private life against the state and the private sector in 
the United Kingdom. This chapter has also highlighted the danger that some media organisations 
such as the BBC may be required directly as public authorities to respect an individual's right to 
respect for private life while the newspapers will not. The solution to this problem is not however 
further legislative intervention to make the right to respect for private life a universally applicable 
right, enforceable against both the public and private sectors. From the outset, this thesis has 
rejected this approach given the difficulties of circumscribing the legitimate parameters of such a 
right. 186 In other jurisdictions such as Germany, circumscribing the growth of a privacy right 
against the private sector has also proved difficult. There, the German right to personality has 
grown to encompass appropriation of one's name or likeness for commercial purposes, 187 
embarrassing lyrical references to a tennis player in a popular love song, 188 and even supplanted 
libel to some degree by recognising a wrong of casting others in a false light. 189 The `rights' to 
publicity and reputation have thereby become fused with privacy under the umbrella concept of 
personality, yet the reasons why they should enjoy protection are clearly different. As Sir Brian 
Neill comments, although we can learn from the way other states such as Germany have 
approached the problem, 190 the protection of an individual's `personality' is too imprecise and 
intangible an idea to appeal to English lawyers". 191 This approach of isolating or identifying the 
specific core wrongs associated with the right to respect for private would seem more in keeping 
185 As Leigh observes, "the Human Rights Act does not formally change the approach to 
Convention questions in the common law, although there may be a change of atmosphere post- 
incorporation". Op. cit, n. 99, p82-83. 
186 See Paragraph 63, p19, Ch. 4, of the Younger Committee's report who argue that "to be 
embodied into a right, its adaptation to the dominant pressures of life in society would require so 
many exceptions that it would lose all coherence and hence any valid meaning". See Report of the 
Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
187 See p34, Ch. 2, Hans Stoll, Protecting Privacy edited by Basil Markesinis. (1999, Oxford 
University Press) 
188 In this particular instance, the lyrics of a pop song entitled "I wanna make love to Steffi Graf' 
were found actionable, and worth some DM 60,000 in damages to the outraged tennis player. 
OLG Karlsruhe 27.4.1994, NJW 1994,1963 
189 The right has grown to encompass the award of damages for fictitious exclusive interviews. 
Cases in point can be found at BGH 8.12.1964, NJW 1965,685; BGH 15.11.1994, BGHZ 128 
1=NJW 1995,861=JZ 1995,360 
190 It is of course, perfectly possible for our courts to have regard to how other jurisdictions such 
as Germany have approached the problem. As Phillipson observes, "The point though, is that the 
courts will not be compelled to look at this jurisprudence, unlike Strasbourg case law; it will be 
within their discretion to do so". See Gavin Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, `Horizontal 
Effect' and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper? " (1999) 62(6) M. L. R. 824,843 
191 Op. cit, n. 187. p22, Ch. 1. 
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with British traditions and legal culture. 192 It is the wrong of intrusion contrary to a reasonable 
expectation of seclusion that our legislature must, even now, enact in statutory form and apply to 
all organisations irrespective of their public or private functions. This approach should avoid the 
problems inherent in the growth of a comparatively unrestricted privacy doctrine, and also 
provide guidance for a justifiably concerned press. Specific wrongs which are clearly prescribed 
by law are less likely to constitute illegitimate restrictions on the antithetic right to freedom of 
expression. In any event, the traditional emphasis placed upon freedom of expression is unlikely 
to change given both the presence of extensive European jurisprudence on the importance of both 
the press and the free flow of information, coupled with s. 12 of the HRA which will both ensure 
the continued weight of Article 10. Redress for those newspaper publications which infringe 
personal privacy merely to satisfy public curiosity rather than public interest, and in so doing, 
provide information not previously available to the public domain, will take the form of post- 
publication damages rather than prior restraint. The purpose of such awards will be for the just 
satisfaction of the individual in question, and will be awarded purely as compensation rather than 
punishment. 193 
192 An approach also hinted at by Ronald Dworkin in terms of the preferable interpretation of any 
Bill of Rights. See p357, Ch. 18, Freedom's Law (1985) 







The Arguments against Legislation 
Is self-regulation effective? 
One of the principal reasons for the absence of either a tort of intrusion into seclusion or the 
unauthorised public disclosure of personal information lies in the Government's continued faith in 
periodic refinements to the current system of press self-regulation. ' The nature of which 2 merits 
discussion for if it does afford an effective deterrent to those forms of wrong identified by this 
thesis, the practical significance of the legal loopholes identified in earlier chapters may be greatly 
reduced. 
The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) was established in 1991 as a response to the 
recommendations of the first committee chaired by Sir David Calcutt to examine the law in 
relation to privacy. 3 The predecessor of the PCC known formerly as the Press Council, had been 
subjected to heavy criticism by Sir David for a preponderance of red tape and cumbersome 
procedures augmented by a lack of resources 4 Both press and complainants alike were said to be 
disillusioned with a complaints system based upon an "unwritten code of ethical conduct"s that 
might prove susceptible to bias. 6 The Press Council relied heavily on "moral pressure within the 
industry"7 with limited powers to censure a publication. 8 The solution it was felt was to replace 
this organisation with the current Press Complaints Commission or PCC consisting of sixteen 
members, nine of whom are unconnected to the press. Their function is to preside over complaints 
relating to a written code of practice. Several of the clauses contained within this code of practice 
are particularly relevant to the subject of this thesis, and as such, the first of these is reproduced 
below. 
Clause 3. Privacy 
See Paragraph 4.13, p16, Privacy and Media Intrusion - The Government's Response (1995) 
Cm. 2918 and Paragraph 45, p13, Ch. 3, of the earlier Younger Committee report (1972) 
Cmnd. 5012. 
Z For a discussion of the concept of self-regulation by an industry generally as opposed to the use 
of legal constraints, see Peter Cane, `Re-thinking self-regulation" (1995) 15 O. J. L. S. 97,98; 
Cosmo Graham, "Self-regulation and Judicial Review" (1987) 6 C. J. Q. 324,328-333 
3 See Paragraph 15.3-15.7, p66-67, Report of the Committee on privacy and Related Matters 
(1990) Cm. 1102. Hereafter referred to as the first Calcutt Committee after its chairman. 
4 Ibid, Paragraph 14.30, p63. 
s Ibid, Paragraph 14.31, p63. 
6 Ibid, Paragraph 14.29, p63. 
7 Ibid, Paragraph 14.34, p64. 
8 Ibid, Paragraph 14.33, p64. 
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(i) Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life, home, health, and 
correspondence. A publication will be expected to justify intrusions into any individual's 
private life without consent. 
(ii) The use of long-lens photography to take pictures of people in private places without 
their consent is unacceptable. 
A newspaper, which publishes a photograph that violates either of these clauses, will be required 
to publish any adverse adjudication upheld against it. The first part of this clause mirrors Article 8 
of the European Convention but the second part differs from both domestic law and convention 
jurisprudence in being entirely ambiguous in regard to its condemnation of the use of long-lens 
equipment to take pictures of individuals who might legitimately expect seclusion. 
Photojournalists who engage in the use of long-lens photography to take such pictures without a 
subject's consent contravene the code of practice, irrespective of the time they spend engaged in 
this pursuit. For liability to have arisen under either nuisance or harassment, this factor would be 
crucial. The code may be violated by a photojournalist even in the absence of encroachment 
through trespass. Similarly, it is unnecessary for a complainant to demonstrate that the 
photojournalist has interfered with his or her enjoyment of property, harassed him or her on more 
than one occasion or intentionally inflicted any psychiatric or emotional harm. One example 
being a complaint in relation to the publication of a photograph of the naked infant Princess 
Eugenie playing in her private high walled garden which had been taken without consent. The 
source of the PCC's discontent with the publication, lay not in any disclosure of personal 
information but simply the manner through which the photograph had been surreptitiously 
obtained without consent. 9 The editor of the newspaper was found to have failed to fulfil his duty 
to ensure the photograph had been obtained in accordance with the code of practice. Similarly, the 
publication of photographs depicting individuals on private property against their wishes who 
would ordinarily lie beyond the range of human eyesight may breach Clause 3 also, 1° such as a 
photograph of Prince Edward and his girlfriend who had paused to kiss some ten feet from the 
door of a property on the Queen's Balmoral estate. " 
The code of practice definition of private places where one has a legitimate expectation of privacy 
was previously limited to "(i) any private residence, together with its garden and outbuildings, but 
excluding any adjacent fields or park land and the surrounding parts of the property within the 
unaided views of passer-by, (ii) hotel bedrooms (but not other areas of a hotel) and (iii) those 
9 See p18-19, PCC Report No. 2 (Jul-Sep) 1991 
10 See p7, PCC Report No. 22 (Dec) 1993; p13-14, PCC Report No. 26 (Aug-Oct) 1994; p6, PCC 
Report No. 21(Oct-Nov) 1993 
11 See p5-9, PCC Report No. 30 (May-Jul) 1995 
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parts of a hospital or nursing rooms where patients are treated or accommodated". 12 Complaints in 
relation to photographs taken of individuals against their wishes in the workplace, 13 street, 14 car 
park, '5 public beaches, 16 or of persons getting in or out of their vehicles were all discarded. 17 The 
code has since been amended, however, after the public outcry resulting from the death of 
Princess Diana in a motor accident linked to a high-speed pursuit by photojournalists. '8 Once 
again, self-regulation demonstrated its ability to endure by adapting "without the cumbersome 
paraphernalia of statute". 19 One of these alterations, which came into force on the V of January, 
1998 was the `significant expansioni20of the term `private places 21 to encompass "public or 
private property where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy" 22 
The code of practice now recognises that an individual may even expect not to be photographed 
on public property in some circumstances such as whilst praying in a place or worship or after 
recent bereavement. A case in point arose where Sir Paul McCartney complained of photographs 
taken of himself and his family walking in Paris, having lunch in a cafe and lighting a candle in a 
cathedral in respect for his late wife. All of which later appeared in Hello magazine. The PCC 
upheld the complaint and found that both he and his family could reasonably expect not to be 
photographed even in these comparatively public settings. The publication accordingly 
constituted both a violation of the clause relating to privacy and unwarranted intrusion into his 
family's grief. 23 The code of practice clearly goes further than the law in this regard also, by 
requiring photojournalists and their editors to exhibit greater sensitivity to the needs of their 
12 See Clause 4 on privacy of PCC code of practice circa 1996. 
13 See Paragraph 20, p31, PCC Report No. 2 (Jul-Sep) 1991 
14 See Paragraph 18, p11, PCC Report No. 9 (May) 1992; Paragraph 56, p20, PCC Report No. 12 
(Aug) 1992; p11, PCC Report No. 17 (Mar-Apr) 1993; Paragraph 126, p36, PCC Report No. 27 
(Nov-Dec) 1994; and p8, PCC Report No. 16, (Jan-Feb) 1993 
'S See p7, PCC Report No. 28 (Jan-Feb) 1995 
16 See Paragraph 33, p26, PCC Report No. 24 (Mar-Apr) 1994 where a complaint by two topless 
sunbathers whose photograph was taken and published without consent; See also Paragraph 130, 
p38, PCC Report No. 26, (Aug-Oct) 1994 in which a photograph of two randomly selected 
seasiders was published without consent and their taste in beachwear criticised. Despite this, their 
complaint was rejected also. 
17 See p16, PCC Report No. 42 (Apr-Jun) 1998; p19, PCC Report No. 43 (Jul-Sep) 1998 
18 Tony Blair had called for a reassessment of the "proper boundaries" of reporting following the 
Princess's death. See Alison Boshoff, "Curbs on the press to protect Princes" (1997) Cover, Daily 
Telegraph, Sep 8. See also Alison Boshoff, "The codes editors agreed" (1997) 3 Daily Telegraph, 
Sep 8 
19 See p2, PCC Annual Review 1997 
20 See p16, Code Committee report by Sir David English, PCC Annual Review 1997 
21 The previous definition of private property having been derived from Paragraph 7.8, p52, 
"Review of Press Self-Regulation" (1993) Cm. 2135. 
u Prior to the code of practice alterations spurred by the Princess Diana tragedy, there was also 
evidence of an ongoing process of reform in stages at regular intervals driven by the PCC itself. 
See Editorial entitled "Strengthening self-regulation" p5, PCC Report No. 17 (Mar-Apr) 1993 and 
the views expressed in "Reforming the press step by step" (1989) 139(6396) N. L. J. 245. Indeed, 
the 1997 change to the code of practice is the second such amendment in four years, the last 
having taken place on 30/06/93. See David Newell and Catherine Courtney, "Speaking Freely? " 
(1994) 91(1) L. S. G. 26 
23 Contrary to clause 5 of the code. See p 12, PCC Report No. 43 (Jul-Sep) 1998 
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subjects. This case also demonstrates the willingness of the PCC to contemplate complaints 
regarding the behaviour of photojournalists on foreign soil, providing this results in publication 
by a domestic newspaper or magazine. 
Of course, a complaint against the publication of photographs taken of one in public without 
consent is unlikely to succeed on these grounds alone. Thus, another complaint concerning a 
photograph of an individual in a public setting succeeded because it had been obtained through 
both intrusive means and deception. 24 In both instances, the claimants also had grounds for 
complaint under a clause other than that of privacy. This would suggest that a complaint against 
the publication of photographs taken of one in public is unlikely to succeed on these grounds 
alone. The latter complaint having been brought against a newspaper which published 
photographs and a story obtained by a journalist who had vehemently denied any association with 
the press when questioned by his subject. Were a photojournalist to deliberately upset or alarm his 
subject with the aim of luring him out into a place where he could expect no privacy, however, 
this would be sufficient ground for complaint. 25 Another relevant clause of the code of practice is 
clause four on harassment. 
(i) Journalists and photographers must neither obtain nor seek to obtain information or 
pictures through intimidation, harassment or persistent pursuit. 
(ii) They must not photograph individuals in private places without their consent; must not 
persist in ... pursuing or photographing individuals after 
having been asked to desist; 
must not remain on their property after having been asked to leave and must not follow 
them. 
(iii) Editors must ensure that those working for them comply with these requirements and 
must not publish material from other sources which does not meet these requirements. 
The above clause may also provide additional grounds for complaint against more sustained 
forms of intrusive photojournalist activity. 26 This clause would appear to provide a slightly 
tougher requirement than its privacy counterpart in that a sustained or persistent period of 
offensive conduct is required in order for a complaint to be upheld. Thus, doorstepping by at least 
five journalists who sat in cars in the vicinity of the plaintiffs property for a number of hours "did 
not go beyond what reporters would reasonably be expected to undertake as background to a 
story" and did not therefore, breach the harassment clause. 27 
24 Contrary to clause 11 on misrepresentation. See p18, PCC Report No. 43, (Jul-Sep) 1998 
25 See p10, PCC Report No. 44 (Oct-Dec) 1998 where the complainant was photographed 
brandishing a stick at two photojournalists. 
26 Previously referred to as Clause 8 in the pre-1997 version of the PCC code of practice. 
27 See p11, PCC Report No. 14 (Oct) 1992 
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Public Interest 
1. The public interest includes: 
(i) Detecting or exposing crime or a serious misdemeanour 
(ii) Protecting public health and safety 
(iii) Preventing the public fr om being misled by some statement or action of an individual or 
organisation 
2. In any case where the public interest is invoked, the PCC will require a full explanation by 
the editor demonstrating how the public interest was served. 
3. In cases involving children, editors must demonstrate an exceptional public interest to over- 
ride the normally paramount interests of the child. 
Like many of the legal actions examined earlier such as breach of confidence for example, the 
PCC code of practice also contains a public interest clause28 which permits a newspaper to justify 
a decision to publish a given photograph or the actions of those who obtained it on the basis of a 
public interest. In order to invoke this defence, an editor must provide a full explanation as to how 
precisely the public interest was served, by reference to one of the three heads in the first 
paragraph. On this basis of the first criterion of the public interest of exposing crime, the PCC 
rejected a complaint relating to the publication of a photograph of the complainant relaxing in his 
garden taken with a long lens camera given his misleading mail order dealings. 9 This head of the 
public interest was also used to justify publication of a photograph of notorious moors murderer, 
Ian Brady pictured through a distant window of Ashworth Hospital with the aid of a telescopic 
lens. 0 His criminal record was found to be a "matter in itself which justified scrutiny of him in the 
public interest". However, those with relatives or spouses accused of criminal wrongdoing have 
also found it difficult to evade the harsh spotlight of publicity given a far from sympathetic PCC. 
Publishing photographs taken without consent by telescopic lens caused the wife of an individual 
accused of operating a misleading mail order company much distress but the actions of the 
newspaper and photojournalist were deemed "on the limit of acceptability" given the public 
interest in exposing crime. " Similarly, the publication of photographs depicting those whose 
companies are the subject of investigation or complaint have also been found to be justified, 32 as 
indeed was a wedding photograph showing the first wife of murderer Fred West's brother, John 
West under the banner "Secrets of the brothers grin". The PCC considered that the publication 
28 Formerly Clause 18 of the code of practice circa 1996 
29 See Paragraph 29, p26, PCC Report No. 24 (Mar-Apr) 1994 
30 See p9, PCC Report No. 31 (Aug-Oct) 1995 
31 See p11, PCC Report No. 17 (Mar-Apr) 1993 
32 Seep 16, PCC Report No. 38 (Apr-Jun) 1997 
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provided "an insight into the life of a man who became an alleged criminal. Authors and 
historians would make reference to her and it was not right to deny any mention of her part in the 
story. There was a public interest in newspaper reporting of the complex tapestry that made up the 
West family". 33 The PCC code of practice now requires, however, that "the press must avoid 
identifying relatives or friends of persons convicted or accused of crime without their consent" . 34 
It is also clear that "editors must demonstrate an exceptional public interest to override the 
normally paramount interests of the child" under the third paragraph of the public interest clause. 
The fame, notoriety, or position of the parents of a child aged under sixteen is an insufficient 
justification for the publication of a photograph of him or her upon private property. 35 
The third public interest ground of "preventing the public from being misled by some statement or 
action of an individual or organisation" provided for by the PCC code is by far the most popular 
among newspapers. This exposure of hypocrisy often affords newspapers with a convenient 
means of justifying the publication of an intrusively obtained photograph in that the image reveals 
evidence of a lifestyle at odds with what one might have expected. For example, a photograph of 
an MP accompanied by his mistress might be legitimately published since "by his words or 
actions, [he had] intentionally or unintentionally continued to give the impression to his 
constituents ... that 
his marital status had not changed", 36 and there was a public interest in 
correcting this erroneous impression in the minds of the public". 37 Similar accusations of `sleaze' 
have caused many an MP to resign, 38 and dissuaded many others from contemplating a life in 
politics where their private lives, both past, present, and future are seen by both PCC and 
newspapers alike as legitimate targets of public interest. The Millian argument from truth and 
democracy holds that the electorate should be supplied with all facts pertaining to candidates for 
public office so that they may make as informed a decision as possible based on truth and fact, 
rather than supposition or impression. On closer examination however, this defence is often 
invoked not merely to correct a false image which arises either deliberately or through accident 
but to provide information on an intimate area of personal life where none existed before. The 
newspapers argue that there is a presumption on the part of the public that the private life of a 
politician or public person is identical to their own or that of the average person which they must 
dispel if incorrect. To accept this argument would be to provide newspapers with a carte blanche 
to dig for abnormalities and inconsistencies with community norms. Indeed, in the majority of 
cases, it is difficult to see how the private sexual life of an MP interferes with his or her ability to 
33 See PCC Report No. 37, (Jan-Mar) 1997 
3' See Clause 10 of the PCC code. 
35 See Clause 6(v) of the PCC Code, formerly known as Clause 12 in adjudications prior to 1998; 
See also p7, Lord Wakeham, "Moving Ahead - The development of PCC policy and practice in 
1995" 
36 See p5, PCC Report No. 37 (Jan-Mar) 1997 
37 See Philip Webster, "Tory resigns over `affair' with hostess" (1997) Cover, Daily Telegraph, 
Oct 15 
38For example, see George Jones, "Merchant resigns `to protect family"' (1997) Cover, The 
Times, Oct 15 
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perform public duties. It is also questionable whether the free flow of such information benefits 
the public whose decisions to elect or re-elect may now be influenced by personal or ethical 
considerations rather than the suitability of a given individual for their particular role. The Third 
Royal Commission on the Press endorsed this view, adding that "it is humbug for newspapers to 
defend the publication of stories obtained by invasion of privacy, written so as to contain sexual 
innuendo and to excite the prurient curiosity of readers, with the justification that such stuff 
strengthens the nation's moral fibre" . 39 The PCC "recognises that circumstances in the private life 
of a Member of Parliament may bear on her conduct of that office or fitness for it.. . where there is 
no such justification a member of parliament is entitled to the normal protection from invasion of 
private life that clause 4 provides"40. Nevertheless, there does seem to be some inconsistency in 
the PCC application of this context 41 Arguably, the PCC should amend its code of practice to 
ensure the defence of exposing hypocrisy may only be invoked by newspapers where an 
intrusively obtained photograph dispels an inaccurate image fostered by the individual pictured. 
The Public Domain 
In evaluating the legitimacy of an individual's expectation of seclusion in relation to a complaint 
under either clauses 3 or 4 of the code of practice, the PCC also considers the extent to which that 
individual has courted publicity either by word or deed. Just as the legal doctrine of breach of 
confidence considers whether the information the individual seeks to protect has entered the 
public domain, the code of practice does also. On this basis, a complaint by transsexual 
councillor, Rachel Webb in respect of a newspaper article publishing details of her private life 
was rejected given that she had spoken earlier about her medical treatment 42 In practice, this may 
mean there are those who cannot object to the publication of intrusively obtained photographs 
which depict an area of their private life upon which they have already spoken to the press. The 
decision of Princess Diana to speak candidly during an interview with the BBC on issues such as 
adultery and marriage may have limited the range of unauthorised photographs to which she could 
legitimately object. 43 A concern which was later to be voiced by PCC chairman, Lord 
Wakeham. 44 A complaint by Princess Diana in relation to the `Dodi' photographs might well have 
been denied therefore, had she complained. 45 
39 See Paragraph 10.2, p75, "Royal Commission on the Press" (1977) Cmnd. 6810. Hereafter 
referred to as the Third Royal Commission on the Press. 
40 See p11, PCC Report No. l (Jan-Jun) 1991; See also p5, PCC Report No. 14 (Oct) 1992 
41 See Louis Blom-Cooper and Lisa Pruitt, "Privacy Jurisprudence of the Press Complaints 
Commission' (1994) 23(2) Anglo. Am. L. R. 133,154 
42 See p9, PCC Report No. 1 (Jan-Jun) 1991; See also p9, PCC Report No. 17 (Mar-Apr) 1993 
43 See Christopher Lake, "Diana risks her right to privacy" (1995) Cover, Mail on Sunday, Nov 
19 
44 See Lord Wakeham, "When the royal right to privacy is compromised" (1995) 28 Mail on 
Sunday, Nov 19 
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Indeed, a complaint by Julia Carling who was photographed through the windows of a restaurant 
where she was enjoying a meal with her hairdresser was rejected by the PCC for she "had clearly 
placed details of her past and current relationships into the public domain by virtue of articles and 
interviews designed in part, to enhance her image, promote her career and... to publicise 
herself'. 46 Inviting the media into one's private life is viewed as a one-way process by the PCC 
which considers that the "Mere passage of time, even of many years, does not necessarily 
diminish... relevance or the justification of the publication in the public interest' . 47 Thus one's 
past life may be resurrected legitimately by the press at any moment, which provides a marked 
contrast to some jurisdictions where even once public information may be reconverted to private 
information through the passage of time. 48 
Does the PCC code of practice negate the need for legislation? 
Having discussed the contents of the code of practice in detail, we must turn to the more 
controversial question of whether self-regulation actually works with sufficient efficacy to make 
further legislation unnecessary. Unfortunately, one cannot accurately measure the effectiveness of 
efforts to improve standards of journalistic and editorial behaviour49 in anything other than crude 
terms? ° The reason being that human and organisational behavioural patterns may be influenced 
by a wide variety of variables and it is difficult to point to a single denominator as the root cause 
of such trends. Statistical information such as the complaints figures often cited by the PCC 
themselves to provide support for their effectiveness and continued existence tend to be 
ambiguous in nature. If complaints go down, they can be explained away as the product of reform 
and restraint amongst members of the press, given the presence of this watchdog organisation. 
Conversely, if the number of complaints increases, this may be explained away as indicative of 
growing widespread awareness among the public of the existence of the PCC and the 
effectiveness of its methods. Alternatively, it is equally possible to argue that, on the other hand, a 
decrease in complaints points merely to an increasingly disenchanted public unwilling to pursue 
complaints through the medium of the PCC or that an increase in complaints is due to a growing 
disregard for the guidance this organisation provides which newspapers consider irrelevant. It is 
possible therefore, to place one's own spin or interpretation on these statistics from which one 
cannot draw any unassailable conclusions. If we did, others might argue that the PCC has a vested 
interest in manipulating such figures for its own ends and to ensure its continued existence, and 
that we cannot rely on empirical data which is not independent. 
45 Particularly given accusations of media manipulation in a C4 Television Programme entitled 
"Royals and Reptiles" (1997) First broadcast on 19t' Oct, 8: 00pm. 
46 See plO, PCC Report No. 32, (Nov-Dec) 1995 
47 See p11, PCC Report No. 1 (Jan-Dec) 1991 
48 See Melvin v Reid, 112 Cal. App 285,297 Pac 91(1931) for example, where a prostitute turned 
wealthy socialite's past was dredged up for the purposes of a movie based on her life through 
which she might be identified. 
" See Paragraph 20.63, p210, "Royal Commission on the Press" (1977) Cmnd. 6810. 
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Similarly, if one were to consult the newspapers themselves to see if they view an adverse 
adjudication as a deterrent, a prudent newspaper would predictably reply yes. Were they to do 
otherwise, they would risk any derogatory remarks getting back to the PCC and existing measures 
might be supplemented by tougher penalties that threaten the existing status quo. As for the views 
of fellow lawyers who practice in this field, s' the prevalent opinion amongst those who responded 
to a small survey undertaken by the author in October 1998 was one of doubtfulness as to the 
independence and effectiveness of self-regulation in its current form. 52 Having said that, 
advocates of self-regulation might simply respond that lawyers would inevitably prefer their 
lucrative legal system to the rival self-regulatory system. We cannot conclusively measure 
therefore, the effect of self-regulation upon those it purports to regulate, particularly as a decision 
not to publish a given photograph may be attributable to any number of factors, whether 
economic, legal or ethical. We may however, examine the likelihood of a PCC adjudication 
discouraging an editor from publishing a photograph obtained through intrusion or endorsing such 
behaviour. 
Assuming that an editor does choose to publish a photograph taken without consent of an 
individual with a legitimate expectation of seclusion, and the PCC subsequently upheld a 
complaint following publication, that editor's newspaper would be morally obliged to print the 
adverse adjudication. There is, of course, no legal obligation upon the editor to publish such an 
adjudication with a particular degree of prominence, 53 although PCC representative, Tim Toulmin 
suggested that were an adjudication "buried under stocks and shares when it was a front page 
article, I think that the Commission would tell them to do it properly". 54 It may be therefore that 
pressure would be brought to bear upon both the editor and newspaper to co-operate with the 
spirit of the code. ss From the editor's perspective, the danger is that the condemnation of a vocal 
PCC might attract the attentions of those campaigning for legislation to combat the public 
disclosure of intimate information without consent. PCC condemnation may also generate 
negative publicity which might damage future sales if the newspaper is seen by its readers to 
appear irresponsible and to advocate the use of disproportional methods to obtain photographs 
and stories with which readers do not sympathise. Some of whom may even feel so strongly as to 
so See p5, PCC Report No. 1(Jan-Jun) 1991 
51 I. e. Specialists in media law generally including breach of confidence, libel and the like. 
52 Such opinions were expressed by the following solicitors: Richard Moxon of Marriot Harrison, 
Peter Lax of Bell-Lax Litigation, Andrew James Stephenson of Peter Carter-Ruck & Partners, and 
Tom Conway of Davenport Lyons who was instrumental in the Kaye v Robertson case. 
53 See Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, p529, Ch. 13, Media Law (1992,3rd Ed, Penguin) 
This is in contrast to the self-regulatory system of the Broadcasting Standards Commission which 
enjoys a statutory footing. 
sa I interviewed PCC representative, Tim Toulmin at the Commission's HQ in Salisbury Square, 
London on 21/11/97 
ss The Younger Committee recommended that adjudications should be given the same 
prominence as the original offending article although this rarely proves to be the case. See 
Paragraph 192, p55, Ch. 7, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
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invoke a temporary boycott of the newspaper if sufficiently moved. More importantly perhaps, 
fellow newspapers might seize upon this opportunity to criticise their rival for blatantly endorsing 
press intrusion and in so doing, seek the moral high ground of declaring themselves above such 
methods. It makes sound business sense for a rival to capitalise upon this opportunity to 
differentiate their product from those of other newspapers in this saturated market through a 
scathing attack on the ethics and methods of a competitor. Indeed, Tim Toulmin agreed that 
"editors absolutely hate publishing these things, it undermines their professional integrity, 
and... the basis of their product. If they didn't mind publishing them, they wouldn't fight so much 
against them". 56 The repeated or continual printing of apologies may well cast doubt on the 
reputation and credibility of the newspaper. 57 
There is, of course, the more immediate opportunity cost to be considered when an editor must 
publish an adjudication in a space that might have otherwise been occupied by a fee paying 
advertiser. The deterrent provided by a PCC adjudication therefore, is intended to dissuade a 
newspaper primarily through the indirect costs associated with publication contrary to the privacy 
clause in its code of practice. Newspaper editors contemplating a breach of that clause are likely 
to weigh these risks including any detriment to public relations against the potential for short-term 
gain. Perhaps one of the biggest criticisms one might level at the PCC is that it is only able to 
galvanise its machinery into action where photojournalist intrusion results in publication of any 
material gained. It is quite possible to envisage circumstances where an editor does not succumb 
to the temptation of publishing photographic material so obtained, so that the original 
transgression by photographers who have unreasonably intruded goes past unnoticed. The 
question arises, therefore, of whether photojournalist intrusion of this sort arises with sufficient 
frequency as to warrant legislation. The Younger Committee, which made a small survey of 
public opinion in 1972,58 suggested that unwarranted intrusion at the hands of the press occurs 
only sporadically and accordingly does not merit the effort of legislation. 59 It found that "despite 
the occurrence in recent years of a number of incidents which have led to complaints of intrusion 
into privacy, the volume of such complaints in relation to the scale of the operation turns out to be 
remarkably small. 60 A total of only four complaints to us by individuals of press intrusion, even 
if they reflect only a small part of the total grievance scarcely provides support for the view that 
unreasonable press intrusion is either common or growing". 1 Other governmental committees in 
$6 op. cit. 
s' See Richard Ingrams, p91, Ch. 5, Wicked, Wicked Libels (1972) edited by M. Rubenstein. 
58 See Paragraph 123, p37, Ch. 7, Report of the Committee on Privacy (1972) Cmnd. 5012. Only 
one percent of those interviewed having spontaneously volunteered examples of press intrusion in 
a sample of 1596. 
59 lbid, Paragraph 118, p36-37, of the Younger Committee report. 
60 lbid, Paragraph 28, p8, Ch. 2. 
61 Ibid, Paragraph 118, p36, Ch. 7. 
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contrast, such as the National Heritage Committee, which reported in the early nineties, consider 
the indications of press intrusion both `revealing and disturbing' . 62 
Is empirical evidence of the scale of photojournalist intrusion a myth? 
In an ideal and utopian world, we would be able to definitively establish whether the lacunae 
identified in this thesis is exploited with sufficient frequency to warrant the adoption of any 
additional legislative measures. Such a goal would, in reality, of course, represent an impossibility 
amid the uncertainties and ambiguities of social science. Consider for example, that the foremost 
source of contemporary statistical information is the PCC, an organisation in which the press are 
themselves a chief constituent. The PCC monitors the proportion of complaints each year, which 
relate to the code of practice privacy clause in its annual reports at the end of each year. These are 
compiled below in Fig. I 
Fig. I Percentage of total complaints received by the PCC which relate to privacy 
Clause 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Privacy 7.2% 8.7% 12.4% 14.9% 13.0% 13.8% 
Harassment 2.1% 0.4% 4.0% 2.3% 3.0% 3.3% 
Intrusion into 5.2% 2.8% 1.4% 1.3% 2.0% 3.3% 
grief 
* No data are available for the years 1992 and 1994 
These figures shown above in Fig. 1 would appear to suggest that privacy related complaints have 
remained fairly static after 1995 and account for a relatively small proportion of total complaints 
received each year. These complaints, however, exclusively relate to the publication of 
information or photographs obtained contrary to the code of practice and gives us little indication 
of the extent to which photojournalist intrusion per se takes place. Naturally enough, there are 
those such as the National Heritage Committee and others who have been "far from convinced 
that the number of complaints made is an accurate reflection on the number of breaches of the 
code' . 63 This is perhaps because those with valid complaints are reluctant to invoke additional 
publicity by bringing a complaint forward the Committee suggests, 64 or because the PCC has a 
vested interest in keeping complaints figures low enough to justify its continued existence 65 
62 Ibid, Paragraphs 30 & 33, p9-10, National Heritage Committee's Fourth Report on "Privacy 
and Media Intrusion" (1992/3) 294-I 
63 Ibid, Paragraph 35, pX, HC(1992/3) 294-I 
64 Ibid. 
63 See Colin Munro, "Self-Regulation in the media" (1997) (Spr) P. L. 6 who argues PCC statistics 
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It is also possible that some privacy complaints may fall outside its remit, perhaps where a period 
of over one month has elapsed between the publication of the photograph or article complained of 
and the brining of a complaint. This limitation period is necessary as it ensures that the 
intervening period of time between a code breach and a subsequent adjudication or apology are 
not so long as to find the readership have long since forgotten the original transgression. The 
inevitable controversy aroused by the complaints figures compiled by any body representative of 
the press lead one academic to seek an independent source of data with which to corroborate the 
need for legislation. Some eighteen years ago, during 1981 and 1982, Professor Raymond Wacks 
devised a simply questionnaire to ascertain how often the general public sought advice from 
solicitors in metropolitan areas of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland upon issues relating to 
privacy and seclusion. "In doing so, Professor Wacks sought to gauge the practical significance of 
the absence of a tort of intrusion amongst other wrongs from our law. 67 Some 185 individual 
solicitors belonging to 85 firms responded to his questions. The first of which asked "in the last 
five years, approximately how many persons have sought advice in respect of possible legal 
action they might pursue arising from... the alleged spying upon, photographing, or electronic 
surveillance of their private activities? "68 Some fifteen solicitors revealed that forty-five 
individuals had sought their advice on this subject. This equates to an average of nine requests for 
advice each year directed to fifteen solicitors from a sample of 185 on matters pertaining to 
intrusive surveillance. 69 This figure would seem to agree with the PCC statistics cited above 
earlier, in implying that a fairly low proportion of the general public encounter objectionable 
forms of intrusion- This is particularly striking when one considers that Professor Wacks' 
question makes no attempt to differentiate between surveillance or intrusion by the public or 
private sectors. 
It is important to consider just how reliable the data from Professor Wacks' survey really are. At 
best, the results of this questionnaire provide a limited snapshot on the views of practitioners 
almost two decades ago. The term limited must be employed as not only are the survey results 
now dated through the passage of time, the very `closed' nature of the survey's questions facilitate 
only a very narrow range of responses from practitioners. Take for instance, the fourth survey 
question which simply asks whether the existing law is adequate? Such a question does not lend 
itself easily to a yes or no answer, despite Professor Wacks' attempts to categorise practitioners' 
responses in these terms. 70 After consultation with Professor Gwynn Davis, a specialist in 
should be treated with caution. 
66See Raymond Wacks, "'Privacy' and the Practitioner" (1983) P. L. 260 
67 Just over 50% of forms having been sent to Greater London firms. 
68 A response rate of 33.59 percent to the survey of solicitors was recorded. See p140, Raymond 
Wacks, Personal Information - Privacy and the Law (1989, Clarendon Press) 
691bid, p 143, table 6. 
70 Those solicitors who felt clients with a privacy-based complaint would be likely to approach 
them were approached for advice around twice as much as contemporaries in other fields. Ibid, 
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empirical forms of research, it seemed an open-ended survey would have been more appropriate. 
Accordingly, it seemed beneficial therefore to initiate a small, more loosely worded survey 
amongst practitioners in the UK today. 7' The first question of which asked "How often would you 
estimate, based on your own experience, that unwarranted press intrusion by photojournalists 
actually occurs in practice? Frequently, occasionally, rarely or never? Feel free to elaborate and to 
draw on your own experience". This question in particular was designed to engender an original 
contribution to the current debate as to whether practitioners felt there is a necessity to legislate to 
ensure individuals are protected from press intrusion. The majority of respondents believed 
photojournalist intrusion does occur frequently. Peter Lax of Bell Lax Litigation explained that 
"for major news stories, papers want quotes or photographs to make their articles better than other 
papers. Others try to get evidence to justify defamatory articles". Phillip Conway of Davenport 
Lyons who was instrumental in the Kaye v Robertson case added that intrusion also arose "when a 
scandal has broken or a disaster has occurred i. e. Bomb blasts or a rail crash. Generally it is not a 
problem except as set out above". The bulk of opinion among solicitors who responded to the 
survey was that a new tort of intrusion might prove beneficial, but only to that small minority of 
the public that find themselves so affected. Interestingly enough, however, the solicitors who 
responded to this survey had themselves been asked for advice in relation to the methods used to 
obtain a photograph only on an occasional basis, at best. It would seem that the respondent 
solicitors perceived intrusive photojournalism as a frequent occurrence but which they themselves 
only encountered occasionally. Equally, the sample solicitors had rarely or never been asked for 
advice on behaviour causing mental distress or insufficient duration to amount to either a nuisance 
or harassment. 72 This would seem to correlate with the second Calcutt committee's admission that 
neither the author nor anyone else can conclusively establish the necessity of a new tort because 
the empirical data against which this could be tested simply does not exist. " What we may 
conclude however, is that although it is impossible to `measure' the frequency of photojournalist 
intrusion with any precise degree of accuracy, the indications are that solicitors are only asked 
occasionally for advice in these areas. Rupert Grey of Crockers, Oswald and Hickson suggested 
that part of the reason for this lies in the considerable expense of employing journalists to observe 
or pursue an individual for any length of time, costing as much as £1500 per day. 74 Any threat of 
intrusion, therefore, is likely to come more from freelance photographers, who operate 
independently on a more speculative basis. One would be inclined to agree with Tim Toulmin 
047, Ch. 4. 
Particularly prominent practitioners in the field of media law were targeted with the aid of the 
Directory of Chambers and Partners, to which the surveys were then forwarded by mail in 1998. 
The results of which were published in an article entitled "New Light Through Old Windows? 
The Practical Realities of Developing Existing Laws to Ensure Private Sector Respect for 
Privacy" (2000) 34(1) Law Teacher 84,94-95 
72 One notable exception being Razi Mireskandari of Simons Muirhead Burton who encountered 
complaints regarding the methods used by an individual to obtain a photograph "once every three 
months". 
73 See Paragraph 4.11, p26, "Review of Press Self-Regulation" (1993) Cm. 2135 
74 1 interviewed Rupert Grey of Crockers, Oswald and Hickson on 9/12/98 near the International 
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therefore, 75 that a maverick minority of journalists are responsible for a relatively small number of 
high profile intrusions when compared to the number of photojournalists employed by the 
industry. 76 It is for this reason that the Government was not convinced that the case for legislation 
had been made out. n Similarly, the earlier Younger Committee admitted that the current 
"piecemeal approach leaves some gaps", 78 but added "we do not think that what remains 
uncovered is extensive, and our evidence does not suggest that the position is deteriorating". 79 
Nevertheless, it remains the contention of this thesis that a new tort of unreasonable intrusion 
should be created. It seems somewhat inefficient that one should delay until private sector 
organisations such as the press show signs of actively beginning to exploit this lacuna before 
intervening to improve our laws. Let us assume, as some commentators have suggested, that press 
and indeed private sector intrusion occur infrequently at the hands of a maverick minority, leaving 
the public largely unaffected. This alone would be an insufficient justification for abstaining from 
law reform If, for example, few individuals are discriminated against on the grounds of race or 
gender in an enlightened society, this does not mean that discrimination should be permitted 
merely because few individuals are subjected to it. Ultimately, "the number of cases which will 
thereby arise is irrelevant to the issue: there are comparatively few actions for trespass to land and 
nuisance, but this does not mean that the interests which they protect should not be protected". 80 
In the words of David Eady, "even if numerically, such a law would not be invoked much in 
practice, " the formal acknowledgement of the value attached to `privacy and family life' would 
serve to set a common standard". 82 Conversely, there are fears that the enactment of this tort 
might open the floodgates to a rush of claimants. What little empirical evidence there is, would 
not seem to support this assertion. 93 Furthermore, the present day use of a patchwork quilt of 
disparate torts to provide redress in so far as they happen to coincide with press intrusion may 
"lead to inconsistency, uncertainty and expense. Few people can afford to litigate up to the House 
Press Centre in London and I am very grateful for his invaluable response. 
's I interviewed PCC representative, Tim Toulmin, for his views on 21/11/97 and 17/3/98 
76 Indeed, photojournalists account for the fastest growing sector employed by the industry. See 
N. U. J. article entitled "Freelances" http: //www. ifi. org/issues/freelance/idx. html 
n See Paragraph 4.13, p16, Department of National Heritage report entitled "Privacy and Media 
Intrusion (The Government's Response)" Cm. 2918 (July, 1995) 
78 See Paragraph 659, p204, Ch. 23, Report of the Younger Committee (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
"Ibid, Paragraph 664, p205, CH. 23. 
8° See Paragraph 3.13, p11, Lord Chancellor's Department (Scottish Office) consultation paper 
entitled "Infringement of privacy" July, 1993. 
61 Even then, it is, as the Lord Chancellor's Department remarked, "very difficult to assess in 
advance the likely number of cases that might be brought. Many factors will bear on the volume 
of litigation: the accessibility of the remedy, public awareness of its availability. The perceived 
chances of success, and of course the actual number of infringements". Ibid, Paragraph 6.36, p51. 
82 See David Eady, "Opinion: A Statutory Right to Privacy" [1996] 3 EHRLR 243,253 
83 Markesinis and Deakin add "Why would the English public, which is notoriously known for its 
dislike of 'making a fuss', change its natural character". See p649, Ch. 7, Tort Law (1999,4th Ed 
Clarendon Press) 
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of Lords, in the speculative hope that their Lordships may be feeling inclined towards law reform 
on the particular day or the particular facts". 84 
Self regulation and the need for a public disclosure tort 
Consequently, the current system of self-regulation does little to assuage demands for a new tort 
of intrusion intro seclusion like that suggested earlier. The code of practice therefore, fails to 
adequately distinguish between the wrongs of intrusion into seclusion and the public disclosure of 
photographs that reveal intimate information about an individual's lifestyle. Nevertheless, the 
presence of the PCC would seem to partially reduce the need for a tort of unauthorised disclosure 
of intimate information. 
The subject of the intrusion will in all probability, be unable to identify either the photojournalist 
in question or his or her employers. Often that photographer may be one face in a crowd of many, 
and this problem is compounded by the lack of investigative powers at the disposal of the PCC. 85 
For this reason, a complaint regarding alleged doorstepping over a sustained period of five days 
which did not result in any publication, could not be upheld given that the PCC had no 
information as to the identity of those involved. 86 Such anonymity may embolden many 
photojournalists in their quest for exclusives. The PCC might also benefit from investigative 
powers to resolve factual disputes. In an adjudication reminiscent of Bernstein v Skyviews 
(1978)87 a newspaper was to publish a photograph taken from a helicopter which had hovered 
over the complainant's home for some time to take a picture of the property. Both the height and 
duration for which the helicopter hovered were disputed. While in this case, given that the picture 
taken was of the property rather than the plaintiff , 
88 in which a public interest existed given its 
value, 89 one may envisage situations where such 
facts are important to determine whether the 
complainant's expectation of seclusion 
is legitimate. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say the presence of the press self-regulatory system operated by the PCC 
does correspondingly reduce the necessity of 
introducing any new tort of public disclosure of 
intimate information. As representative, Tim Toulmin suggests, self-regulation does have the 
advantages of speed of resolution, and an apparent willingness amongst editors to resolve. One 
cannot, of course, determine the number of 
intrusively obtained photographs withheld from the 
public in accordance with the code of practice, particularly when newspapers would not want 
84 Ibid, 243 
" See Keith Stanton, P464, Ch. 24, 
The Modern Law of Tort (1994, Sweet & Maxwell) 
86 See Paragraph 23, p26, PCC 
Report No. 16 (Jan-Feb) 1993 
87 Bernstein V Skyviews [1978] 
Q. B. 479 Discussed earlier in chapter two. 
88 Photographs of property rather than 
identifiable persons do not violate the PCC privacy clause. 
For examples, see Paragraph 
41, p25, PCC Report No. 19 (Jun-Jul) 1993; Paragraph 63, p 18, PCC 
Report No. 22 (Dec) 1993 
89 See p6, FCC Report 
No. 8 (Apr) 1992 
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readers to know the stories kept back from them or how much of their subscription goes towards 
the suppression of censored information. 90 Speed of resolution, on the other hand, is undeniable 
given that the adjudication process under self-regulation takes an average of forty four days rather 
than years to resolve 91 The press would certainly appear outwardly to wholeheartedly endorse the 
process, 'Z despite initial reservations, 93 and have even introduced certain self-imposed restrictions 
as to which photographs are acceptable for publication. 94 However, co-operation may be 
motivated solely by self-interest through their subscription to this form of anti-press law 
insurance. 95 
At one time, publishing pictures of individuals, and particularly members of Royalty upon private 
property was said by a prominent photojournalist to be "politically suicidal for an editor" 96 
Perhaps the most potent example of this self-regulatory deterrent to which that photojournalist 
referred concerned the dismissal of an unrepentant editor by proprietor Rupert Murdoch who 
advocated a breach of the PCC code of practice. 7 This provides an isolated and dramatic example 
however, which has yet to be repeated. One suspects that the editor in question provided a 
convenient scapegoat at a time when the issue of privacy was particularly sensitive amid the 
Calcutt committee era, which served as a useful exercise in public relations. Nevertheless, 
prominent photojournalist Mark Saunders was to remark in his autobiography that "Since its 
introduction, Fleet Street has adhered to the PCC code of practice. Ten years ago, a picture of 
Princess Diana would walk into the papers, Nowadays, editors judge every picture on merit. If the 
photo has an angle, a story on which they can tentatively justify publication they'll run it. If 
there's no story, you've got no chance". 98 
90 See Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, p260, Ch. 10, in from the cold: national security and 
parliamentary sovereignty (1994, Clarendon Press) 
91 See p1, PCC Annual Review 1997 
92 See Alison Boshoff and Robert Shrimsley, "Editors promise more support for paparazzi 
review" (1997) 9 Daily Telegraph, Sep 2; "Let her go but never forget" (1997) 2 The Mirror, Sep 
8 
93 For example, see survey of 700 editors carried out by the Association of British Editors prior to 
the PCC's creation. 34 % favoured redrafting the code of practice which was viewed as overly 
restrictive; another 34 % were firmly opposed to what they viewed as a `threat to press freedom'; 
with only 24.5 % in favour of a non-statutory body; and 7.5 % advocating Calcutt's initial 
proposals. See Brian Jones, p19, "The Road to Calcutt and beyond (Legal and self-inflicted 
pressures on the British press during the Thatcher years)" (Nov, 1991) Cambridge. (Wolfson 
College Press Fellowship article) 
" See "Newspapers impose photo restrictions" (1997) 1 Ceefax 104, Sep 8 in which the 
proprietor of the Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, and London Evening Standard, Sir David English 
announced that none of these newspapers would accept intrusively obtained pictures of Prince 
William. 
95 See G. Robertson, p2, People Against the Press (1983, Quartet Books) 
96 See p149, Mark Saunders and Glenn Harvey, Dicing with Di - The amazing adventures of 
Britain's royal chasers (1996, Blake) 
97 Although I was able to find reference to one ITV television photographer who was fired given 
mounting pressure by both MP's and Buckingham Palace who objected to a film of Princess 
Diana declining for either herself or her children to be photographed having lunch outside a 
restaurant. See above at p168. 
98 Ibid, p168. 
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How might the effectiveness of the PCC self-regulatory system conceivably be improved? 
The system of self-regulation administered by the PCC might be improved by encouraging 
feedback both from a newspaper against whom a complaint has been upheld' and also from the 
general public whose response Lord Wakeham has acknowledged to be essential to the continued 
effectiveness of self-regulation. 1°° Although a PCC adjudication does serve to publicly 
acknowledge newspaper infringement of an individual's privacy, apologising for such a 
transgression does not leave the victim better off in a material sense. 101 
For this reason, there are those who question the continued adherence of newspapers to the self- 
regulatory code of practice over the long term, where such "ethical principles... have no moral 
sanctions connected to them - no rewards or punishments injured parties can invoke and no 
apparatus for seeing that the sanctions are applied when the principles are generally agreed to". '°2 
The use of standardised contractual terms between photojournalists and newspapers, which 
incorporate compliance with the code of practice as an express term of the contract has been 
suggested. Increasingly, the likes of News International do require freelance photojournalists to 
sign such contracts as these to ensure compliance with the code of practice. However, the actual 
proportion of the press industry which regularly incorporates an express term relating to the code 
in their contracts remains unknown. Were this practice encouraged, this might enable 
photojournalists to resist unethical orders from their employers to invade privacy. '03 The code of 
practice itself might be adapted quite easily to require newspapers to endeavour to incorporate the 
code into their contracts with photojournalists and employees. 104 Discipline of those who broke 
the rules would, of course, be a matter for the newspapers themselves in which the PCC could not 
intervene. This is one of the principal drawbacks to the scheme. The PCC cannot compel a 
newspaper editor to take punitive or disciplinary measures in respect of a breach of contract by a 
photojournalist. 
99 Op. cit, See Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, p543, Ch. 13, Media Law (1992,3rd Ed, 
Penguin) 
'0° See p21, Letters to the Editor (1996) Times, Oct 10 entitled "Lord Wakeham warns on press 
excess" 
101 See Paragraphs 6.2 & 8.4, Trinidad and Tobago Green Paper entitled "Media and the Law" 
http: //www. trinidad. netlcxpress/media6. htm; See also "Campaign for Press and Broadcasting 
Freedom" intenaet article entitled "21" Century Media" http: //www. architechs. com/cpbf/cpbfhtml 102 See pXVI, Howard Becker, Image Ethics by Gross, Katz and Ruby. (1988, Oxford) 
103 See Thomas Gibbons, p163, Ch. 5, Regulating the Media (1991, Sweet & Maxwell. ) 
104 See Paragraph 2.14(iv), p7, Department of National heritage Committee on "Privacy and 
Media Intrusion" (July, 1995) Cm. 2918. 
104 Ibid. 
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Another alternative might consist of the establishment of a compensatory fund set up and paid for 
by the industry, 105 particularly as "there is nothing available to the complainant between an 
apology and expensive recourse to the courts". However, this scheme also suffers from drawbacks 
particularly as to the propriety of the newspaper industry as a whole proving liable for the social 
costs of a few mavericks. Surely, if there are to be financial penalties they would be better 
directed against the newspaper in question. Furthermore, the threat of having to pay out 
compensation to the PCC might cause editors to more fiercely contest its adjudications, perhaps 
even going so far as to appeal to legal courts to intervene. Judicial review of PCC decisions might 
become more commonplace, destroying the spirit of co-operation among newspapers which the 
PCC has tried so hard to foster. Lawyers would take an increasingly important role in the 
advocacy of self-regulation as the economic stakes were raised higher. During an interview with 
the author at the International Press Centre, Rupert Grey of Crockers, Oswald and Hickson106 who 
specialises in media law, considered that to empower the PCC itself to award compensation would 
necessitate devising a system of checks and balances analogous to a legal system. 107 Currently, as 
PCC representative Tim Toulmin suggests, "the absence of legalese is one of the attractions of the 
system - that it's not a legal body and it doesn't try to be. Its decisions are based on the common 
sense of commissioners and the adjudications reflect that. It's got to be straightforward". 108 This 
practical approach to decision making together with the style of reporting adopted by PCC 
jurisprudence1" would need to undergo radical change to ensure guidance for would-be 
applicants and newspapers alike as to the circumstances where compensation might be awarded 
and the sums involved. Such matters are best left to the courts. 
In any event, the option of empowering the PCC or an equivalent body with the ability to award 
compensation has been ruled out by several successive governmental committees, 1° fearful of 
"turning the profession into a closed and licensed profession""' or discouraging investigative 
journalism. "2 Proposals enabling the PCC to exercise even more draconian powers such as 
`shutting down' a given publication for a period of days as a penalty for publishing intrusively 
taken photographs' 13 are likely to fall upon similarly stony ground therefore. The advent of 
compensatory powers administered by the PCC itself is unlikely, therefore, and would inhibit the 
105 See Paragraph 75, p18, National Heritage Committee's 4' report on "Privacy and Media 
Intrusion" HC[1992/93] 294-I 
1061 interviewed Rupert Grey just outside the International Press Centre in London on 09/12/98 
107 See Louis Blom-Cooper and Lisa Pruitt, "Privacy Jurisprudence of the Press Complaints 
Commission" (1994) 23(2) Anglo. Am. L. R. 133,136; See also James Michael, "Complaints 
against the media" (1996) YMEL 373,396 
108 Op. cit, n. 54 
109 Op. cit, n. 41, p6. 
110 See Paragraph 638, p169-170, First Royal Commission on the Press (1947/49) Cmd. 7700; 
Paragraphs 15.8-15.9, p67, First Calcutt Committee. Cm. 1102 
111 See Paragraphs 20.61, p210 and 20.69, p212, "Third Royal Commission on the Press" (1977) 
Cmnd. 6810. 
112 See Keith Stanton, p463, Ch. 24, The Modern law of Tort (1994, Sweet & Maxwell) 
1 13 See proposal of Gerald Howarth MP in letter available on Privacy International Website. 
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co-operativeness of editors reluctant to pay out compensation, prolong the swift resolution of 
complaints, and increase the likely volume of appeals seeking judicial review of PCC decisions. 
The knowledge that one's newspaper is vetted by an organisation endowed with such powers 
might lead to a declining trust on the part of readers in newspaper content and independence, 114 
and would certainly necessitate a larger PCC with greater resources to administer them. 
The Future of Self-Regulation and the Data Protection Act 1998 
So how are the PCC to ensure the co-operation of editors and continued effectiveness of the self- 
regulatory system as the threat of impending `privacy' legislation diminishes and recedes? After 
all, the predecessor of this organisation was also criticised on similar grounds for its lack of 
sanctions and reliance upon `moral pressure' within the industry. ' 15 The answer to that question is 
to be found in the Data Protection Act 1998. The law of data protection is a comparatively recent 
invention devised amid a growing realisation that we can now store records more effectively to 
build a composite picture of an individual's lifestyle through the accumulation of small and 
seemingly unobtrusive facts16. Data protection laws are pertinent to the current discussion of the 
future of self-regulation in that they purport to regulate the use of equipment utilised to process 
image data by reference to those industry codes of practice already in existence. Indeed, 
newspapers habitually store large volumes of pictures on computer including those obtained by 
freelance photojournalists or newspaper employees ready for digital processing at a later data 
prior to publication. 
s. 10(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998 enables an individual to require a data controller by 
notice in writing "at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not 
to begin, processing... any personal data in respect of which he is the data subject, on the ground 
that ... the processing... 
is likely to cause substantial damage or distress to him or to another, 
and.. . would 
be unwarranted". This right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress 
cannot be used to restrain intrusively obtained photographic material at the pre-publication 
stage. "' s. 13(2) of the Act does 
however, entitle an individual to compensation should he or she 
suffer distress by virtue of such a publication. 
The wide ambit afforded to `personal data' under 
s. l(1) of the Act encompasses 
data from which a living individual might be identified, and 
http ý/ww<v nrivacy orQ/pi/issues! ress/howarth 
letterhtml 
114 Compare the lessons from the regulation of the press in France as discussed by Raymond 
Kuhn, p2S, Ch. l, The Media 
in France (1995, Routledge) 
115 See paragraph 14.33, p64, "Report on 
Privacy and Related Matters" Cm.! 102. 
116 See p136, Ch. 2, Pierre 
Juvigny, Privacy and Human Rights edited by A-Robertson. (1973, 
Manchester University Press) 
117 See s. 32(4) of the Act which 
is shortly discussed in more detail. The protection for the media 
covers "all processing up 
to 24 hours after the first publication" and the courts will stay 
proceedings for this purpose. 
See Column 463, Lord Hansard text for 2 Feb, 1998 (98020-07) per 
Lord Wakeham. 
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conceivably includes photographic material therefore. Clause 14 of Directive 95/46/EC"8 upon 
which the Act is based and was designed to implement, 119 expressly applies to "the techniques 
used to capture, transmit, manipulate, record, store of communicate image data relating to natural 
persons"'2° 
Arguably a newspaper editor represents a `data controller' for the purposes of this Act and is 
responsible for the `processing' or acquisition, retention and disclosure of such photographic 
data. 121 s. 32(1) of the Act states that personal data which are processed only for the special 
purposes of journalism., literature, and art are exempt from these provisions solely where three 
conditions are satisfied. The processing must be undertaken with a view to publication which the 
data controller reasonably believes to be in the public interest so that compliance with the 
provisions of the Act would be incompatible. The media do not enjoy a blanket exemption 
therefore, and remain susceptible an action after publication under s. 13(2))22 s. 32(3)(a) states that 
in considering "whether the belief of a data controller or newspaper editor that publication would 
be in the public interest was or is a reasonable one, regard may be had to his compliance with any 
code of practice which.. . is relevant to the publication in question". The PCC code of practice is 
just such a code which becomes relevant when an editor of a newspaper chooses to publish 
intrusively obtained photographic material that might reasonably give rise to distress on the part 
of the data subject contrary to s. 10(l). 
The provisions of s. 32(3) should continue to ensure the adherence of newspaper editors to the 
PCC code of practice who will not wish to leave themselves susceptible to a claim for 
compensation under s. 13(2) which is supported by a breach of their obligations under the code. 
Newspaper editors will be aware that a breach of the code of practice clause on privacy will assist 
the subject of published newspaper photographs acquired through disproportionate and intrusive 
means to make use of this section. l" This chapter has focused upon the PCC code of practice 
although there is also a less publicised further code of practice devised by the National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ). Clauses I and 5 of which, provide that a "journalist has a duty to maintain the 
highest professional and ethical standards" and that photographic material should only be 
1 'a The purpose of this directive was primarily to co-ordinate the "laws of member states to ensure 
that the cross-border flow of personal data are regulated" as per Clause 11, Directive 95/46/EC, 
O. J. L281/32 (23/11/95) 
1" The origins of this directive may be traced back or at least linked to the Information Society 
Forum which has been particularly active in promoting change and accelerating attempts to 
protect both intellectual property and privacy throughout Europe. See Santha Rasaiah and David 
Newell, "The Information Society, Deregulation or Control in Europe" (1996) YMEL 75,82; See 
also p16-17, Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society COM(96) 
568 final. 
120 Op. cit, Clause 14. 
121 See Santha Rasaiah, "Current legislation, privacy and the media in the UK" (1998) 3(5) 
Comms. L. 183,184 
122 Ibid. 
123 See Brian McConnell, "Nightmare and minefield in data protection" (1997) 147(6809) N. L. J. 
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obtained through "straightforward means" unless justified by some over-riding considerations of 
public interest 124 These clauses, are obviously coached in much vaguer and nebulous terms 
intended solely for the guidance of union members rather than the press industry as a whole, and 
are consequently less likely to be referred to by the judiciary in relation to this Act. The deterrent 
provided by the existing self-regulatory system, which tends to be indirect at best, is thus 
supplemented by the potential for newspapers to prove liable for the publication of intrusively 
obtained photographic material under sections 10(1) and 13(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
s. 32(3) of which provides scope for legal recognition of the importance of adherence to the PCC 
code of practice. 
For this reason, enhancing and improving the existing self-regulatory system would seem 
preferable to the creation of any additional tort of publicly disclosing personal information, 
whether in photographic form or otherwise. Specific recommendations would include tightening 
the public interest defence of exposing hypocrisy and encouraging editors to incorporate the code 
of practice within contracts of employment and the purchase of photographic material. By 
reflecting the UK's commitment to the European Convention right to respect for private life in its 
code of practice, the PCC has taken its first steps towards recognising a `growing process of 
internationalisation'. `Tbe domestic media have become increasingly integrated within, first a 
European media system and second, a global one". 125 The newspaper industry, like many other 
parts of the private sector has increasingly seen media groups form larger conglomerates, 
sometimes with multi-national dimensions over the past decades and there appears to be a trend 
towards horizontal and vertical integration within Europe. 126 With increased size, an organisation 
may enjoy more power together with the ability to disseminate intrusively obtained photographic 
information through many outlets in different countries where codes of practice relating to privacy 
may vary. 127 Perhaps greater liaison between European self-regulatory bodies may provide the 
answer. At present, other European regulatory bodies tend to have less well defined general 
principles. Article 8 of the `publistic principles' of German equivalent, Deutcher Presserat for 
example, require that "the press shall respect the private life and personal sphere of the individual. 
If a person's private behaviour touches on public interests, however, it may be discussed in the 
press. In such cases, care must be taken to ensure that the publication does not violate the 
personal rights of the individuals involved", 128 but offers no further guidance on the nature of the 
1378 
124 See NUJ Code of Conduct, http: //www. mn. apc. or media/nujcode html 
125 See Kuhn, p237-238, Ch. 8, n. 99, supra. 
126 See Mike Feintuck, "Regulating the Media Revolution: In Search of the Public Interest" 
(1997) 3 JILT 1; See also Green Paper on "Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal 
Market - an assessment of the need for community action" COM (92) 480 final, 23 Dec 1992 127 See Privacy International Media Release entitled "World-wide privacy body calls for United 
National Global Convention on privacy and press intrusion" 31/9/97 
httn //www privacy org/pi/issues/press/ni statement 897 html 
128 See Article 8 of Deutcher Presserat's Publistic Principles, 
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public interest unlike the PCC code of practice. The public interest is merely said not to justify 
sensationalism. 129 The expression of French equivalent, the SNJ's130 code of practice is couched 
in even more vague terms and imposes generalised duties not to use "disloyal means to get 
information or take advantage of anybody". "' An increased level of liaison between these bodies 
may lead to greater harmonisation of such standards across Europe. As yet, however, we have yet 
to see this development, although the non-profit making charitable trust, the Thompson 
Foundation has sought to educate foreign photojournalists through units on ethics, privacy and 
intrusion within the syllabus of their International print Journalism and Advanced Reporting 
Courses. 132 Both the Newspaper Society and the PCC's privacy commissioner, Robert Pinker 
have also sought to educate a small proportion of budding photojournalists in ethical 
considerations such as unnecessary and disproportionate intrusion, 133 but this too is not 
widespread given the inherent costs of training large numbers of joumalists. 134 
Conclusions 
To summarise, the PCC's mechanisms for the resolution and adjudication of complaints only 
come into play as the result of publication. Intrusion, however, is an entirely separate wrong from 
the unauthorised public disclosure of personal information and as such, one does not necessary 
follow the other. Consequently, the PCC code of practice alleviates the need for a new tort of 
intrusion only to the extent that it reduces domestic editorial demand for pictures obtained in this 
manner. The victim of singular or transient photojournalist intrusion that does not result in 
publication remains uncompensated and unrecognised by the PCC code of practice. One must 
conclude therefore, that despite the presence of the PCC, there are circumstances where such a 
tort of intrusion is still needed. In the words of one professional photojournalist, 
"Unfortunately.. . paparazzo 
don't adhere to the PCC. In preparation for [Prince] William's 
schooling we had already established at least sixty hidden positions from which we could 
photograph him". This was despite Palace Officials timely reminder of PCC guidelines. 135 It may 
be that only a specific few are the target of such attention. Nevertheless they like any other 
member of our community, should be free to periodically enjoy the seclusion of the private 
property they occupy free from the prying eyes or lenses of the press. 
129 See Guideline 13.2, ibid. 
130 See Francois Boissarie, "L'Histoire du SNJ" for more information on this organisation. 
http: //www. mygale. orzil 1 /snj/ 
13' See Paragraph 2.5, "Declarations of Duties and Rights of Journalists" (1971) ibid. 
132 See "The Thompson Foundation - Making the World of Difference" booklet. 
13 See p 14, PCC Annual Review 1997 
134 The 'Press Commission' envisaged by the National Heritage Committee was more actively 
involved in setting standards of ethical training as well as researching public attitudes towards the 
press. See Paragraphs 70-71, pXVII, National Heritage Committee's Fourth report on "Privacy 
and Media intrusion" HC(1992/3) 294-I 
135 See Saunders and Harvey, n. 93, pp202 & 205 
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The system of press self-regulation operated by the PCC does, however, significantly reduce the 
necessity of enacting a new tort of public disclosure of intimate or personal information. Until 
recently, the deterrent value of an adverse PCC adjudication has been almost entirely indirect 
through negative publicity or opportunity cost. The Data Protection Act [19981 should serve, 
however, to underline the importance of continued adherence by newspapers to the privacy clause 
of the code of practice so that the enactment of such a tort should prove unnecessary. If the views 
expressed above do prove through the passage of time to be unduly optimistic, the solution most 
readily acceptable to the press lobby would be to enact the relevant portions of the code of 
practice privacy clause as suggested by Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol. 136 This proposal 
would seem less controversial given that the press have already agreed to abide by these rules. 
Having said that, the code of practice would first need to underline the distinction between 
intrusion by newspaper employees gathering photographic information and the publication of 
intimate information for these wrongs may arise independently. Accordingly, the second part of 
Clause 3(1) should be amended to read: "A newspaper will be expected to justify intrusion 
through the publication of intimate information relating to any identifiable individual without 
consent". 








The opening chapter examined each of the rival claims in turn of philosophers, sociologists, and 
lawyers who claim to have isolated a core element core to all privacy-based claims. The 
significance of which might be to facilitate delineation of the boundaries of a discrete legal 
principle capable of protecting individuals from press intrusion. However, after due 
consideration, we determined that while a loss of dignity, autonomy, intimacy or seclusion may 
prove indicative of press infringement of privacy, they are by no means conclusive. These factors 
are unable to resolve where the boundary lies between privacy and other torts. Accordingly, it 
was felt that were a generalised right or tort of privacy enforceable against the press, there would 
be considerable risk of eventual illegitimate `colonisation' of other torts. If the law is to protect 
our privacy from incursion by press photojournalists, a more viable alternative is to address the 
problem by means of more specific forms of behavioural tort. Specifically, wrongs of 
unreasonable intrusion and unauthorised public disclosure of personal information were 
identified which this thesis argues deserve legal protection. The boundaries of these wrongs are 
less likely to face accusations of being either non-existent or arbitrary and can peacefully co-exist 
alongside other existing wrongs, in a culture that has traditionally preferred to subject the press 
and private sector to narrow obligations rather than nebulous rights. 
The first of these dubbed the intrusion tort, prohibits an individual from observing, monitoring or 
recording the activities of another without consent where he knows or ought to know that the 
other has a justifiable expectation of seclusion. For liability to arise, a two-part test would need to 
be satisfied. The initial question would consider whether a claimant's expectation of seclusion is 
reasonable and consistent with that of a hypothetical average member of our community, and 
would not seem an intractable problem for a court to resolve. Relevant factors would include the 
ease with which he or she was accessible to the unaided senses of others, the time of day the 
incident occurred, and the character of the neighbourhood. Often, that legitimate expectation of 
seclusion is inversely proportional to the number of others who share access to finite resources. 
The second part of this test would then consider whether the defendant's behaviour was 
proportional relative to its purpose and the availability of alternative and less intrusive means of 
accessing that individual. 
The second wrong identified in this chapter which is often committed by the press arises where 
newspapers publicly disclose personal or intimate information. This would include photographs, 
communications, or information that relates to the individual and which is of such a nature that it 
would be reasonable to expect him to regard as intimate or sensitive, and therefore want to 
withhold or at least to restrict its collection, use or circulation. It is argued that on this basis, 
through the use of such an objective test, the courts might recognise a principle that would not 
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clash unduly with freedom of speech. If the existing laws are to be satisfactory, it is argued that 
they must provide indirect protection against the commission of these wrongs by the press. 
The final argument made in this chapter is that the state ought to intervene to ensure the press do 
not commit these wrongs and to ensure those who do compensate their victims adequately. 
Firstly, because an increasingly expensive array of anti-surveillance devices would otherwise 
become needed simply to maintain the level of seclusion enjoyed by individuals today. A purely 
economic and utilitarian argument may be made therefore, for the use of the law in this context 
which surely represents a more efficient means of ensuring seclusion relative to the costs of 
erecting physical or technological barriers against the intrusive use of long-lens and other 
surveillance technologies. The state itself also benefits by protecting individuals from these 
wrongs for they are then better able to function efficiently and contribute creatively to the wider 
society it exists to serve. Society as a whole reaps the benefits of this arrangement and ought to 
ensure this arrangement continues to persist. Another argument that the law should intervene 
because the private sphere itself is constituted by the State in the sense that it is dependent on the 
state for the provision and enforcement of the norms which regulate relations within that sphere. 
The individual himself is powerless to compel other organisations or groups larger than himself 
such as newspapers forming part of multi-national empires to respect it. 
Chapter Two 
The second chapter concludes that existing laws are able only to afford partial protection against 
the wrong of photojournalist intrusion, in so far as a parasitic claim can be made under a pre- 
existing tort. Damages are calculated accordingly, primarily on the basis of temporary loss of 
amenity or enjoyment of property, 
' anxiety caused through repeated harassment or psychiatric 
harm intentionally inflicted. A discretionary award of exemplary damages to mitigate any 
shortcomings is available only in respect of the older torts given that A-B & Others v South West 
Water Services Ltd (1993) 2 confines such awards to those causes of action in which a precedent 
exists prior to 1964. Consequently, newer torts enacted after 1964 such as the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 cannot satisfy the cause of action test so as to permit a photojournalist to 
profit in committing a newer form of tort. More importantly perhaps, individuals cannot obtain 
any compensation when they fall victim to irregular, transient or isolated forms of intrusion. This 
deficiency is open to exploitation by opportunistic photojournalists who attempt to use long lens 
cameras for the purpose of photographing or merely observing an individual on private property. 
The suggestion by influential American theorists, Warren and Brandeis that existing common- 
law remedies could nevertheless be made to evolve in their `eternal youth' to recognise this 
1 Both the torts of trespass and nuisance are also severely constrained by the requirement of 
possession, and the notion of trespass by proxy would seem an unrealistic one, particularly when 
one considers the further problem of privity of loss. 
2 A-B & Others v South West Water Services Ltd [1993] Q. B. 507 (C. A) 
162 
wrong seems to be erroneous. Subjecting the Wilkinson v Downton tort to further development is 
perhaps the most feasible alternative to legislation but even this wrong is far from an ideal basis 
for compensating individuals for isolated forms of press intrusion. In order for the judiciary to 
develop this doctrine even further, both the requirement of intent and psychiatric harm will 
necessitate considerable distortion so that the tort is a pale shadow of its former self. The modem 
civil law, as it exists today therefore, fails to overtly recognise the value of ensuring an individual 
has a place of refuge from the continuous scrutiny of others. Current remedies provide an 
imperfect degree of protection against singular or transient forms of intrusion and at best, tacit 
recognition that a photojournalist has unjustifiably transgressed the claim of an individual to 
seclusion. A new tort of intrusion as recommended in the earlier chapter is long overdue. 
Chapter Three 
Similarly, the law does not recognise a tort of publicly disclosing personal or intimate 
information, whether in photographic form or otherwise. Copyright ensures that the proprietary 
rights of a photographer over the use and publication of a photograph that he or she has taken are 
protected regardless of the means by which he or she obtains it. The torts of libel, malicious 
falsehood, and passing off merely protect one against the publication of false or misleading 
information that injures either an individual's reputation or causes him economic loss. 
Accordingly, these torts can be of little assistance in restraining the publication of true personal 
information, particularly as they focus on protecting one's reputation, profession, or trade 
goodwill from injury. 
Chapter Four 
It is fortunate therefore that the absence of a prior interpersonal relationship of trust between a 
photojournalist and his subject would not, however, seem to preclude an obligation of confidence 
from arising between the two. Breach of confidence does not seek to challenge a photographer's 
absolute property in the photographs he takes but seeks instead to restrict the use and publication 
of pictures which he or a subsequent newspaper ought reasonably to know are confidential. This 
thesis takes a contrary view to those who argue that the origins of the doctrine are entirely 'in 
rem' given the frequent references in early cases to 'property' in letters, information and the like. 
A more plausible explanation exists, for these early judicial references to property in information 
are more likely to constitute attempts to remedy the deficiencies of the Copyright Acts of the 
period. Indeed, closer examination of these cases reveals that the majority of these cases would 
today lend themselves to copyright actions. Breach of confidence instead, therefore, provides 
what is perhaps an imperfect solution by imposing a rather artificial obligation of confidence 
upon newspaper editors to be of good faith. It is upon this basis that the doctrine has been able to 
3 See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harvard law Review 
193 A view more recently echoed by David Seipp, "English Judicial Recognition of A Right to 
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readily attain a position from which it can compensate those who are the subject of photographs 
taken through surveillance whose publication threatens to reveal personal information about us. 
However, like much of the law capable of compensating individuals for the public disclosure of 
such information, the potential use of this doctrine in this context is theoretical, rather than 
proven at this stage. Members of the judiciary such as Laws J. in Hellewell v Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire (1995) have already begun to challenge the traditional boundaries of breach of 
confidence therefore, expressing support for the potential application of the doctrine to 
photographic information of sufficient intimacy or confidentiality obtained through surveillance. 
However, this obiter dictum remains something of an anomaly for as yet, in all actionable 
instances of breach of confidence, there has been an intention on the part of the claimant either to 
communicate information to another or to record that information for his own use. Breach of 
confidence has proved applicable to personal information obtained through surveillance thus far 
only in cases of an interlocutory nature to which Creation Records proves no exception. 
Equitable redress is an option only for those who have not invited the justifiable interest of the 
press by speaking openly of their private life in the same area as the photograph they seek to 
restrain. Providing the photograph itself has the necessary quality of confidence about it with no 
other contemporary photographs of a similar content circulating in the public domain, damages 
should prove available albeit in a reduced form where the individual pictured suffers no 
pecuniary detriment. It is possible, of course, for this doctrine to grow in order to facilitate greater 
protection against the public disclosure of personal and intimate information obtained through 
photojournalist surveillance. Admittedly, imposing an obligation of confidence where there is no 
pecuniary detriment, prior interpersonal relationship of trust or reliance or even a deliberate 
attempt to record or communicate information does tend to push breach of confidence to its 
limits. As such, breach of confidence provides a workable, if imperfect solution to this problem 
given that its purpose lies primarily in the preservation of relationships of trust and reliance, 
ensuring good faith, and precluding the exploitation of trade secrets. Unlike the policy 
considerations underlying the public disclosure of personal information obtained by a 
photojournalist, "there is no single purpose, which the law on breach of confidence seeks to 
realise". Judicial development of one area of confidentiality to prohibit the publication of 
information acquired from covert private sector surveillance may, of course, have ramifications 
for the doctrine as a whole. There is always a risk that adopting breach of confidence to combat 
the publication of photographs surreptitiously obtained in this manner may also unwittingly alter 
the boundaries of commercial or industrial confidentiality unconnected with the disclosure of 
such information. These are the risks involved in developing a doctrine whose parameters extend 
well beyond those of the public disclosure of personal information to the protection of trade 
secrets and intellectual property. 
Privacy" (1983) O. J. L. S. 325,370 
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Chapter Five 
In this chapter, the limited impact of the European Convention right to respect for private life is 
ascribed primarily to the costs involved in pursuing a claim against the UK all the way to the 
European Court of Human Rights and satisfying the requirement that all potentially applicable 
domestic remedies have been exhausted. Further, in those instances where such a claim has 
indeed been brought, the UK has been afforded a generous margin of appreciation by the EctHR, 
which is reluctant to examine a domestic state's decisions as to how they chose to protect privacy 
in any detail. These difficulties, together with the emphasis placed upon freedom of expression in 
European Convention jurisprudence provide an explanation for the limited impact of Article 8 
upon domestic laws relating to press intrusion. 
It is possible that s. 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 may have a `horizontal effect' by 
encouraging courts to consider the right to respect for private life whenever relevant to the case at 
hand or face liability under s. 6(l) for omitting to do so. The Courts are unlikely to create any new 
remedies, but they may be required to develop common law remedies where they are uncertain, 
unclear or incomplete. The extent to which the judiciary are duty bound to undertake the 
proactive role envisaged in developing common law remedies in line with Article 8 remains 
unclear. It would certainly appear, however, that an inventive and enthusiastic judiciary is 
nevertheless constrained by the limited range of domestic torts at their disposal, and is able to 
recognise the importance of protecting individuals against these wrongs only on a tacit rather 
than overt basis. There remains, therefore, a strong case for the enactment of a new tort of 
unreasonable intrusion. 
The judiciary are likely to continue fitting the circular peg of public disclosure of intimate 
personal information by the press into the square hole of a broader more loosely defined principle 
such as confidentiality, or data protection. Arguably the most important objective is that one is 
protected against this wrong regardless of the name attached to that protection, but 
understandably, purists shudder at what they perceive as a relegation of these torts to a second 
division unworthy of specifically directed legal protection. What we can expect in the wake of 
the HRA is a much greater propensity on the part of the courts to employ existing laws, which are 
already capable of theoretical protection to be utilised against this wrongs, so as to negate the 
need for legislation in this context. s. 3(l) of the HRA which requires a court, in so far as it is 
possible to do so, to interpret primary and subordinate legislation to be ready and given effect in a 
way which is compatible with Convention rights. Examples of which could include both the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The effects of the HRA are also 
unlikely to be felt immediately, but rather gradually particularly as the Act will not be brought 
into force until the millennium. Ultimately, one may only speculate until such time as some 
intrepid individual brings a test case in relation to either photojournalist intrusion or a newspaper 
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publication of surreptitiously obtained photograph depicting intimate aspects of an individual's 
lifestyle with a reasonable expectation of seclusion. 
Chapter Six 
One of the principal reasons for the absence of either a tort of intrusion into seclusion or the 
publication of intrusively obtained photographs that disclose intimate information about one lies 
in the Government's continued faith in periodic refinements to the current system of press self- 
regulation. The PCC is, however, rarely able to uphold a complaint of unwarranted intrusion into 
an individual's seclusion unless this leads to a subsequent publication for which a newspaper 
editor may be held responsible. In this sense, the current system of press self-regulation fails to 
adequately distinguish between the wrongs of intrusion and the public disclosure of intimate 
information obtained in this way. Consequently, one must conclude that press self-regulation 
does little to assuage demands for a new tort of intrusion into seclusion except perhaps, by 
reducing domestic editorial demand for such pictures. The absence of investigatory powers on the 
part of the PCC compounds this problem, as photojournalists who employ intrusive techniques to 
acquire photographs are left unpunished and unaccountable, so as, once again, to warrant 
legislation. The absence of empirical evidence to suggest that press intrusion is either a growing 
or significant problem as yet, is a poor excuse for legislative inactivity in the past, it is argued, for 
such incontrovertible proof is unlikely ever to be found. Social science being an inexact science 
that is open to different interpretations. It seems somewhat inefficient that one should delay until 
private sector organisations such as the press show signs of actively beginning to exploit this 
lacuna before intervening to improve our laws. Even if the lacunae identified by this thesis have 
yet to be actively exploited by photojournalists or others in the private sector in any great 
numbers, this alone would be an insufficient justification for abstaining from law reform. If, for 
example, few individuals are discriminated against on the grounds of race or gender in an 
enlightened society, this does not mean that discrimination should be permitted merely because 
few individuals are subjected to it. Such a tort of unreasonable intrusion would serve to set a 
common standard, and avoid the uncertainty of litigation up to the House of Lords in the hope of 
favourable law reform. 
The system of press self-regulation operated by the PCC does, however, significantly reduce the 
necessity of enacting a new tort of public disclosure of intimate or personal information. Until 
recently, the deterrent value of an adverse PCC adjudication has been almost entirely indirect 
through negative publicity or opportunity cost. The Data Protection Act 1998 should serve, 
however, to underline the importance of continued adherence by newspapers to the privacy 
clause of the code of practice. If the prophesised horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act upon 
breach of confidence and the Data Protection Act fails to materialise and enthusiasm for the code 
of practice wanes, only then should such a tort be considered. Should this measure indeed prove 
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necessary, the best approach would consist of enacting the relevant portions of the code of 
practice outlined in this chapter to which the press already voluntarily subscribe. 
Conclusions 
This thesis has argued throughout that a new statutory tort of unreasonable intrusion into 
seclusion is still needed to protect individuals from the incursion of the press into an individual's 
private life. Such protection as we enjoy from press intrusion `nder our law is the fortuitous by- 
product of laws designed or evolved for other purposes. Nor would it be surprising if it showed 
itself inadequate to meet the increasing pressures created by developments in the technology of 
collecting and recording information". 4 This thesis has centred largely on the menace of the 
photojournalist's camera, a device well over a century old, that today still remains the most 
popular form of surveillance device. Tomorrow there will be another surveillance device perhaps 
more pervasive than ever to make the need for such a tort even more pressing. Already, there are 
other more sophisticated devices available that will one day replace the camera as the most 
inexpensive, accessible, and efficient means of penetrating another's environment. The tort 
proposed by this thesis, however, is flexible enough to grow alongside them, and to adapt to meet 
the challenge they pose. Admittedly, such a Bill is likely to face opposition from the growing 
industry of professional eavesdroppers, private investigators, and counter-espionage services who 
have profited from the absence of such a remedy. The reason being that the proposed tort would 
not be aimed solely at the press or media but rather the private sector as a whole, for it would be 
foolish to suggest that only the media and the state have the capacity to unreasonably intrude on 
our lives. Many other prospective torts and legislative efforts to correct this state of affairs have 
foundered on the rocks of parliamentary debate, when confronted by the storms of the press 
lobby, such as the Bill Mr Lyons sought to enact consisting of a right to be let alone, or seclusion 
of self, family and property! In each case, however, these torts have all, without exception, been 
too widely drawn and loosely worded. Had Mr Lyon's Bill for example, been confined to the 
protection of a person from "any unreasonable and serious interference with his seclusion of 
himself, his family or his property from the publics6 it might have been likely to meet with 
parliamentary approval. The Bill that most closely resembles the tort advocated by this thesis is 
Mr William Cash, MP's Right to Privacy Bill of 1988. The first clause of which proposed that 
"Any substantial and unreasonable infringement of privacy taking place after the coming into 
force of this Act shall be actionable at the suit of any person whose right of privacy has been so 
infringed or, with the authority of that person, by another on his behalf'.? Here too, the all- 
4 See Paragraph 5, p2, JUSTICE Report entitled Privacy and the Law (1970) 
s Lyon Bill 1967. See Paragraph 645, p199-200, Ch. 22, Younger Committee, (1972) Cmnd. 5012. 
6 See Paragraph 7, p77-78, Annex D, Lord Chancellor's consultation paper entitled "Infringement 
of privacy" July, 1993. 
7 Defences to which would include reasonable belief of public interest or benefit, absolute or 
qualified privilege, necessity to protect person, property, or lawful business. A limitation period 
of six years would be enforced. 
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embracing term of privacy to which this thesis so vehemently objected has been used as a legal 
term of art. Clause 9(1) defines a "right of privacy" as: 
"The right of any person to be protected from intrusion upon himself, his family, his relationships and 
communications with others, his property and his business affairs, including by: 
a) Spying, prying, watching or besetting; 
b) The unauthorised overhearing or recording of spoken words 
c) The unauthorised making of visual images 
d) The unauthorised reading or copying of documents 
e) The unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information, or of facts (including his name, 
identity or likeness) calculated to cause him distress, annoyance or embarrassment, or to place 
him in a false light 
f) The unauthorised appropriation of his name, identity or likeness for another's gain 
Parts b, d, and e of the definition do much of the work already done by confidentiality, while c is 
surely so wide as to be of little use as a definition of a wrong protected us from intrusive 
photojournalism. Parts e and f arguably have no place in a privacy Bill at all, as the wrongs 
described as more akin to libel and the restitution of benefits obtained through the exploitation of 
reputation, image and goodwill. It is easy to see, therefore, while these Bills were unlikely to be 
pass successfully through Parliament to become law, and on that basis, the tort proposed by this 
thesis, at least would seem to have a greater probability of success in this regard. 
Why a tort of publicly disclosing intimate information should not presently be introduced 
It is the recommendation of this thesis that a new tort of publicly disclosing intimate information 
without consent should not be introduced at the present time. Admittedly, breach of confidence is 
not perhaps best suited to this task of protecting individuals from the unauthorised public 
disclosure of intimate information obtained through surveillance. It copes with the problem by 
subjecting strangers, eavesdroppers and photojournalists to be of good faith, focusing on the 
maintenance and preservation of confidentiality as opposed to mitigating the after-effects of its 
breach. This requires the courts to impose obligations of confidence where no prior relationships 
of trust and reliance exist, and where no attempt to communicate information or even to record it 
for one's own use is made. Data protection laws, in contrast, are perhaps more suited to this task 
for although they are intended for a much wider purpose ranging from protecting details of 
income and banking details to one's private address. Self-regulation would appear strongly 
endorsed by the industry, and adherence to its principles is likely to perpetuate given newspaper 
editors wary of the revised Data Protection Act 1998 that might be invoked by dissatisfied 
complainants. The decision not to introduce an additional tort of publicly disclosing intimate 
information at this time would exhibit prudence rather than procrastination therefore. If the 
168 
legislature is to act, they must be careful not to replace the slightly imperfect protection afforded 
by today's laws with yet another imperfect solution. 
In the unlikely event a public disclosure tort does prove necessary, what form should it 
take? 
The past is strewn with legislative attempts that foundered on the rocks of parliamentary debate. 
Take for instance the Mancroft Bill of 1961 which gave a right of action against "any person who 
without his consent publishes of or concerning him [the individual] in any newspaper or by 
means of any cinematograph exhibition or any television or sound broadcast any words relating 
to his personal affairs or conduct if such publication is calculated to cause him distress or 
embarrassment". Specifying the particular technologies used to publish the personal information 
gives a Bill such as this a limited lifespan before it needs to be amended as new technologies 
replace old. Liability is also dependent on intent rather than recklessness as is often the case. 
For this reason, Mr John Browne's Protection of Privacy Bill 1989 represents a better approach. 
He proposed to "establish a right of privacy against the unauthorised use or disclosures of private 
information; and for connected purposes". 9 Clause 7 of which provides that "private information" 
consists of any matter that concerns an individual in respect of his: 
a) personal communications 
b) home 
c) personal relationships 
d) personal behaviour 
e) health 
f) personal financial affairs 
The overlap, however, with the existing parameters of confidentiality is obvious. Furthermore, 
Mr Browne's Bill can hardly have proved attractive to the press lobby in so far as it purports to 
give individuals a `right' enforceable against the press, with no corresponding right given to the 
press of freedom of expression. 1° Inevitably, such a Bill as these is likely to face even more 
opposition than one hoping to enact a tort of unwarranted intrusion, given that a public disclosure 
tort restricts not merely the more intrusive methods of gathering information but the very 
8 Disclosure involved making the information known to others in the form of printed matter, 
broadcast material or matter reproduced through telecommunications and devices for automated 
data processing or by electronic means. 
9 See Clause 6(1) of this Bill. A public interest defence arises if "the defendant satisfies the court 
that there was or is a public interest or public benefit in the information being so used or 
disclosed and the p0laintiff is unable to satisfy the court that the public interest or public benefit 
in use or disclosure us outweighed by the public interest or public benefit involved in upholding 
the privacy of the information". 
10 The Walden Bill of 1969 was similarly defined, as the "right of any person to be protected 
from intrusion upon himself, his home, his family, his relationships and communications with 
others, his property and his business affairs". 
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information newspapers print. The capacity for censorship or the manipulation of such laws to 
hide wrongdoing is obvious amid an atmosphere of mistrust among the press. If such a Bill 
containing a public disclosure tort is to move successfully through parliament, realistically the 
most feasible option will be to offer the press lobby an acceptable compromise. One must talk of 
narrow duties rather than broad rights. This might be achieved by giving statutory weight to 
Clause 3(1) of the PCC code of practice to which the press have already agreed to adhere. If the 
press are following the rules laid down by the PCC, what have they to fear from such a statute? 
Originality and contribution to academic debate 
It is of course, important to assess the nature of the original contribution made by this thesis to 
the sphere of photojournalism, privacy and the law. This thesis contributes to that debate and 
extends it in a number of ways. Firstly, it does so by challenging those who claim to have 
identified a unifying factor common to all privacy claims through which a discrete legal principle 
enforceable against the press might be delineated. At the same time, this chapter also shows that 
workable legislation to prohibit intrusion or public disclosure of intimate information by the press 
and other members of the private sector can be constructed. Secondly, in the decade since the 
disconsolate cry for help by the judges in Kaye v Robertson (1991) and the Calcutt committees 
convened to examine the issue of press intrusion further, neither the legislature nor the judiciary 
have stood idle. The pace of change has been dramatic, both in terms of the enactment of new 
legislation and judicial development of existing remedies. No less than three new Acts have been 
added to the statute books and both the tort of intentionally inflicting emotional distress and 
breach of confidence have been developed to afford greater protection against press intrusion. 
This thesis is the first to evaluate the potential impact of this spate of recent legislation and the 
parallel developments taking place in the common law upon the photojournalist industry in 
detail. " Thirdly, the fourth chapter provides an innovative new explanation for the apparently `in 
rem' applications of breach of confidence and critical analysis of the promising obiter dicta of 
Laws J. in the case of Hellewell. Fourthly, the fifth chapter contributes to current academic 
debate by taking to a new and more pragmatic approach in examining the potential effect of the 
Human Rights Act upon legal protection for privacy against press incursion. The author does so, 
by not only asking the extent to which there is a duty upon the courts to develop existing laws, 
but also asks the extent to which they are able to. This analysis reveals the limitations of 
precedent within a pre-existing legal environment, which favours specific wrongs and as such, is 
only able to recognise any the UK's commitment to the right to respect for private life to a 
limited and finite extent. Finally, the penultimate chapter of the thesis carries out the first, albeit 
11 This research lead to a number of original published pieces by the author including "Stalking - 
the tortfeasor" (1997) 31(2) Law Teacher 252; "Privacy and the Human Rights Act 1998 - Damp Squib or Firecracker? " (1999) 18(6) Litigation 30; "Being Positive About Privacy" (1999) 32(2) 
Law Teacher 215; "Privacy and the private sector: law at the crossroads of evolution" (2000) 6(2) 
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limited empirical work to gauge practitioner's views as to the scale of the problem for almost two 
decades. '2 
Ongoing academic debate 
Academic debate on issues such as photojournalism and the law is, of course, ongoing. The 
process of research never stops. Successive researchers of this subject will need to take account 
of the work undertaken in this thesis by examining whether the predictions of the author as to the 
limited scope for the courts to develop a wrong of unreasonable intrusion by themselves has 
proven correct. If the development of a common law tort of intrusion into seclusion does indeed 
manifest forged from the embers of the most likely candidate of Wilkinson v Downton, their 
discussion is likely to focus upon whether the consequences of uncertainty or conceptual 
distortion have indeed materialised as this thesis foretold. As the early 21" century unfolds, 
subsequent researchers will need to critically examine whether the horizontal effect of the 
European Convention right for correspondence, together with private, home, and family life upon 
doctrines such as breach of confidence and data protection predicted by this thesis does indeed 
materialise. Only then can one reassess the necessity of also introducing a tort of public 
disclosure of intimate information. Issues such as whether a larger empirical survey than that of 
this thesis as to the views of practitioners give any indication there is a problem steadily growing 
in stature will occupy the next generation of researchers. These burning questions, which time 
will do much to answer, are the legacies of this thesis. 
12 See Peter Jones, "New light through old windows? The Practical realities of developing 
existing laws to ensure private sector respect for privacy" (2000) 34(1) Law Teacher 
(forthcoming) 
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